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INTRODUCTION
It is not a matter of surprise to us that we find scant treatment of the
body in the fragments left us by early Greek philosophers.

If the nobler

part of man, to wit, the human soul, was scarcely conceived to be more than
a quantitative or qualitative arrangement of water, air, fire, or the atoms,
we can hardly expect that any sketch of the place that the body occupies in
the life of the soul would have found space in the earliest systems of
philosophy.
Plato, indeed, did devote attention to the study of man, but his doctrine falls short of a satisfactory solution of the nature of man as that
nature is testified by our own experience.

In the Platonic system, the body

contributes nothing to the nature of man, nothing essential to the soul's
perfection in knowledge, and nothing to its happiness.

Rather, would Plato

have us look upon the body as a weight upon the soul, a hindrance and a burden to it.

Let us briefly consider each of these points.

First of all, the body apparently contributes nothing to the nature of
the soul.

This Plato would have to hold if he asserted, as, in fact, he did,

that the soul was created apart from the body for which it had no aptitude
nor inclination.
its nature.

It must then have been fashioned in the full perfection of

The Demiurge, Plato tells us, created souls, not in proportion

to the number of bodies to which they were to be united, but rather according to the number of stars, to which stars they were to return if they lived
i

11

well their time of probation.

Furthermore, there could have been nothing in

the nature of human souls which required human bodies, for the Platonic
creator placed some souls nin the earth, and some in the moon, and in the
other stars which are the vessels of time,"l

the choice, it would seem, de-

riving from no special distinction in the nature of the souls.
youn~er

To the

gods had been assigned the task of forming the human body and of

giving to the souls destined for these bodies something that was yet lacking
to them.
• • • and when he had sown them he committed to the younger
gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired
them to furnish what was still lacking to the human souls
and make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot
the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner Which they
could and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.2
This addition that the lesser gods made seems at first sight to contradiet the notion that souls were created in the full completion of their
natures.

If they were, then, why should the makers of the body be requested

to supply what souls lacked?

The explanation, if it is the correct one,

only strengthens the former assertion, for souls, as the Demiurge formed
them were perfect with no special powers which required human organs for
their exercise, but when they were obliged to go into human bodies they
needed something added to what they had already received to fit them for
their new office.

The following citation seems to warrant the interpreta-

tion just given.

1Plato, Timaeus, 42, (Translation by B. Jowett, Hearst's International
Library Company, New York, 1914).
2 Ibid.
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Now, as they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and
were always gaining or losing some part of their bodily
substance, in the first place there was a necessity that
they should have sensation and be affected all in the
same manner by external force; and in the second place,
they must have love which is a mixture of pleasure and
pain; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are
akin or opposite to them; • • • 3
What the souls seem to have lacked and what the lesser deities supplied
ware the passions, the sensitive powers of the human soul.

What is of in-

tarest here and to the point is that the body apparently contributed nothing
in the way of completing the nature of the soul.
Plato's thought is found in his

m~~hical

Although this portion of

account of creation which does not

admit of too serious an interpretation, still his teaching on pre-existence
and the burden of the body substantiate this position.
For Plato, the whole nature of man was soul, and only soul.

This he

does not explicitly state except in the doubtfully authentic dialogue, First
Alcibiades, and in one other text which seems clearly to express the underlying idea in Plato's whole exposition of the relation of soul and body.
Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that
the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and
that even in life what makes each one of us to be what
~~~only the soul; and that the" bodyfOliowsus
about in the likeness of each of us, end that, therefore,
when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said
to be our shades or images, for tr~t the true and immortal being of each of us which is called theiSoul goes on
her way toother gods-; • • 4 -- If man is entirely soul, he is not a unity, for he has a body attached
to him which must necessarily be a complete substance if the soul is, and
!Ibid.

~· XII, 959.

(Emphasis mine)
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of two complete substances united together there cannot result an essential
unity.

The unity of man is sacrificed, but the nobility of the rational

soul preserved.

But if the human soul were such a noble and self-sufficient

being, why, then, should it ever have been united to a body?

Is this sub-

jection to life in a human body a punishment inflicted on the soul for an
offense committed in some previous state?

That view-point Plato attributed

to the Orphic poets,S and although he did not explicitly endorse it, he certainly considered the body no blessing, since he could say:

"the connection

of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of tham, as I am ready
to maintain quite seriously." 6
Indeed, the body is a prison to which the soul has been confined.

We

are not, then, astounded at the definition by which Plato distinguishes it:
"the grave of the soul which may be thought to be buried in this present
life."7 Why buried?

Because the soul had lived before, delighting in that

vision of "beauty shining in brightness" which it had enjoyed in that other
existence in which the body had had no part.

In that blessed state souls

had lived an exquisite life, for then they were pure, and "not yet enshrined
in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the
body as in an oyster shell." 8

"Living tomb" and "oyster shell" are, to say

the least, not very flattering epithets by which to designate the human body,
but Plato was forced to view the mortal frame of man in this light since he
5cratylus, 400.
SLaws, VIII, 828.
'l'Cratylus, 400.
8Phaedrus, 250.
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expressly stated that souls had contemplated the absolute ideas and had been
nourished on the divine beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and only descended
from their exalted height to earthly shrines because of some weakness that
interfered with the soul's contemplation of the ideas.
that "• •• the soul

w~~ch

Thus he tells us

has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as

a philosopher, or artist, or musician, or lover; that which has seen truth
in the second degree shall be a righteous king or warrior or lord • • • "9 and
so on down to the ninth degree which determines the soul to birth in a
tyrant.
It is not difficult to see why the body in such a system will have no
share in the soul's growth in knowledge.

Rather than a source of under-

standing, it is a cause of the soul's forgetting those truths it had previously known.

The soul is deceived by the senses which are unreliable wit-

nesses since they do not report on the absolutes which alone are real.

The

soul can best find truth when she is wholly recollected in herself and has
the least possible intercourse with the body.
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? - is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry,
a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and
hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets
are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet if
even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be
said of the rest of the senses? • • • Then when does the
soul attain truth? for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived?
• • • Then must existence be revealed to her in thought,
if at all? Yes. And thought is best when the mind is
gathered into herself and none of these things trouble
9 Ibid., 246-249.

vi

her-- • • • And in this the philosopher dishonors the body;
his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone
and by herself.lO
The soul considers the body as hindering it in the contemplation of ideas in
their highest purity, for to this it attains in its perfection when the soul
goes to the true essences with the mind alone.
• • • he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone,
not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or
introduction of sight or any other sense in the company
of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her
clearness penetrates into the very light of truth in each;
he has got rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of
the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing
element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her--is not this the sort of
man who, if ever man didi is likely to attain to the
knowledge o£ existence?l
Not only is the body a check upon knowledge because she is a deceiver,
but also by reason of the care she demands and the turmoil of the passions
which prevent a man from giving his whole attention to contemplation.
And when they consider all this must not true philosophers
make a reflection of which they will speak to each other
in such words as these: We have found, they will say, a
path of speculation which will bring the argument to a conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul
is mingled with this mass of evil, our desires will not be
satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body
is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere
requirement of food.12
Plato then lists as other properties of a body which serve as a burden to the
soul, subjection to disease, its "loves, and lusts, and fears and fancies,"
1°Phaedo, 65.
llrbid., 66.
12rbid., 66.
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and every sort of evil and idol which prevent people from having "so much as
a thought."

He further remarks that all troubles such as wars, fighting,

dissens!ons, and the like are all to be traced back to the love of money and
the love of money to the service required by the body.

Then he concludes

that even if "there is time and inclination towards philosophy, yet the body
introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation,
and hinders us from seeing the truth."
thought in a short sentence:

Plato then crystallizes his whole

''and all experience shows us that if we would

have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in
herself must behold all things in themselves:"

That blessed state we must

not hope to attain while we live, but after death, for when the soul is
united to the body she cannot have pure knowledge.

She must then expect

true knowledge, if she is to have it at all, only after death, for then,
"and not till then the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. «13
Clearly, then, the body is considered by the Platonic soul to be a
veritable burden to it, and from the fact that it is an obstacle to knowledge, it follows that it is likewise an obstacle to happiness, for happiness is "the possession of the good,n14 and the highest good is wisdom, "the
one true coin for which all things ought to exchange.•rl5

Having considered

that all other desirable objects are goods, not in themselves, but in their
use, and that this use is given by the possession of wisdom, he concludes
13rbid.
14symposium, 204.
15Phaedo, 69.
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viii
that'wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil.ul6

To be happy,

therefore, every man must strive "to make himself as wise as he can.nl7
Now, to become wise is to become godlike, 18 and in this process of
divinization, the body is again more of a hindrance than a help.
must, consequently, flee from the body.

The soul

It must be purified to attain to

this true wisdom, and what, Plato asks, is Purification but the liberation
of the soul from the body?
And what is purification but the separation of the soul
from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the
soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out
of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own
place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as
far as she can--the release of the soul from the chains
of the body.l9
The soul is ever seeking release from the body, and, indeed, it is the
special study of philosophy to master the art of body-separation, for "the
true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to release the soul.
Is not the separation and release of the soul their special study?"20

The

wise man who seeks to possess wisdom, and, consequently, happiness, must
"disregard the things of the body," and "Instead of caring about them, despises anything more than nature needs."
soul and not with the body."

He is "entirely concerned with the

Indeed, he "would like as far as he can, to be

quit of the body and turn to the soul," and thus it is that "philosophers,
above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the
16Euthydamus, 281.
l'iibid., 2s2. ·
18fheaetetus, 176.
19phaedo, 67.
2orbid.
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soul from the body.n21

Philosophy is looked upon as a merciful ch~pion

coming to deliver this noble being of the human soul, imprisoned in a body,
~astened

and glued" to that which is no help but a burden to it, and philo-

sophy it is which gently leads the soul to the realm of truth from which she
is excluded by contact with a body.22
The body thus contributes nothing to the soul's happiness in this life
since it is regarded by the soul as "that heavy, weighty, earthly element of
sight" by which the soul is "depressed and dragged down again into the visible world,n23 and from the company of this, its enemy,24 it ever strives to
be liberated.

Neither has the body any part in the happiness of the soul

after death, for the Platonic soul, duly purified, will "live henceforth
altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these.n25
Thus has Plato conceived the place that the body occupies in the life o
the soul, and although we can readily sympathize with his zealous care to
escape mastery of the soul by the body, we cannot conclude that he has adequately accounted for human beings as they appear to us.

With his idea of a

soul as an immortal being whose very essence is "self-motion," and because
of this self-motion must have had no beginning since "the self-moving is the
beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten,n26 with
such a notion as this, if it be Plato's real thought rather than his mythical
21Phaedo, 64.
22rhid., 83.
23rbid., 81.
241"bTcf., 67-68.
2Srbid.
2 ~drus, 245.
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description of the soul's creation, then we can readily understand why the
body was violently united to the soul and why it constituted such a weight
upon the soul.

Indeed, we may be tempted to say that the soul is a god, and

during the time of its confinement it seeks to be true to its own divine self
and act in accordance with its divine nature.

This, M. Gilson, referring to

the Platonic doctrine, expresses very aptly in the following passage.
When a philosopher thus reaches the intelligible world,
he does not strictly speaking, divinize his soul: his
soul is a god in its own right. He does not even,
strictly speaking, immortalize his soul: his soul is
an indestructible life; it is immortal in its own right.
A philosopher is a human soul which remembers its own
divinity and behaves as becomes a god.27

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

But Plato was a pagan, and as such, his erring thought found no restrictions laid upon it by revelation.

Was it, then, a peculiarly pagan

attitude--this minimization of the body's place in the life of the soul, and
have all Christians, fortified by the doctrine of the satisfaction the Creator found in all his works, given to the less noble part of man its share in
his life? We all know that this has not been the case, and a brief sketch
of that pre-eminently saintly Christian and profound philosopher, st. Augustine, will make us appreciate all the more readily the task achieved by the
Angelic Doctor in his enlightened and thoroughly common-sense description of
human nature.
Plato had felt no need to safeguard the unity of man, for Plato did not
27Etienne Gilson, God~ Philosophy, (Yale University Press, New Haven,
1941)' 29.
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consider •man' as the work of the creator, and, therefore, not a part of a
harmonious whole, the elements of which were meaningful and wisely arranged.
st. Augustine found himself in somewhat of a different position.

A Christian

could not tolerate any theory of man which would make of him something unnatural, a composite whose two parts were united together, as it were, by
force, and, therefore, not originally intended the one for the other.

Will

the Christian Augustine, then, maintain the unity of man and sacrifice the
immortality of the individual soul, as was done, apparently, by Aristotle,28
or will he make man to be all soul or all body?
roots of the Augustinian solution.

It is not easy to get at the

Certainly we can say that he wanted to

preserve both the unity of the man and the immortality of his soul, but did
not justify his position and perhaps, we may add, acknowledged that he saw
no way in which to explain the mystery.
The question of whether man consisted of only the soul or only the body
was raised by St. Augustine when he sought the object that would make a man
happy.

Obviously, the beatitude of man would require to be something above

man's nature.
nature.

It was, therefore, necessary to determine, if possible, that

He thus presents the question:
Nee nunc definitionem hominis a me postulandum puto. Illud
est magis quod mihi hoc loco quaerendum videtur, cum inter
omnes pene constat, aut certe, id quod satis est, inter me
atque illos cum quibus nunc agitur hoc oonveniat, ex anima
et corpore non esse composites, quid est ipse homo, utrumque horum nominavi, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo
anima. Q.uanquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum
vocaretur homo, si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo

28Aristotle, ~Anima, III, 5, 430a20.

xii
esset, si anima non esset; nee rursus anima homo, si ea
corpus non animaretur;) fieri tamen potest ut unum horum
et habeatur homo et vooetur.29
He then asks whether we should consider the union of soul and body like
to that which exists between two objects harnessed to the same thing.

Or

should we think of the soul's relation to the body as the relation of the
light to the case in which it is contained?
soul is the horseman, and the body its horse?

Or again, may we say that the
These are just so many diffi-

culties which the Saint confesses are not easily solved, or if they are
readily solvable they require time and strength to probe them which he will
not devote to the task in this present instance.30

A little further on, he

seems to dismiss the subject vdth the reflection that whether soul and body
make the man, or soul only, or body only, is not the important question, but
rather this:
1~,

soul.

what is it that gives perfection to the soul?31

for the holy Bishop of Hippo, is,indeed, a composite of body and

"Sic, cum quaeritur ex quibus sit homo compositus, respondere possum:

ex anima et ex corpore;"32

However, the definition that he considers most

suited to man as viewed by men attributes the nature of man to the soul, and
not to the body as a necessary part of that nature.
interpret the well known definition:

How otherwise can we

"Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima

rationalis est mortali atque terrene utens corpore"?3 3

The same idea he

29st. Augustine, De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, IV, 6, (Opera Omnia, J. P. Migne,
Paris, 1861) XXXII.
30Ibid.
31~., I, V, 7.
32ne Quantitate Animae, I, 2 (:Migne, XXXII).
33]e Mar. Eccl., I, XXVII, n.52.

---

,
xiii
expresses elsewhere in a slightly different terminology:

"Quid est homo?

Anima rationalis habens corpus.n34
That is how st. Augustine defines man, but when we find that he has
designated the soul as "substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori acco:mmodata," 35 we may ask, with M. Gilson,3 6 how the man differs from
his soul if the definition of each is identical.

However, st. Augustine

still maintains that the union of body and soul must constitute a unity, and
an essential unity.

In speaking of the Incarnation, he states that the Word

united to the flesh made but one person, "Sicut anima habens corpus, non
facit duas personas, sed unum hominem.n37 And again when speaking of the
interior and exterior man referred to in the Scriptures to the effect that
man serves God's law with his mind, and the law of sin with his flesh, he
insists that both actions derive from one and the same principle, for man is
one, and it is the very same man who sins whether it be by his mind or by his
body.
Denique ita conclusit: 1 Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi
Dei, carne autem lege peccati 1 (Rom., VII, 19-25) 'Ipse
ego', inquit. Non enim duo sumus-Inter nos contrarii de
diversis principiis venientes; sed 'ego ipse' mente servio
legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati; quamdiu languor obluctatur saluti.38
There can be no doubt that St. Augustine is concerned to safeguard the
unity of man, but if man is a rational soul using a body, it seems fairly
34In Joannis Evangelium, Tract., XIX, v, 15 (Migne, XXXV).
35De Quant. Animae, XIII, 22.
36E; Gilson, The Spirit ~Medieval Philosophy, translated by A.R.C.Downes,
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930) 174.
3 7In Joan. Evan., Tract., XIX, v, 15.
38'fbid., Tre:ct7, XLI, viii, 11.

-
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obvious that he would make a one out of two substances which seem to be camplete wholes, an impossibility both mathematically and philosophically.

As

M. Gilson noted,39 with the principles that the Christian Plato has formulated, he can hardly justify his conclusion as to man's unity, though St •
.Augustine himself might be the first to object to such a criticism.
Now, in such a doctrine concerning the union of the soul with the body,
what place can be expected to be reserved for the body?

First of all, we

must observe that st. Augustine vehemently denies that the body is bad in
itself.

That had been the heresy of the

b~ichaeans,

and their saintly op-

ponent is at pains to refute them, and that in a very virile manner.40
The very conception that st. Augustine had as to this being a universe
wherein things could not better be, necessitates this optimism of the worth
of the human body in itself and the good of its union with the human soul.
In speaking of the justice of God which sustains and arranges and holds all
things in the best possible manner, he states:

"qua [justitia] etiam factum

est, ut non modo sint omnia, sed ita sint, ut omnino melius esse non possint.n4l

The human body, then, as part of this harmonious whole, is a de-

cided good, and anyone who denies that the human body and its members are
the work of God may be considered accursed.42
All that the body has it owes to the soul, life, integration, preservation, and all the rest.
39Gilson, The Sp. of Med. Phil., op. cit., 174.
40contra Faust\iiii Maii'i'CE:aeum, XXI,v, 9,(:Migne, XLII).
4lne Quant. Animae, XXXIII, 75.
42'COntra Faustum ~·· XXI, 9.

,.
• • • corpus hoc terrenum atque mortale praesentia sua [i.e.,
by the presence of the soul] vivifioat; colligit in unum,
atque in uno tenet, diffluere atque contabesoere non sinit;
alimenta per membra aequaliter, suis cuique redditis, dis•
tribui facit, congruentiam eius modumque conservat, non
tantum in Eulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque
gignendo.4
The body does, indeed, depend upon the soul in the Augustinian system,
but in what sense, if any, can the soul be said to depend upon the body?
Does the rational soul require a body for the beginning of its existence?
concerning the first soul, st. Augustine seems to have held that it was
created before its body, as he states in the following:
Credatur ergo, si nulla scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradioit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut
corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi;
anima vero jam ipsa crearetur sicut primitus oonditus est
dies, et creata lateret in operibus Dei, donee eam suo
tempore sufflando, hoc est inspirando, formate ex limo
corpori insereret.44
With regard to the origin of all other human souls, except for his complete faith in God's creation of them directly or indirectly, he is silent
repeating over and over again in his refutation of a young man who presumed
to knowledge on that score that he himself did not feel qualified to make
any certain statement concerning the soul's origin, and that the young man
would do well to share his hesitation on the subject.
Quod ei ne contingat, quanto melius tenet de animae origine
cunctationem meam, ne audeat affirmare, quod nee humana
ratione oomprehendit, nee divina auctoritate defendit; ne
cogatur insipientiam profiteri, dum veretur ignorantiam
oonfiteri.45
43De Q.uant. Animae, XXXIII, 70.
44D; Genesis ad Litteram Imperfectus, VII, 24, n.35, (1figne, XXXIV).
45De Anima et Ejus Origine, I, xiii, n.l6, (Migne, XLIV).

.And also:
(nihil enim horum tanquam oertum affir.mamus, sed quid horum
verum sit adhuc quaerimus.)46
'What St. Augustine does not hesitate to proclaim with certainty is that
the soul is not united to the body because of a punishment inflicted on it in
view of another existence prior to that of its life in a human frame.

Indeed

he waxes indignant at a certain Vincentius Victor, the same who held positive
opinions about the soul's origin, because the latter said that the soul deserved to be polluted by the body.47

No less will St. Augustine permit the

body to be considered as alien to man's nature, for he observes that the entire nature of man is spirit, soul, and body, and spirit and soul are identical.
Nature carte tota hominis est spiritus, anima et corpus,
quisquis ergo a natura humana corpus alienare vult,
desipit.48
The soul was not united to the body by force.

It was made to be placed

in a body, and it has a natural desire for that body.
Sed si ad hoc fit anima, ut mittatur in corpus, quaeri
potest utrum, noluerit, compellatur? Sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter vella, id est, in ea nature creari
ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est valle vivere.49
However, strongly as he holds this natural desire of the soul for its
body, he gives no philosophical justification of it.

Y~en,

for example, he

inveighs against Victor for the erroneous judgments put forward by the

latte~

46Ibid., I, xvii, 27.
47ne Anima et Ejus Origins, III, v~~~, n.ll.
48Ibid., IV-;-11, n.3, for the passages concerning soul and spirit, ~·· IV,
iiir, n.l9, also, Ibid., IV, xxii, n.36.
49 De Gen. ad Litt., -VII, 37, n.38.
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he contents himself with repeating before each new tenet that he denies, that
the young man may not hold such views if he wishes to be a Catholic.

Thus:

"Noli credere, nee dicere, nee docere, 'Quod anima meruerit esse peccatrix
ante omne peccatum•, si vis esse catholicus.n 50 Now, why would not St.
Augustine attempt a philosophical demonstration concerning the points he
criticized in his opponent, notably that concerning pre-existence of souls
and the body looked upon as a punishment? Was his reticence because he could
not see any natural reason for the union of soul and body and, therefore, had
to content himself with submissive faith?

At any rate, he states quite

plainly that the body is man's heaviest burden, owing to original sin.

This

has happened by God's most righteous laws, a well-knovm fact, but an impenetrable mystery.
Sed inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini
gravissimum vinculum est, justissimis Dei legibus, propter
antiquum peccatum, quo nihil est ad intelligendum secretius.51
The soul is united to the body for reasons know.n to the Creator.

Such a

being as man, composed of body and soul, is a unit in an order wherein all
things are most beautiful, for the Supreme and true God judges a thing to be
most beautiful when it is as it is.

"Id enim iudicavit esse pulcherrimum,

ut esset quidquid est, quomodo est.n52

No one, therefore, should take it ill

that the soul should be united to the body, for so great and divine an order
could not better be connected.

"Quae cum ita sint, quis ·est qui iuste

stomachetur quod agenda atque administrando corpori data sit, cum tantus et
50ne Anima et Ejus Origine, III, viii, n.ll.
5lne Mor. Eccl., XXII, 40.
52~ Quant. Animae, XXXVI, n.ao.
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tam divinus rerum connecti melius non possit;"53
The body, consequently, cannot be termed the body of this death except
because of original sin. 54

It is fallen man, not natural man, that st.

Augustine describes, and fallen men we are, in very truth.

Why not content

ourselves with such a picture and strive to free ourselves from a burden felt
by all of us?

Such a treatise will not satisfy us precisely because we know

that there was a first man, and that first man had a nature like unto our

own, and in that nature free from the evil effects of sin he lived at least
for some time.

The soul and body of that first man, essentially comparable

to ours, were united naturally.

Why should this have been so, if the first

man, too, were only a soul using his body?

It is extremely beautiful--this

description of the perfect order of the universe, and the unfathomable good
of a human oomposite,--constituted just as it is and in no other way--, but
we may be permitted to ask why, if the Augustinian soul has no need of its
body, should its union vdth that body be such an admirable thing, God's wisdom excluded, which, of course, st. Augustine would

~ver

exclude?

enough even the Augustinian soul makes use of the senses.55
senses, we may add, is not identical with a need for them.

True

This use of the
Their chief need

would be for knowledge, but the soul, according to our great saint, does not
understand by any help from the body, but rather when it wishes to understand it turns away from the body.

"Non enim id agit, nisi qui intelligit:

nee corpus intelligit, nee animus auxiliante corpore intelligit; quia cum
53Ibid., XXXVI, n.82, et sqq.
54ne Peccato Originali, II, XLI, n.37, (~ligne, XLIV).
55ne Quant. Animae, XXI, n.:35.
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intelligere vult, a corpore avertitur. 1156
We can see, moreover, from his doctrine on sensation that he will not
permit any action of the body on the sou1. 57

Sensation does not pertain to

the human composite; it is wholly and entirely an action of the soul.

Still

there appears to be some dependency of the soul on the body for contact, at
least, with the exterior sensibles, but St. Augustine, possessed as he is by
that principle that the lower cannot act upon the higher,56 can only reach
the conclusion that the whole problem is a paradox, and the union of a spiritual substance with a corporeal one a mystery which he cannot understand.
"Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, at anim.alia
fiunt, omnino mirus est, nee comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo
est.n59

M. Gilson in treating of this particular problem in St. Augustine's

doctrine assures us that one will seek in vain for a solution of this
enigma.so
A partial explanation of the problem may, however, be found by a different approach to the difficulty.

Although it may be true that the lower

cannot act upon the higher, still the higher can act upon the lower, and this
is precisely what happens in the Augustinian account of sensation.
is in the body to give life to that body and to maintain it.

The soul

In its role,

then, of anirrAtor and protector, the soul must be cognizant of what is taking
56ne Immortalitate Animae, I, 1, (Migne, XXXII).
57For a lucid exposition of the doctrine of st. Augustine on sensation consult E. Gilson, Introduction ~ l'Etude de Saint Augustin, (J. Vrin, Paris,
1929) 71-66.
-56ne ?~sica, VI, 5, n.8, also De Genes. ad Litt., XII, 16, n.32-33.
5Sfie Civ. Dei, XXI, 10, 1. Quoted in GiiSon;-op. cit., 30.
60Clilson, Introd. 8. l'Etude ~~·Aug., 2,f• cit., "6'0.'

~
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place in the body subject to her care.

If there is any increase or decrease

in the functioning of the corporeal organs, the soul must be aware of it and
turn her attention to the re-establishment of harmony disturbed by an outside
influence on the body. 61

The definition of sensation as stated ~the philo-

sopher of Hippo expresses this idea in a carefully worded formula:
corporis per seipsam non latens animam.n62

"passio

It is not fitting here to add

more about this definition, but we should like to observe, as did st. Augustine himself, that the soul is not in the body to be acted upon or to receive; she is there to act and to give.63
This does indeed establish the problem in a new light, but it only
deepens the mystery of a noble soul united to a body to which it gives everything, and from which it apparently receives nothing in return.

The soul,

as judged by its office in sensation, becomes the servant of the body, while
remaining essentially superior to the corporeal part of man.

The metaphysi-

cal principle underlying such a doctrine and one that gives to it its true
character is in the words of a profound student of st. Augustine, "la servitude d'une lme qui se mets au service d'un corps, bien qu'elle lui demeure
irreductiblement transoendante jusque dans l'acte mame de la sensation par
lequel elle s'y soumet.n64
The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the body figures
Slne Musica, VI, 5,
62ne Quant. Animae,
63D; Musica, VI, 5,
S4-G·l
"t
~ son, ~· ~··

n.9.

XXV, n.48.
n.9.
83.

~------------------~
scarcely at all in the soul's growth in knowledge. 65 What man knows, he
knOWS

by reason, and sense perception is not knowledge.

ratione scimus:

nullus igitur sensus scientia est.

"Et omne quod scimus

Quidquid autem non

ad nullum sensum pertinet non latere, •• • 1166

latet, ad scientiam pertinet:

Human reason and knowledge transcend the sense organs in such a way as
not to depend, it would seam, upon these channels at all.

The soul must re-

cede from the sensibles and seek the pleasure that is within.
Humana vera anima per rationem atque scientiam, de quibus
agimus, quod sunt ista longe praestantiora sensibus, suspendit sa a corpore quantum potest, at ea quae intus est
libentius fruitur voluptate; quantoque in sensus declinat,
tanto magis similiorem hominem pecori facit.67

Now, St. Thomas would never gainsay the primary excellence of reason
and knowledge over the senses.

He

would likewise concede the necessity of

withdrawal from sense indulgence, and, therefore, he would grant with the
Christian Plato, that the soul should not waste time on the senses beyond the
limit determined by nature.

"Quamobrem, quamvis aliud ex alio inciderit

libenter, taman in eo sermone demoror, quo admonatur anima, na se, ultra
quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus;"68

But he does differ in fixing

those natural limits of the part played by the sense organs.

The Augustinian

65charles Boyer, s.J., in his Essais sur la Doctrine de Saint Augustin,
(Beauchesne et ses Fils, Paris, 193zr-166-183, considers that there is in
St. Augustine a doctrine of abstraction, in its basic principles, not unlike Thomistic abstraction. He likewise holds that the differences between Thomism and Augustinianism in what regards the union of soul and body
have been exaggerated, for he states: "Ces differences sont plut~t dans
le degre d'ach~vement at de precision que dans la substance de la doctrine." 170.
66ne Quant. Animae, XXIX, n.57.
6'lne Quant. Animae, XXVIII, n.54.
68"fbid., n.55.

-

~-------------------------------------------------------------,
xxii

soul withdraws from the senses into itself to become a child of God; the
Thomistic soul goes to itself and God through the senses.

Thus st. Thomas

would understand in a somewhat different manner the procedure implied in the
following statement:
puerascat Deo:

"• •• sed ab his potius ad seipsam colligat. at re-

quod est novum fieri, vetere exuto;"69

We may conclude, therefore, that the human body has no essential part in
the life of the soul, according to the teaching of St. Augustine.

Union of

soul and body is a natural thing--even a good; the body naturally belongs to
the soul in this life, and in the next something will be wanting to the
soul's complete fulfillment if it has not its body.
• • • inest ei naturalis quidem appetitus corpus administrandi; quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum coelum, quamdiu non subest
corpus, cujus administratione appetitus ille conquiescat.70
But a justification of the union of soul and body and a description of the
body's place in the life of the soul which satisfies us it would be difficult
to find in the writings of the great philosopher and bishop of Hippo.

It

matters little whether we grant that he outlined in broad design the same
sketch st. Thomas was to complete in clear and skilful drawings in the same
masterly way he marked out the reconciliation of faith and reason treating of
their respective merits and their interaction; we must admit that it is to
the greatest of the Scholastic philosophers that we owe the rational justification of the union of soul and body and a description of the true and vital
place played by the body in the life of the rational soul.

xxiii
At first sight, it might seem, that St. Thomas also has not devoted much
space to a treatment of the human body.

In his treatise on man, he himself

declares that he will consider man's nature in relation to its spiritual aspect and not in relation to its material side except in so far as the
material part has bearing on the spiritual part.

"Naturam autem hominis con-

siderare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis,
nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam.n71
The concern, then, of the Angelic Doctor, seems primarily and entirely
to be taken up with the rational soul.

A detailed account of the essence of

the soul, its powers and its operations can, therefore, be sought and found
in his philosophy, but no such complete and all-embracing delineation of the
human body can be discovered therein.

Vfu may, consequently be tempted to

think that again in this system the body has been neglected, but a glance at
the text just quoted will quickly dissipate all fears on that score.

St.

Thomas there states that he will not treat of the human body except in so
far as it is related to the soul, but for those who know the intimate relation which exists between the soul and its body in the doctrine of st.
Thomas, it will not be difficult to conclude that the human body holds a
place of no little importance in the writings of this learned Saint.

Thus

we may discover in his works a sketch of the body, its nature, constituent
parts, and disposition such as will be necessary to portray its close relationship to the rational soul.
7lst. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.75, a.l.Prol., (Ed. Leonine,
Rome, 1888).

~·
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It is the purpose of this thesis to investigate that part which St.
Thomas gives to the human body in the life of the rational soul and, therefore, to seek in the treatises of the eminent theologian an account of the
body in so far as it influences the soul.

We shall consider:

First, the place that the human body has in the beginning
of the rational soul in the perfection of its nature.
Secondly, the share that the body has in all the operations
of the soul, particularly in its highest operation; namely,
understanding.
Thirdly, the disposition required of the body for its
intimate relation to the soul.
Fourthly, the problem of whether or not the body can be
considered an impediment to the soul.
Fifthly, the place of the body in the final happiness of
the soul.
Precisely because man is a compound of body and soul, we shall see that
the body occupies an important and necessary place in the substantial, accidental, and final perfection of this nobler part of man's nature.

In view

of the relationship that it bears to the rational soul, the body is, consequently, not excluded from the attention of the greatest of the

Schoolmen

nor is it, in any real sense, minimized.
A brief sketch of the task undertaken thus presented, we shall turn to
the consideration of the dependence of the rational soul on the body for the
beginning of its existence.

In this first chapter, as well as in the sub-

sequent ones, we shall be guided by the desire to adhere as closely as possible to the actual expressions and argumentation adopted by the Angelic
Doctor, convinced, as we are, that st. Thomas better than anyone else, exlains St. Thomas.

CHAPTER

I

THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR
THE BEGINNING OF ITS EXISTENCE
In the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, great care is taken to safeguard the unity of man.

It is for this reason that the body plays such an

important place in the life of the soul.

Man, for the Angelic Doctor, is

neither a soul, nor a body, nor a soul enclosed in or merely using a body;
man is a composite of body and soul.

His very unity derives from the close

and intimate union of these two parts.

The relationship of the body to the

soul will, therefore, be no merely accidental one, but one that is truly
essential.

We shall devote the following pages to a study of the first im-

portant part the body has in the life of the soul.
The rational soul depends upon the body in the sense that it begins to
exist only in the human body.

That the soul is a subsistent being, that it

is in itself nobler than the body, and that the soul does not exist for the
body, but rather the body for the soul, st. Thomas certainly admits,l

but

that the rational soul can begin its existence in the perfection of its
nature outside the human body, he will not grant, for he tells us:

"•

• •

anima, quamvis non dependeat a corpore quantum ad suum esse vel quantum ad
suum finem, dependet taman quodammodo quantum ad suum principium. n2
1A discussion of the being of the soul may be found in: st. Thomas Aquinas,
Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l a • 2, c., also Contra Gentiles, II, 68.
2St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2.a.2.ad 4um, (Mandonnet,
Lethielleux, Paris, 192"9; I"'').
-1
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The reasons that are given for the necessity that devolves upon the
rational soul's receiving its existence only in the body may be summarized
as follows:

First, the perfection of the nature of the human soul requires

that it should begin to exist only in a human body;3

secondly, the soul is

related to the body as form to matter, to constitute one being, and in one
and the same being, man, for example, the form or the act cannot precede the
matter or the potency;4

thirdly, no reasonable cause can be assigned for

the union of the soul with the body if the soul were created in its perfect
natural state without the body;5 fourthly, since matter is the principle of
individuation, there could be no distinction between this soul and that soul
if they were created before their union with their determinate matter;6 and
fifthly, the rational soul needs the senses, and it would not have been fitting for it to have been created without a body equipped with sense organs.7
We shall now consider the first proof; namely, that the perfection of
the nature of the human soul requires that it should begin to exist only in
a human body.

The soul is an incomplete substance, a part, but only a part

of human nature; the body, likewise, is an incomplete substance, also only
a part of human nature.

But God created all things in a sta.te of natural

perfection, for what is perfect should precede what is imperfect.

There-

fore, it was necessary that the soul should receive its existence in the
3st. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp • .£!Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. (Marietti, Tarini, Rom
Italy, 1927, I).
4st. Thomas Aquinas, Cont. Gent., II, 83, also Ibid., 89, (Bertrand, Barri,
Ducis, Paris, 1878).---5st. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp • .£! ~·, q.3, a.• lO, c.
6Ibid.
?cont. ~·, II, 83.
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human body, as st. Thomas states in this underlying principle:
creatae sunt a Deo in sua perfectione naturali.
.
f eo t urn, • • • n8
praece d.it ~mper

"• •• res

Perfectum enim naturaliter

The soul was, therefore, not created without

the body, nor the body without the soul because such an order would have been
contrary to the first formation of things:

"Sed contra rationem perfectionis

primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel anima
sine corpore fecerit cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae."9
The rational soul, for st. Thomas, although it is only a part of human
nature, is nevertheless a "hoc aliquid," a this particular thing, but it is
not this particular thing in the sense that it is complete in its being and
in its species, but only in the sense that it is this particular thing in
act.

This may, perhaps, appear in a clearer light by noting the three mean-

ings which st. Thomas attaches to the expression, "hoc aliquid."
quid" may beapplied to matter, to form, and to the composite.
the meaning will be different.

\~en

"Hoc ali-

In each case

the term is applied to matter, it does

not mean that matter is this particular thing in itself, but only that it is
in potency to become so.

"Materia quidem. est, quae secundum se non est hoc

aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc ali quid. "lO

YJhen we apply the

term to a form, vre mean that the form is this particular thing in act.
"Forma actu est, secundum quam jam est hoc aliquid in actu. nll

However, it

8Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c.
9 Sum. Theol.,
-I, q.91, a.4, ad 3um. •
lOst. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotilis Librum De Anima Commenta.rium, II, lect.
1, n.215, (Pirotta., N~rietti, Tarini, Rome;-Ita.ly, 1924), also Sum. Theol.,
I, q.75, a.2, ad 1um.
llibid.
--

-
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is only of the composite that we can truly say that it is this particular
thing.

(This applies only to composite substances in the material order, for

separate substances, although not composed of matter and form, are still "hoc
aliquid" since they are subsistent in act and complete in their nature):
Substantia vero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur
enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est
completum in esse et specie; et hoc convenit soli substantiae
compositae in rebus materialibus. Nam substantiae separatae,
quamvis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen
hoc aliquidi cum sint subsistentes in actu et completae in
natura sua. 2
Now, the human soul can be said to be this particular thing in so far as
it can subsist in itself, but because it has not a complete species in it•
self, but is a part of a species, it is not entirely true to say that it is
this particular thing.
Anima autem rationalis, quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc
aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens.
Sed quia non habet speciem completam, sed magis est pars
speciei, non omnino convenit ei quod sit hoc aliquid.l3
It is because the soul is not complete in its species that it requires
its proper matter for its completion in its proper species, and this is likewise the reason why a body cannot be said to be united to it accidentally •
• • • licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur
quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem
esse quod est animae, communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse
totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsisters, non taman habet speciem complet~; sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei.l4
We find the same idea in this passage:

112Ibid •
3Ibid.
14 Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l,

um

~!__·

(Marietti, Rome, Italy, 1927, II).
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Anima autem non habet perfectionem suae naturae extra corpus,
cum non sit per se ipsam species completa alicujus naturae.
sed sit pars humanae naturae:l5
It is evident that St. Thomas teaches that the soul does not in itself
constitute a distinct species, but why precisely should that be the case?
The answer lies in the type of spiritual substance the soul is.

It is nobler

than matter, but less noble than purely intellectual substances; it is on the
horizon of corporeal and separate substances, "• •• manifestum est quod ipsa
in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta.nl6

The soul

is an intellectual substance, that is true. but it requires help which the
organs of the human body can give to it for its act of intelligence.

The

body is, consequently. naturally united to it to complete the species of the
soul.

"Quia taman ipsum intelligera animae humanae indiget potentiis quae

per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex
hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem
humana.m.nl7
Since, therefore, the human soul has not what is required for the proper
operation of its species, it is not complete in that species, as st. Thomas
insists upon again and again:

"Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, ni•

si habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propria.m operationem ipsius speciei.n18
The human soul must begin to exist in the human body precisely because
it is a part, and only a part, of human nature.
l5Q. Disp. De Pot •• q.3, a.lO, c.
l SQ. Disp. De An~ma, q.l, a.l, c.
17
--l~ont~ GQnt., II, 68.
Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.l, c.

Now no part separate from
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its whole has the perfection of its nature.

Thus if the soul were created

before the body, it would be an imperfect thing, "• •• nulla pars habet perfectionem naturae separata a toto.

Unde anima, cum sit pars humanae naturae,

non habet perfectionem suae naturae nisi in unione ad corpus;"l9
Furthermore, it is not fitting that the soul should exist in an imperfeet state, that is, apart from the body, before it has existed in a perfect
state, that is, in union with the body, for the perfect precedes what is imperfect in the order of natural things.
fecto, in rerum naturalium ordine.

"Perfectum autem est prius imper-

Non igitur competit naturae ordini quod

ani~A fuerit prius creata corpore exuta, quam corpori unita.n20

The rational soul, consequently, is united to the body because of the
good which is its substantial perfection; namely, the completion of the human
species, and also because of the good which is its accidental perfection;
namely, that it should be perfected in knowledge by reception from the sensibles, for this manner of understanding belongs to the nature of man:
• • • anima unitur corpori et propter bonum quod est perfectio substantialia, ut scilicet compleatur species humana; et
propter bonum quod est perfectio accidentalis, ut scilicet
perficiatur in cognitione intellectiva, quam anima ex sensibus acquirit; hie enim modus intelligendi est naturalis
homini.21
That the body is for the perfection of the soul and what part it plays in the
accidental perfection to Which we have referred, will receive further consideration vmen we treat of the need for the body, in the follovdng chapter.

l9Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., q.l, a.2, ad sum., (Marietti, II).
20
- ...;..~--:::":'
~·, II, 83.
21~~t.
Q. Disp. E! Anima, q.l, a.l,
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We have seen, then, that it would have been unfitting for the soul to
have been created without the body because its nature requires it to be united to a human body, and God would not have created it in the perfect natural
state its species required, had He not united it to a body immediately.
Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfectu statu suae naturae secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei
specie exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae
non habet naturalem perfectionam nisi secundum quod est
corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine
corpore creari.22
st. Thomas strongly insists upon the naturalness of the union between
soul and body.

Indeed he states that if the soul were not capable of being

united to the body, it would be of a different nature,
esset corpori unibilis, tunc esset alterius naturae;n23

ff

• • • si anima non
It is in very truth

so natural for the human soul to be united to the body that a soul never
united to a body so as to make one being would not be a human soul, for what
is beside nature cannot be always:
bilis est corpori.

"Alllplius, anima humana naturali ter uni-

Anima igitur quae numquam corpori unitur ad aliquid con-

stituendum non est anima humana quia quod est praeter naturam non potest esse
semper.n24
It is unnatural for the soul to be without the body because without its
corporeal complement, it lacks the perfection of its nature.

With unnatural

and imperfect things, it would not have been fitting for God to have begun
22 Sum. Theol., I, q.90, a.4.c.
2
24~II
_ _ _Sent., d.I, q.q.2, a.4, _ad 1um.
Cont. Gent., IV, 37.
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Eis work, for if God did not make man without a hand or foot, which are
natural parts of man, still less did He make a soul without a body:
Si enim anirrAe naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens
non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab
his quae sunt praeter naturam: non enim fecit hominem
sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales
hominis. hrulto igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore.25
This leads us to the second proof that the soul receives existence only
in the human body, and this proof is based upon the principle that the
rational soul is the substantial form of the human body, and together with
the human body, constitutes one being.

Now in one and the same being, act

is not prior to potency, as we shall explain further on, (Vide footnote 53).
Therefore, the soul which is the act of the body, is not prior to, but simultaneous with, the human body.
To begin with, the rational soul is not just a subsistent being; it is
a form, a substantial form.
ditions are required:

For the soul to be a substantial form, two con-

first, it must be the principle of substantial being

to that of which it is the form; and secondly, from its union with matter,
there should be effected one, and only one, being.
Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialia alterius,
duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut forma sit principium
essendi substantialiter ei cujus est forma: principium
autem dico non effectivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est
et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod
forma et materia conveniant in uno esse quod non contingit
de principia effective cum eo cui dat esse; et hoc esse
est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una
25 sum. Theol., I, q.llS, a.3, o.
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secundum esse ex materia et forma constans.26
The rational soul is the principle of substantial being to the human
body, for the form and the act of a thing is that whereby a thing from a potential being is made into an actual being:

"Quod autem ut forma propria

anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur, illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ante
actu ens, est et forma et actus ipsius."27

now, the soul communicates that

existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, and one being thus
results from the matter and the rational soul:

"• •• anima illud esse in

quo ipsa subsistit communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae.n28
The soul is, therefore, the form of the body because it actualizes the
body, gives it being:
existente.

"Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia

Vivere enim est esse viventium • • • n29

That by which the body

lives is the soul, and the soul is that by which the human body has being in
act.

"Manifestum est enim, id quo vivit corpus, animam esse; vivere autem

est esse viventium:

anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu.

Hujusmodi autem forma est.

Est igitur anima humana corporis forma."30

In

nature, matter has being only through the form, and the form coming to the
matter bestows being on that matter.

"In natura igitur rerum corporearum

materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveni26cont. Gent., II, 68.
2irbid. ,--sr;
28 sum: Theol., I, q.76, a, 1, _ad _sum.
29Cont. Gent., II, 62.
3
- -De Anima, q.l, a.l, c.
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ens materiae facit ipsam esse actu, sicut anima corpori."31
It should be clear enough, then,, that the soul is the form of the body,
since it gives being to the body, actualizes what was being only potentially.
Is the soul on that account a substantial form or an accidental form?

The

substantial form gives being simply to its subject; an accidental form gives
it being, not being simply, but only in respect to something else, that it
should be colored, or large or small, or soma other like quality, which
quality would be only an accidental one.

By an accidental form, a thing be-

comes such a thing; by a substantial form, a thing becomes a being.

"Est

autem hoc proprium formae substantialia quod det materiae esse simpliciter;
ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est.

Non autem per formas

accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid; puta esse magnum, vel coloratum, vel aliquid tale."32
If, therefore, the form does not give being simply to a thing, but
comes to it already existing in act, that form will not be a substantial
form.

"Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed ad

veniat materiae jam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma .
substantialia. rt33
But since the soul does give being to the body, and being simply, it is
a substantial form.

Moreover, it is because the soul is the substantial

form of the body that it must be so closely united to it since being belongs
31Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.l, c.
32Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.9, c.
33Ibid; This-same distinction between substantial and accidental form is
c learly expressed in ~E! Anima, II, lect.l, n.224.
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to a thing more closely and immediately than anything else.

"• •• inter

omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus • • • ; unde
oportet, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae, ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris
sibi inesse.n34
This point may appear in a clearer light if we consider what st. Thomas
says when commenting upon Aristotle's definition of the soul, that it is the
act or form of a physically organized body having life potentially.

He in-

vites us to observe that the soul is the form of the physically organized
body having life potentially, and not merely having life.

For, he tells us

the body having life is understood to be the living composite substance.
This composite does not belong to the definition of the form, that is to say,
the form is not the whole composite.

The matter of the living body is that

which is related to life as potency to act, and this act is the soul by
which the body lives.
Dixit autem 1 habentis vitam potentia' et non simpliciter
habentis vit~. Nam corpus habens vit~ intelligitur
substantia composita vivens. Compositum autem non ponitur in definitions formae. Materia autem corporis vivi
est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum:
et hoc est anima, actus, secundum quem corpus vivit.35
The intellectual soul is the first act by which man lives, and feels,
and knows, and moves because nothing acts except so far as it is in act, and
a thing acts by that whereby it is in act.

Now, life is shown through

various activities, but the first principle of each of these activities is
34Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.9, c.
3
5rn De Anima, II, leot.l, n.222, also Cont. Gent., II, 68-69, and 89.
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the soul.
Manifestum est autam quod primum quo corpus vivit, est
anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo prime
operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima:
anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et
movemur secundum locum; at similiter quo prime intelligimus.36
This does not mean, however, that it is the soul that lives, and feels,
and moves, and knows.

For St. Thomas, it is the man that acts, and this

leads us to the second condition necessary for the soul to be the substantial form of the body; namely, that soul and body should form one and only
one substance.

One thing cannot result from the union of two substances

existing in act and complete in their species, but a unity can result from
the combination of two incomplete substances, and soul and body are substances of this kind.

"• •• ex duabus substantiis actu existentibus et

perfectis in sua specie et natura non fit aliquid unum.

Anima autem et

corpus non sunt hujuronodi, cum sint partes humanae naturae; unde ex eis
nihil prohibet fieri unum."37
Soul and body, since they constitute one being, cannot be united by
way of contact, properly so called, for such a union is only between bodies,
and the soul is not a body.
Similiter autem patet quod substantia intellectualis non
potest uniri corpori per modum contactus propria sumpti.
Tactus enim nonnisi corporum est; sunt enim tangentia
quorum sunt ultima simul, ut puncta, aut lineae, aut
superficies, quae sunt corporum ultima, non igitur per
36 Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.l, c.
3
'7Q.""""Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ~ ~·
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modum contactus substantia intellectualis corpori uniri
potest.38
Neither can the union of soul and body be that of virtual contact, which
is that by which one thing touches another but is not itself touched by that
other.

It is by this sort of contact that a heavenly body touches an ele-

mental body, in so far as it changes the elamental body but is not itself
changed by the contact.

"Corpora enim coelestia tangunt quidem hoc modo

elementaria corpora, in quantum ea alterant; non autem tanguntur ab eis,
quia ab eis non patiuntur.tt39

Now, although a heavenly body can, in a sense,

be said to be united in this way to the elements, such a union does not make
one thing simply, for a thing has unity from the same cause that it has being.

" • • • ab eodam ali quid habet esse et unitatem:

consequuntur."40

unum enim et ens se

Since the heavenly body does not give being to the object

it touches, it does not make one thing simply.

Such a union would not suit

soul and body.
Sic igitur substantia intellectualis potest corpori unlrl
per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum
talem contactum non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim
unum in agendo et patiendo, quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse
autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nee
esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter.41
Now, the human composite must be a thing which is simply one, but there
are three ways in which a thing may be said to be simply one:

38cont. Gent., II, 56.
39Ibid.4Ibid.,
073.
41Cont. Gent., II, 56.
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one, a continuous one, or an essential one.42

Now, an intellectual substance

and a body cannot form together the kind of one that is indivisible, for the
one that they will constitute obviously must be composed of two substances.
Nor can they form together the one which is continuous because parts of the
continuous are parts of quantity, and it is clear that there is no quantity
in an intellectual substance.
Unum autem simpliciter tripliciter dicitur: vel sicut indivisibile, vel sicut continuum, vel sicut quod est ratione
unum. Ex substantia autem intellectuali et corpore non
potest fieri unum quod sit indivisibile. Oportet enim
illud esse compositum ex duobus. Nee iterum quod sit continuum, quia partes continui quantae sunt.43
It remains, therefore, to determine whether the union of body and soul
can result in the one which is essential.

From two things which are per-

manent, essential unity does not result except from substantial form and its
matter, for from a substance and an accident, for example, a man and his
clothes, there cannot result a substance that is one essentially.

"Ex duobus

autem permanentibus non fit aliquod ratione unum, nisi sicut ex forma substantiali et materia.

Ex substantia enim et accidente non fit ratione unum;

non enim est eadem ratio hominis et albi."44
If the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, the soul would
doubtless move the body, but it would not with the body constitute one thing,
for the union would, in that case, be only a virtual one.

Nor can the soul

42 For examples of these three types and further explanation consult Aristotl~
Metaphysics, v, 7, 1015bl7-1017a (Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of
Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1941).
43cont. Gent., II, 56.
44:Ibid".-
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be related to the body as a man is related to his clothes, because the union
existing between a man and his clothes is only an accidental one since the
soul, in such a union, would constitute the entire essence.
In refuting those who held that the whole nature of man was in his soul,
and that man was not a unity consisting of two incomplete substances but a
soul related to its body as a driver to the thing he moves, St. Thomas states
that this opinion cannot be maintained because in that case the soul would
not give species to the body and its parts; whereas the contrary is true, for
we know that

~~en

the soul departs, the various parts of the body retain

their names only in an equivocal sense.

The eye of a dead man, for instance,

is only called an eye equivocally as that of a painted or stone eye.
Ita si anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, non daret
speciam corpori, neque partibus ejus; cujus contrarium apparet ex hoc quod recedente anima, singulae partes non retinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus
mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus aut lapideus; et
simile est de aliis partibus.45
This same thought of the soul's bestowal of species on the body appears
in practically the same phrasing when St. Thomas proves that a spiritual
substance can be united to a body and that it must be united to it as form
to matter.

Thus:
Si enim anima non uniretur corpori ut forma, sequeretur
quod corpus et partes ejus non haberent esse specificum
per animam; quod manifeste falsum apparet; quia recedente
anima non dicitur oculus aut caro et os nisi aequivoce.
Sicut oculus pictus vel lapideus. Unde manifestum est
quod anima est forma et quod quid erat esse hujus corporis; id est a qua hoc corpus habet rationem suae speciei.46

45Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c.
46
Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.2, c.
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That the soul could not give species to the body if it were in it only
as a sailor is in his ship is evident because the soul would then be only a
mover, and the thing moved does not derive its species from that which moves

• • • mobile non sortitur specie.m a suo motore. Si igitur
anima non conjungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, corpus et partes ejus non consequuntur speciem ab anima. Abeunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus et partes ejus ejusdem
spec~e~.
Hoc autem est manifeste falsum; nam caro, et os,
et manus, et hujusmodi partes, post abcessum animae, non
dicuntur nisi aequivoce, cum nulli harum partium propria
operatic adsit, quae speciam consequitur. Non igitur unitur anima corpori solum sicut motor mobili, vel sicut homo
vestimento. 47
Furthermore, the soul cannot be united to the body as a sailor to his
ship because, since such a union would be accidental, death which effects
their separation would not be a substantial corruption.

But we know that

death does bring about the dissolution of the composite; this, therefore,
could not be true.

"Et praeterea si anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in

navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis asset accidentalis.

Mors

igitur, quae inducit eorum separatione.m, non asset corruptio substantialia;
quod patet esse falsum."48
The composite substance

~nich

is the result of soul and body united is,

therefore, one being essentially, not accidentally, nor virtually, as we
have seen.

It is one precisely because the composite receives its being

from the form.

Before the advent of the form, the composite may be said to

have existed potentially, but it did not have being actually.
47c ont. Gent., II, 57.
4SQ:-is'isp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c.
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est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura
constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in
quantum est susceptiva ejus."49
That soul and body should combine to form one being is absolutely necessary in the doctrine of st. Thomas, for it is always the man that feels and
lives and knows.

It is true that the soul is the first principle of these

operations, but we cannot say that the soul
the man that performs those activities.50

kn~•s,

or feels, or acts; it is

Moreover, things different in be-

ing cannot produce an action which would be one in origin.

YAny agents act-

ing together can perform the same action, such as rowing a boat.

The termi-

nation of such an action would be one, but on the part of the rowers themselves there would be many actions by many actors.

now, although the soul

has a proper operation in which the body has no share, for example, understanding, there are, however, some operations which are common to body and
soul working together, such as to fear, to be angry, and the like, for these
happen by some change in a determinate organ of the body.

This makes it

clear that there are operations pertaining to the composite, and soul and
body must, therefore, be one being, and not each a distinct being.
Item, impossibile est quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum
esse sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam non ex
parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod
egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navem, unam
actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen
ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, qui sunt diversi
impulsus ad trahendum • • • Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua
operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut

!~Q. Disp. ~ Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.l, c.
~·
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intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi
et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi.
Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod
simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint
secundum esse diversa.51
It is quite evident, therefore, that since being and operation belong
neither to the form alone nor to the matter alone, but to the composite,
being and action are attributed to two substances which stand to each other
as form to matter, for we say that a man is healthy in body and health, and
that he is knowing in knowledge and soul; knowledge is the for.m of the soul
knowing, and health is the form of the healthy body.

But living and feeling

belong to both soul and body, for we live and sense as man, not in just the
soul, nor in just the body, but the soul is still the principle of life and
feeling,--and is, therefore, the form of the body.
Amplius, quia tam esse quam etiam operari non est solum
formae nee solum materiae, sed conjuncti, esse et agere
duobus attribuuntur, quorum unum se habet ad alterum sicut forma ad materiam, Dicimus enim quod homo est sanus
corpore et sanitate, et quod est sciens scientia et
anima. Quorum scientia est forma animae scientis, et
sanitas corporis sani. Vivere autem, ac sentire attribuitur animae et corpori. Dicimur vivere et sentire anima
et corpore, sed anima taman sicut principia vitae et
sensus. Est igitur anima forma corporis.52
The two requirements to be fulfilled in order that a substances may be
the substantial form of a thing have, consequently, been verified in the
rational soul.

The rational soul is a substantial form, first, because it

gives being simply to the body, that is to say, it communicates existence to

51
cont. ~·· II, 57.
52 Ibid.
~
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the body; and secondly, because together with the body it constitutes one
bein0, since the composite receives its being from the soul, and before the
advent of the soul has being only in potentiality.
Now, since the soul is the substantial form of the human body, it is
natural that it should be united to its proper matter.

To be separated from

the body is unnatural to the soul, as we shall show in the final chapter.
since, therefore, union with the body is according to nature, and separation
from the body not in accordance with nature, it is fitting that what is
natural should precede what is unnatural, and that the soul should be first
united to the body before being separated from it, and should, therefore,
receive existence only in the human body.

This is fitting because what be-

comes a thing according to nature is in it "per se"; whereas, that which becoms a thing beside nature is in it only accidentally and always follows
what becomes the thing "per se."

Therefore, the soul was not created before

the body to which it is united.
Amplius, unicuique formae naturale est propriae materiae
uniri; alioquin constitutum ex forma et materia esset aliquid praeter naturam. Prius autem attribuitur unicuique
quod convenit ei secundum naturam quam quod convenit ei
praeter naturam; quod enim convenit alicui praeter naturam,
inest ei per accidens; quod autem convenit ei secundum
naturam, inest ei per se: quod autem per accidens est,
semper posterius est eo quod est per se. Animae igitur
prius convenit esse unitam corpori quam esse a corpore
separatam. Non est igitur creata ante corpus cui unitur.53
There is, however, one sense in which we may say that the soul precedes
the body, and another sense in which we may say that the body precedes the
53

~.~·~

II, 83.
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soul.

Soul and body, as we have said, are related to each other as act and

potency.

Now, in nature whatever is in potency to become something must be

actualized by something already in act.

However, in one and the same thing

potency is prior to act.
Actus autem, • • • natura est prior potentia. Est enim
finis et complementum potentiae. Sed ordine generationis
et temporis, universaliter loquendo actus est prior potentia. Nam id quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum
per aliquid ens actu. Sed in uno et eodem potentia est
prior actu. N~ aliquid est primo in potentia, et postea
actus fit.54

Now, the human body is matter proportionate to the human soul, for it is
related to it as potency to act:

"• •• corpus humanum est materia propor-

tionata animae humanae; comparatur enim ad eam ut potentia ad actum;"55

But

the human body from being potentially human is made actually so by the coming
of the human soul.

In this sense, then, matter does precede the soul in

point of time, matter considered as being in potentiality to form; it is
then not human in act but only in potentiality, for when it is human in act,
as perfected by the human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the
soul, but simultaneous with it.
Corpus igitur hurranum, secundum quod est in potentia ad
animam, utpote quum nondum habet animam, est prius tempore quam anima; tunc autem non est humanum actu, sed
potentia tantum; quum vero est humanum actu, quasi per
animam humanam perfectum~ non est prius neque posterius
anima sed simul cum ea.s
The soul in the sense that it has the being which it communicates to its

;~~Anima, II, lect.l, n.228, also Cont. ~·, II, 89.
Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, ad sum.
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matter can likewise be said to be prior to the matter which it will take to
itself, but in the being of the composite there is no true priority, for body
and soul are created simultaneously, and the being of the composite is the
being of the form.
Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod
est subsistens • • • esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae; non est enim
inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum_
et forma ipsa, quum compositum non sit nisi per formam • • • o7
The second proof, then, that the rational soul receives existence only
in the human body is based upon the principle that the soul is the substantial form of the body, and although it actualizes the body, which is its proper matter, it does not begin to exist .apart from the body because its being
does not subsist apart from the being of the composite, as st. Thomas states
when he concludes the statement just quoted with the words:

"• •• nee

seorsum utrum.que subsista.t. n 58
A third proof that the soul begins to exist only in the body is found
in the impossibility of sufficiently accounting for its union vdth the body
if it already existed and had the completion of its nature, "• • • si anima
rationalis extra corpus oreata fuit, et ibi habuit sui esse naturalis complementum, impossibile est convenientem causam assignare unionis ejus ad
corpus."59
Now, if the soul pre-existed, it must have been united to the body
either by force, or by nature, or by deliberate choice, or by divine ordi57 Ibid., 68.
58cont. Gent., II, 68.
5
~isp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c.
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nance.
It could not have been joined to the body by force because that would
make of the resultant composite the effect of violence and thus opposed to
nature.

We cannot admit that the human composite is something

we have proved that the soul is the substantial for.m of the

unnatural~

body~

for

and the

form of a natural thing is its nature; "Item, natura est secundum quam res
aliqua dicitur res naturalis.

Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet

formam • • • Forma igitur rei naturalis est ejus natura.n60

As we have al-

ready shown that St. Thomas insists upon the naturalness of the union between
soul and

body~

we need only mention here that the thought of any union which

would be the result of force is repugnant to us, for we cannot suppose that
man is an unnatural being.

Furthermore~

higher order than are the heavenly

intellectual substances are in a

bodies~

and if nothing violent can be

found in these latter, much less can it be found in the former.

Therefore,

we must conclude that rational souls are not united to their bodies by force.
This is the argument which St. Thomas gives vmen he investigates the possibility of violence as a cause of union:
Si autem violenter (omne autem violentum est contra naturam),
unio igitur animae ad corpus est praeter naturam; homo igitur, qui ex utroque componitur, est quid innaturale; quod
patet esse falsum. Praeterea, substantiae intellectuales
altioris ordinis sunt quam corpora coelestia; in corporibus
autem coelestibus, nihil invenitur violentem neque contra
naturam; multo igitur minus in substantiis intellectualibus. 61
Souls created before their bodies would not be united to them by nature,
60cont. Jent., IV, 35.
6lcont. Gent., II, 83.
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ror if it is nature that unites them, souls would have had a natural desire
ror union with their bodies from the first moment of their creation.

Now the

natural appetite is immediately operative unless it is in some way hindered,
as is clear from an observation of the movements of heavy and light bodies.
Therefore, if pre-existing souls were endowed with this natural desire for
union with bodies, they would have been inunediately united to them unless
they were prevented.

But everything that impedes the exercise of a natural

appetite does so by violence.

It would follow, therefore, that it was by

violence that souls were at some time separated from their bodies.

This con-

sequence would be unfitting since there can be nothing violent in substances
such as rational souls, as has been shown.
Si autem naturaliter animae sunt oorporibus unitae, naturaliter igitur animae in sui creatione appetierunt corporibus
un1r1. Appetitus autem naturalis statim prodit in actum,
nisi sit aliquid impediens, sicut patat in motu gravium et
levium; natura enim semper uno modo operatur. Statim ergo
a principia suae creationis, fuissent corporibus unitae,
nisi asset aliquid impediens. Sed omne impediens executionem naturalis appetitus, est violentiam inferens. Per
violentiam igitur fuit quod animae assent aliquo tempore a
corporibus separatae; quod est inconveniens, tum quia in
illis substantiis non potest esse aliquid violentum, ut
supra ostensum est, tum quia violentum et quod est contra
naturam, quum sit per accidens, non potest esse prius eo
quod est secundum naturam, neque totam speciem oonsequens. 6 2
It is clear, therefore, that it is not by nature that souls created before bodies would be united to their bodies since such a union would have to
be by violence, and so, unnatural and accidental and, consequently, such an
unnatural state could not precede the natural nor be consequent upon the

-
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species, as St. Thomas states in the above text.

Furthermore, why

should souls created from the beginning desire after long intervals to be
united to bodies since spiritual substances are above time as superior to
heavenly revolutions?

"• •• quia nulla ratio asset quare animae a principia

mundi creatae, post tot tempera, voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur.
Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones coeli excedens."63

Nature would not have brought about a union after so many years

because what happens at time intervals is caused by the movement of celestial
bodies since movement is the measure of the spaces of time.

Now souls with-

out bodies would not be subject to the movements of celestial bodies; wherefore, we cannot say that souls were united to bodies by nature if we hold
that they first existed bodiless.

This is what St. Thomas has expressed as

follows:
Nee iterum potest dici, quod post aliquos annorum circuitus
naturalis ei appetitus supervenerit corpori adhaerendi; et
quod ex operatione naturae hujusmodi unio sit causata. Nam
ea quae certo temporis spatia secundum naturam aguntur, ad
motum caeli reducuntur sicut ad causam, per quam temporum
spatia mensurantur. Animas autem separatas non est possibile
caelestium corporum motibus subjacere.64
If, however, it is said that it is natural to the soul to be at one time
separated from the body and at another to be united to it, this would seem
impossible because whatever varies naturally in a subject is accidental to
it, for example for a man to be young at one time and old at another time.
If, therefore, it were natural to the soul to be at one time united to the
63~sum. Theol., I, q.ll8, a.3, c.
6 Q. Disp. ~~·· q.3, a.lO, c.
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body and at another time separated from the body, it would follow that it is
accidental to the soul to be united to the body at all, the consequence being that man himself would be an accidental being.

This seems to be the

thought of the following passage:
Si autem dicatur quod utrumque est animae naturale, scilicet
uniri corpori et esse a corpore separatam pro diversis tamparibus, hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia ea quae naturaliter variantur circa subjectum sunt accidentia, sicut juventus et senectus. Si igitur uniri corpori et separari a corpore naturaliter circa animam varietur, erit accidens animae
corpori uniri; et sic ex hac unione homo constitutus non
erit ens per se, sed per accidens.65
Although in this quotation, St. Thomas is speaking of a soul pre-existing without a body as an unnatural thing, still he holds the same opinion
with regard to the soul after death has occasioned the separation of soul and
body.

More will be said on that subject when we treat of the final happiness

of the soul in the last chapter, but we may note in passing this remark of
the Angelic Doctor's:
Manifestum est • • • quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur,
est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpora esse. Nihil aute.m
quod est contra naturampotest esse perpetuum. Non igitur
perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo
maneat, oportet earn oorpori iterate conjungi: quod est
resurgere.66
The soul is likewise not united to the body by deliberate choice:

firs

because if it were united to the body by its own will, it could leave the
body at its own will, and it is quite evident that the soul has not this
power.

"Non enim potest dici, quod proprio motu se corporibus adjunxit, cum

65 cont. Gent., II, 83.
66cont. Gent., IV, 79.
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videamus quod deserere corpus non subjaceat animae potestati; quod esset, si
ex voluntate sua corpori asset unita.n67
Furthermore, it could not be united by its own choice because if it
could begin to exist apart from the body, it would be in a higher state at
that time than when joined to the body.

Now it is impossible that it should

desire to exist in a less perfect state unless it were deceived.

It could

not be deceived because if it were in a perfect state it would have perfect
knowledge and no bodily passions to influence it.
Si autem dicatur quod neque per violenti~ neque per naturrun corporibus uniuntur, sed spontanea voluntate, hoc esse
non potest. Nullus enim vult in statum pejorem venire nisi deceptus. Anima autem separata est altioris status quam
oorpori unita, et praeoipue secundum Platonicos, qui dicunt
quod ex unione corporis patitur oblivionem eorum quae prius
scivit, et retardatur a contemplations purae veritatis.
Non igitur volens corpori unitur nisi decepta, Deceptionis
autem nulla causa in ea potest existere, quum ponatur secundum eos scientiam omnium habere. Nee posset dici quod judicium ex universali causa procedens in particulari eligibili
subvertatur propter passiones • • • quia passiones hujusmodi non sunt absque corporali transmutations; unde non possunt esse in anima separata. Relinquitur igitur quod anima,
si fuisset ante corpus, non uniretur corpori propria voluntate.68
Likewise it could not be united by its own choice because such a union
would be a chance union since everything resulting from hvo mutually independent wills is a casual effect.

This is clear from an example.

If a per-

son desiring to meet an acquaintance, but not making an engagement to do so,
were to meet the desired man by chance at a certain place, we would designate
such a meeting as a chance one.
67
Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c.
68 Cont. Gent.,
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of the begetter would not depend upon the will of the pre-existing soul.
since the union of soul and body could not take place in such an instance
without the concurrence of both wills, it would follow that if there were a
union, it would be a chance one, and the generation of man a casual, not a
natural, occurrence.

Obviously this cannot be admitted for such a union hap-

pens in the majority of instances.
Praeterea, omnis effectus procedens ex concursu duarum
voluntatum ad invicem non ordinatarum est effectus casualis; sicut patet quum aliquis, intendens emere, obviat
in foro creditori illuc non ex condicto venienti. Voluntas autem patris generantis, ex qua dependet generatio
corporis, non habet ordinem cum voluntate animae separatae uniri volentis. Quum igitur absque utraque voluntate
unio corporis et animae fieri non possit, sequitur quod
sit casualis; et ita generatio hominis non est a natura,
sed a casuA quod patet esse falsum, quum sit ut in
pluribus. 6 ~
That the soul is not united to the body by deliberate desire and choice
seems clear then from the three preceding arguments:

first, the soul lacks

the power to leave the body at vrill; secondly, the soul would not choose to
exist in a less perfect state; and thirdly, a union dependent on the will of
the soul could only be a casual one.
Finally, if the soul existed before its union with the body, we cannot
say that it was united in time by divine ordinance.

For if it be said that

God united the soul to the body for the perfection of the soul, what reason
could be assigned for His having created the soul without a body?

nsimiliter

non potest dici, quod a Deo sint oorpori alligatae, si eas prius absque corporibus creavisset.

-69
'-

Si enim dicatur, quod ad earum perfeotionem hoc fecit,
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non fuisset ratio quare absque corporibus crearentur."70

If God did create

the soul before its union with the body, that state of the soul would have
been more perfect since God created each thing according to its nature.

Now

just as it is repugnant to us to think that any soul would deliberately
choose a worse state, so it is likewise inconceivable that God, in His divine
goodness, would reduce the soul from a higher state to a lower one.
Si autem rursus dicatur quod nee ex natura nee ex propria
voluntate animae corpori unitur, sed ex divina ordinations,
hoc etiam non videtur conveniens, si animae ante corpora
fuerunt creatae. Unumquodque enim Deus instituit secundum
convenientem modum suae naturae; unde et de singulis creatis dicitur: 'Vidit Deus quod esset bonum' (Gen., I, 10),
et simul de omnibus: 'Viditque cuncta quae fecerat, et
erant valde bona' (Ibid., 31). Si igitur animas creavit
a corporibus separatas, oportet dicere quod hie modus essendi sit convenientior naturae earum. Non est autem ad
ordinationem divinae bonitatis pertinens res ad inferiorem
statum reducere, sed magis ad meliorem promovere. Non
igitur ex divina ordinations factum fuisset quod anima corpori uniretur.71
Further, it is contrary to divine wisdom to ennoble lower things to the
detriment of higher.

Now bodies subject to generation and corruption are

the least in the order of things.

It would, therefore, have been unsuitable

to divine wisdom to ennoble human bodies by uniting to them pre-existing
souls because it is evident that union with bodies would be a less perfect
state for souls and to their detriment if they had pre-existed.
Praeterea, non pertinet ad ordinem divinae sapientiae, cum
superiorum detrimento, ea quae sunt infima nobilitare. Infima autem in rerum ordine sunt corpora generabilia et corruptibilia. Non igitur fuisset conveniens ordine sapientiae,
ad nobilitandum humana corpora, animas prae-existentes eis
70
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71 Cont. Gent.,
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unire, quum hoc sine detrimento earum esse non possit, ut
ex dictis patet.72
Nor can we say that God united souls to bodies as a punishment for some
sin committed in a pre-existing state.

The soul would thus be in the body

as in a prison, and it would follow that the formation of natures composed
of spiritual and corporeal substances would have been accidental and not
originally intended by God.
creation:
we

This is again contrary to what we are told of

that God saw all the things that He had made and found them good.

can see from this that God's goodness, and not the creature's sin, was

the cause of His good works.
Si vera in earum poenam hoc factum est, ut corporibus quasi
quibusdam carceribus intruderentur, • • • propter peccata
commissa, sequeretur quod institutio naturar,um ex spiritualibus et corporalibus substantiis compositarum, esset per accidens, et non ex prima Dei intentione: quod est contra id
quod legitur Genes., I, 31: 'Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat,
et erant valde bona:' ubi manifeste ostenditur bonitatem
Dei et non malitiam cujuscumgue creaturae fuisse causam
bonorum operum condendorum.7~
It would certainly be contrary to reason to hold that union of body and
soul were a punishment of sin for the soul is naturally a part of human
nature and imperfect without the body, just as is any part separated from
its whole, and it is repugnant to reason to suppose that God would begin His
work with imperfect things:
Unde non est dicendum, quod animae habuerint merita bona
vel mala, antequam corporibus unirentur. Est etiam contra
rationem. Nam cum naturaliter anima sit pars humanae
naturae, imperfecta est sine corpore existens, sicut est
quaelibet pars separata a toto. Inconveniens autem fuisset
72 Ibid
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quod Deus ab imperfectis suam operationam inciperet; unde
non est rationabile quod animam creaverit ante corpus,
sicut neque quod manum formaverit extra hominem.74
Furthermore, punishment is opposed to the good of nature, and because of
this is said to be something evil.

If, therefore, the union of body and soul

is a penalty, it is not a good of nature.

This is an impossible supposition

since union is intended by nature and is the natural end of human generation.
If such union were not a natural good, the being of man would not be a
natural gpod.
Poena enim bono naturae adversatur, et hoc dicitur mala.
Si igitur unio animae et corporis est quoddam poenale,
non est bonum naturae; quod est impossibile; est enim
intentum per naturam, nam ad hoc naturalis generatio
terminatur. Et iterum sequeretur quod esse hominum non
esset bonum secundum naturam, quum tamen dicatur post
hominis creationem: 'Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat
et erant vald.e bona' (~., I, 31).75
That union of soul and body is a punishrnent is proved false from the Old
Testament, from reason, and from Apostolic teaching, for St. Thomas says:
"Sed hoc repugnat apostolicae doctrinae; dicit enim Apostolus,
de Jacob et Esau loquens:
egissent; etc.'

~··

IX, 11,

'Cwn nondum nati assent aut aliquid boni vel mali

Eadem autem est ratio de orr~ibus.n 7 6

We have now shown that it is necessary to hold that souls were not
created before their bodies because no reason can be fittingly assigned for
their union with their bodies if they pre-existed.

We have seen that tl1ey

could not be united by force for the union resulting would be an unnatural
74
Q. Disp. De Jllalo, q.5, a.4, c. (Marietti, II)
75cont. Gent.",""""IY; 83.
7
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one; they could not be united by nature since we can see no reason why they
should experience any desire for bodies if they once lived without them especially since they are not under the influence of the_ heavenly bodies; they
could not be united by deliberate choice for they would not wish to enter
into a less perfect state than that they formerly enjoyed apart from their
bodies; moreover, such a union by the concurrence of two mutually independent
wills could only be a casual one and 1nan, consequently, a being ''per accidens"; likevrise we cannot say that God ordained that pre-existing souls
should in a moment of time seek dwelling in bodies since it is contrary to
His wisdom and goodness to reduce creatures to a lower from a higher state or
to elevate lower creatures at the expense of superior beings; it is likewise
repugnant to divine wisdom and goodness that man should be constituted as he
is as a result of sin, a state contrary to the good of nature resulting in
man's nature composed of soul and body being something unnatural.

And this

leads us to the fourth argument given by the great Christian philosopher to
prove that the rational soul is created at the same time as its body and not
before.
Huw~n

another.
bodies.

souls depend upon their bodies for their distinction one from
Diversity of souls, in other words, depends upon diversity of

If human souls were not created together

they would not differ one from another.

~~th

their proper matter,

Fow, st. Thomas holds that each

rational soul is substantially distinct from every other rational soul, but
this distinction does not arise from a difference in the essential principles
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of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the aptitude which
each soul has for its own body, for one soul is adapted to this particular
body, and another soul to that particular body.

In stating that the multi-

plicity of souls separated from their bodies by death follows upon a sub5 tantial

distinction of forms, "• ••

et illius;"

~uia

alia est substantia hujus animae

he adds:

Non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius anime.e, nee est secundum
diversam rationem ipsius animae, sed est secundum diversaw, commensurntionem animarum ad corpora; haec enim
anima est commensurata huic cor2ori et non illi, illa
autem alii, et sic de omnibus.77
Again he states that souls are diversified according to number because
they are capable of being united to bodies, numerically diversified.
"• •• unde per hoc quod est unibilis diversis corporibus, diversificatur
secundum numerum. • • n78

This same thought we find in slightly different

terminology in the following:
• • • sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem
competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita
haec anima differt ab illa numero solo, ex hoc quod ad
aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet; et sic individuantur animae humanae • • • secundum corpora, non quasi
individuatione a corporibus causata.79
We shall refer a little later, (Infra, footnote, 92), to the last claus
in the text just cited, but here we desire only to emphasize that matter is
the principle of individuation of forms.
77Cont. Gent., II, 81.
7
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The fact that there are differences in men even from their birth led
some to suppose that difference must have arisen from merit, as the objection
states:

"Sed secundum justitiam non dantur di versa et inaequalia nisi in

illiS in quibus aliqua inaequalitas meriti praeexistit.n80

To this St.

Thomas replies by asserting again that diversity of souls derives from
diverse dispositions of their bodies and not from a difference in merit of
souls.

Justice pertains to what is due to a thing, but nothing is due to a

soul as yet uncreated •
• • • ad justitian1 pertinere reddere debitum; unde contra
justitiam fit, si inaequalia aequalibus dantur, quando
debita redduntur, non autem quando gratis aliqua dantur:
quod convenit in creatione animarum. Vel potest dici,
quod ista diversitas non procedit ex diverse merito anir.Arum, sed ex diversa dispositions corporum;Bl
How just why is it that souls depend upon their bodies for their distinction one from the other?
each soul

The answer is that if souls differed as souls,

would constitute in itself a distinct species, for a distinction

of forms is a distinction of species, according to St. Thomas, who holds
that there is a two fold distinction in things:

one, a formal distinction

in those thinls that differ specifically; the other, a material distinction
in those things which differ
rebus:

numericall~r·

"Duplex distinctio invenitur in

una formalis in his quae differunt specie:

alio vero materialis in

his quae differunt numero tantum. nS2
Just why is it that the soul is not a species in itself?
80
Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, obj. 15.
81Ibid., adl5um.
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because it is a form. and a form is not perfected in its species without its
proper matter.

We saw in the first proof of the soul's dependency upon the

body for the beginning of its existence that st. Thomas insists upon the fact
that the soul is not the entire essence of human nature. but merely a part of
human nature.

If each soul were a distinct species, men would differ the one

trom the other specifically, and this cannot be held.

Psrhaps we may present

this in a clearer light if we consider very briefly the reason that St.
Thomas gives to prove that the soul has not all that it needs for the perfaction of its nature.

The species of a thing. he tells us, is judged ac-

oording to the operation proper to it according to its nature.

"• •• speoi-

es rei judicatur secundum operationem competentem ei secundum propriam na-

turamJ"83

Now, the proper operation of the soul is understanding.

This

operation, though distinct from the body, requires material received through
the senses for the exercise of its operation.

In the grade of intellectual

substances it is. therefore, the last since higher intellectual substances
do not in any sense require bodies for the exercise of their proper operations.

Speaking of immaterial substances, st. Thomas has this to say:
• • • at hoc quidem gradatim producitur usque ad animam
humanam. quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia
prima in genera rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non
habet perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia
ad intelligibilia. sicut materia prima ad formas sensibiles; unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in
actu formarum intelligibilium aoquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum operatio
sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione
suae naturae campetit ei quod oorpori uniatur. et quod

8
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sit pars speciei humanae; non habens in se speciam completam.84
More will be said later on this need of the soul for the senses (Infra,
footnote, 99, and the following chapter); it is simply mentioned here to insist upon the impossibility of human souls being of different species, and
just why they are not complete in their species.
are identical.

As forms, rational souls

They differ by union with their matter.

idem specie, differentia autem numero, habent materiam.

"Quaecumque sunt
Differentia autem

quae ex forma procedit inducit diversitatem speciei; quae autam est ex materia inducit diversitatem secundum numerum;n85

Obviously by "habent materi-

am" st. Thomas does not mean that there is matter in the soul.

The soul can-

not have matter in it because it can know the natures of all corporeal
things, a knowledge which it could not have if anything material were in it
since that material element would constitute an obstacle to the understanding of other beings.86

A clear exposition of this is contained in the text

which follows:
Cum enim anima non sit composita ex materia at forma • • •
distinctio animarum ab invicem esse non posset nisi secundum formalem differentiam, si solum secundum se ipsas
distinguerentur. Formalis autem differentia diversitatem
speciei inducit. Diversitas autam secundum numerum in
eadem specie ex differentia materiali procedit; quae quidam animae competere non potest secundum naturam ex qua
fit, sed secundum materiam in qua fit.87
The soul is, therefore, individualized by matter, not matter which is a part
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of it, but by the matter in which it is, and for which it has an aptitude.
"• •• anima non individuatur per materiam ex qua sit, sed secundum habitudinem ad materiam in qua est.• 88

The soul finds its perfection through its

matter, and souls are, therefore, multiplied according to number, not according to species ". • • quamvis anima non habeat materiam part em sui ex qua
sit, habet taman materiam in qua est cujus perfeotio est; ad ejus enim divisionam multiplicatur secundum numerum, et non secundum speciam.n 89
Matter is, therefore, the principle of individuation, but not matter
considered in itself.

To be the principle of diversity matter must be under

certain determinate dimensions, for St. Thomas states:
Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec materia signata, et sic individuat formam, et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie. Unde patet quod materia secundum se considerata
non est principium diversitatis secundum speciem, nee
secundum numerum: sed sicut prinoipium diversitatis
secundum genus prout subest communi formae; ita est
prinoipium diversitatis secundum numerum prout subest
dimensionibus interminatis:90

And again st. Thomas says that if it should be asked why this form differs from that, there is no other reason than that it is in this determinate
matter.

"• •• sed si quaeratur quare haec forma differt ab illa, non erit

alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata.n 91
It should be clear, than, that it is determinate matter, matter proportionate to the rational soul, such as the substance of the human body, that
88 Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.6, ad 13um.
89In II Sent., <I.xvu, q.2, a.l-;-a~.
90Iii' BOe'th.""""De Trinitate, q.4, a.2, ;:-( Opuscula Omnia, Mandonnet, III).
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18 the matter which is the principle of diversity, but lest it should be
thought that the worth of the individual suffers from this dependency upon
matter for his distinction from other individuals, it may be well to note
that st. Thomas does not make of matter, even determinate matter, the cause
of di varsity.
Manifestum est autem • • • quod causa diversitatis in rebus
non est materiae diversitas. Ostensum est enim, quod materia non praasupponitur actioni divinaa, qua res inesse
produoit. Causa autem diversitatis rerum non est ex materia
nisi secundum quod materia ad rerum productionem praeexigitur, ut scilicet secundum diversitatem materiae diversae
inducantur formae. Non igitur causa diversitatis in rebus
a Deo produotis est materia.92
This is simply affirming that the multiplication of bodies is not the cause
of the multiplication of forms since the matter is for the form, and the
material distinction for the formal one, as he insists upon:

"Cum autem

materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter formalem." 93
That the form is not for the matter but the matter for the form is an essential point in the Thomistic doctrine.

We find it again expressed in these

terms:
Adhuc, secundum res habent esse, ita habent pluralitatem
at unitatem, nam unumquodque secundum quod est ens, est
etiam unum: sed non habent esse formae propter materiam,
sed magis materiae propter formas, nam actus melior est
potentia, id autem propter aliquid est, oportet melius
esse: neque igitur formae ideo aunt diversae ut competant
materiis diversis, sed materiae ideo aunt diversae, ut
oompetant diversis formis.94
St. Thomas reaches the conclusion that souls are multiplied according
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to the multiplication of bodies, but also that the multiplication of bodies
is not the cause of the multiplication of souls by observing that things that
need to be adapted or that are proportionate the one to the other are togather multiplied or unified each by its own cause.

Now, if the being of the

one depends upon the being of the other, the unity or multiplicity of the one
depends likewise upon that other; if not, then it depends upon some extrinsic
cause.

Now, matter and form must always be proportionate to each other, and,

as it were, naturally adapted to each other because the proper act of a thing
is produced in its proper matter.
agree in multitude and unity.

Matter and form must, therefore, always

If the being of the form depends upon the be-

ing of the matter, its multiplicity and also its unity will depend upon the
matter, but if not, it will, indeed, be necessary that the forrr. should be
multiplied according to the matter, that is to say together with the matter
and proportionate to it, but not in such a way that its very unity and multiplicity, however, should be dependent upon the matter.

He concludes, con-

sequently, that since rational souls are forms independent of matter in their
being, they are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, but the
multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls.
This is, moreover, the reason that he gives for the continuation of the multiplicity of souls after separation from their bodies:
• • • quaecumque oportet esse invicem coaptata et proportionata, simul recipiunt multitudinem vel unitatem, unumquodque ex sua causa. Si igitur esse unius dependeat ab
altero, unitas vel multiplicatio ejus eti~ ex illo dependet; alioquin ex alia causa extrinseca. For.mwm igitur et
materiam semper oportet esse ad invicem proportionata et
quasi naturaliter ooaptata, quia proprius actus in propria
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materia fit; unde semper oportet quod materia et forma consequantur se invicem in multitudine et unitate. Si igitur
esse formae dependet a materia, multiplicatio ipsius a materia dependet et similiter unitas; si aute.m non, erit quidam necessarium multiplicari formam secundum multiplicationem materiae, id est simul cum materia et (secundum) proportionem ipsius; non aute.m ita quod dependeat unitas vel
multitude ipsius formae a materia. Ostensum est autem quod
anima humana est forma secundum suum esse a materia non dependens. Unde sequitur quod multiplicantur quidem animae
secundum quod multiplicantur corpora; non taman multiplicatio corporum erit causa multiplicationis animarum. Et
ideo non oportet quod~ destructis corporibus, cesset pluralitas animarum. • • 5
It should be manifest, then, in what sense st. Thomas means us to take
matter as a principle of individuation.

It is both this matter and this

form which make a thing an individual.

This form, the rational soul, al-

though a self-subsistent being, cannot, precisely as for.m, be a self-subsistent being.

It requires its matter to enable it to be distinguished from

every other soul, and, therefore, it cannot begin to exist apart from its
determinate matter.
Unde sicut diversitatem in genera, vel specie facit diversitas materiae, vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia: nulla autem forma,
in quantum hujusmodi, est hie ex seipsa. Dico autem in
quantum hujusmodi propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo ex seipsa est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum for.ma.
Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam possibile est recipi in aliquo, sicut in materia, vel sicut in subjecto,
natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem
ejus quod est hoc aliquid, unde forma fit per hoc quod
recipitur in materia: sed cum materia in se considerata
sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se recaptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis.
Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod reoipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hoc materia, vel illa
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distincta et determinata ad hoc et nunc.96
We can say, consequently, that we cannot have many human souls of the
same species which would at the same time differ one from the other unless
they were united from the very beginning of their existence to their proper
bodies.

God is, however, the efficient cause of their distinction.

But it

is no less true to say that matter is a principle of individuation because
without matter human souls would differ in species as do all separate substances.
Sic ergo solum ponere possumus plures animas humanas ejusdem speciei, numero diversas esse, si a sui principia corparibus uniantur, ut earum distinctio ex unione ad corpus
quodammodo proveniat, siout materiali principia, quamvis
ab efficiente principio talis distinctio sit a Deo. Si
vero extra corpora animae humanae fuissent creatae oportuisset eas esse specie differentes, sublato distinctionis
materialis prinoipio, sicut at omnes substantiae separatae
a Philosophis ponuntur specie differentes. 97
We find the same argument stated elsewhere:
Impossibile est enim diversitatam in numero sub eadem
specie causari nisi ex diversitate materiae: quia ad
diversitatem formalium principiorum sequitur diversitas
specierum. Si ergo anima, ut dictum est, non habeat
materiam ex qua sit, non possunt plures animae unius
speciei esse diversae numero, nisi per diversitatem materiae in qua sunt. Unde si ante corpus creatae fuissent, oportuisset eas vel esse diversas in specie, et
sic omnes homines specie differre ex diversitate formarum; aut quod asset una tantum numero, • • • sa
The doctrine of st. Thomas as regards the first essential relationship
of the body to the soul may now be briefl;>• summarized.
: 6In Boeth. De Trinitate, q.4, a.2, c.
7Q. Disp. D~Potentia, q.3, a.lO, c.
98 In II Sent.,
- -d.XVII,
- - - q.2, a.2, c.

---

The rational soul is
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created by God at the very moment when it is infused into the potentially

human body.

That this must be the case is evident when we consider that the

soul without its body is not in the perfection of its nature since it is an
incomplete, though subsistent, substance and requires a body for the completion of its species.

The soul is, moreover, a form, and every form re-

quires to be united to its proper matter.

It is the act of the human body

and communicates to the composite its own being which then becomes the being
of the composite.

Now in one and the same being, man, for example, act is

not prior to potency but simultaneous with it.

Furthermore, if the soul

were created apart from the body, it is clear that only at the price of
making man an unnatural being can we assign a cause for the union of a preexisting soul with its body.

For neither force, nor nature, nor deliberate

choice, nor divine ordinance can sufficiently explain why a nobler creature
existing in the fulness of its natural perfection should at some time be
united to a less noble and corporeal substance, a substance which would necessarily not be essential to the soul if it could begin to exist without it.
Finally, we have seen that it is matter which is the principle of individuation of rational souls, and without that matter one soul would not be distinct from another without at the same time constituting a different species,
a consequence which would make men differ specifically, which conclusion is
obviously absurd.
As a further proof that the human soul receives existence only in the

human body, St. Thomas states that the soul needs the senses, and as nature
does not fail to supply whatever is necessary to anything for its proper
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operation. it would not have been fitting for the soul to have been fashioned
without a body which would have sense organs.
Si ergo anima humana ad intelligendum sensibus indiget
(natura autem nulli deficit in necessariis ad propriwm
operationem explendwm. sicut animalibus habentibus animwm sensitivam et motivam dat convenientia organa sensus
et motus). non fuisset anima humana sine necessariis
adminiculis sensum instituta. Sensus autem non operantur sine organis corporeis • • • • Non igitur fuit instituta anima sine corporeis organis.99
Raving now shown that the soul needs the body in order to have its substantial perfection. we shall turn our attention to a consideration of the manner
in which the soul likewise needs the body for its accidental perfection, and
that brings us to the next chapter.

--

99cont. Gent •• II. 83.

CHAPTER II
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS OPERATIONS
In the first chapter we considered that the human body was necessary for
the substantial perfection of the rational soul, which was only a part of
human nature and an incomplete substance.

first perfection of the soul.

That was 'V'Jhat may be termed the

The second is its accidental perfection, that

is to say the perfection of the soul in the exercise of its operations.

The

distinction St. Thomas gives as follows:
• • • duplex est rei perfectio: prima et secunda. Prima
quidem perfectio est secundum quod res in sua substantia
est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius,
quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem
secunda est .finis. Finis autem vel est operatic sicut
finis citharistae est citharizare • • • 1
Because the human soul has a variety of powers which require a body for
their exercise, the rational soul can, in a very real sense, be said to need
that body.

Let us first see why the soul should have so many powers.

Thomas assigns two reasons for this.
plaoe in the hierarchy of beings.

st.

The first is taken from the soul's

In the order of beings the lowest crea-

tures cannot attain perfect goodness, but they are able to achieve imperfect
goodness which they gain by means of few activities.

There is a higher order

of beings that can attain perfect goodness but only by means of many activi1st. Thomas Aquinas, ~· Theol., I,q.73, a.l, c.
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ties, and these beings are rational souls.

Still higher up on the scale of

being are those creatures that can achieve perfect goodness and can do so by
rawer movements.

These are angelic spirits.

The highest in this order of

being is God, Who, without any movement at all, is perfect goodness.
serve to make this clearer by an analogy.
positions or degrees.

It may

In health there are various dis-

He is least disposed to health who can never be per-

fectly healthy but who can, by means of a few remedies, succeed in reaching
imperfect health.

Better disposed to health is he who has it in his power

to become perfectly healthy but who is obliged to make use of many remedies
to do so.

Still better disposed is he who can become perfectly healthy by

means of very few remedies.

Finally best disposed is the one who is in a

state of perfect health and needs no remedies at all.

The human soul, st.

Thomas concludes, is in the class of those who can reach their perfection by
the exercise of many and various powers and operations.
Dicendum est ergo quod res quae aunt infra hominem, quaedam
particularia bona consequuntur: et ideo quasdam paucas et
determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem
potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem: quia
potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est taman in ultimo gradu,
secundum naturam, eorum quibus oompetit beatitude: et ideo
multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget
anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum
competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio,
praeter eius essentiam.2
The second reason given for the variety of the soul's powers is taken

from the position of the soul which is midway between the spiritual and oorporeal worlds, for in the rational soul, the powers of both these orders meet

~~·

2

Theol., I, q.77, a.2, c.
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together.
tiarum:

"Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potenvidelicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creatura-

rum et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum."3
The soul has nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers, but these
forces do not all belong to the soul in the same way, for some pertain to
the soul as to their principle, and others pertain to the soul as to a subjeot.

Thus the intellectual powers, as understanding and will, are per-

formed without a corporeal organ, and are, therefore, in the soul as in their
subject.

There are, however, other operations of the soul which are per-

formed by means of physical organs, as sight by the eye and hearing by the
ear, and so for all the other operations of the sensitive and nutritive
parts.

The powers which are the principles of these operations belong to

the composite as to their subject and to the soul as to their principle.
Manifestum est autem • • • quod quaedam operationes sunt
animae, quae exeroentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et vella, Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam
vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa
corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem.
Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae
et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium
operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.4
The soul is said to be the principle of these operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts because it is through the soul that the composite
has the power to perfor.m them.

"• •• Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae,

non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii:

quia per animwm coniunctum habet
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quod tales operari possit."5
Although some powers of the soul are thus attributed to it as to their
subject and others as to their principle, they all, however, flow from the
essence of the soul as from a principle because although the sensitive and
nutritive powers have the composite as their subject, the composite itself
owes its actuality to the substantial form, and hence the actuality of these
lesser powers, Which are accidental forms, is caused by the actuality of the
subject, which, as we have just stated, derives fran the soul.
Manifestum est autem • • • quod potentiarum anima.e subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola quae poteet esse subiectum
accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis,
• • • vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per
animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae anim.ae,
sive subieotum earum sit anima. sola, sive compositum,
fluunt ab essentia anim.ae sicut a principio: quia iam
dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum
quod est in actu, et recipitur in eo in quantum est in
potentia.6
The nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers are thus rooted in
one and the same soul, and this must be the case if the unity of man is to
be preserved.

Now, unity follows being.

If, therefore, the intellectual

soul gives being to the composite it will likewise give it unity.
be considered from another point of view.

This can

Different powers not rooted in one

and the same subject do not impede one another's action unless the powers are
contraries, and the powers of which there is question here are not contrarie&
Now, in the human soul we can observe that different powers do hinder one

another, for when one power is intense, another is remiss.
5Ibid., ad 1um.
~
Sum. Theol., I, q.77, a.6, c.

--

--

We can only con-
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elude that these actions and their powers Which are their proximate principles must be reduced to one ultimate principle.

The human body cannot be

that principle, for in the act of intelligence it has no part, and bodies
other than the human body have not these same powers we find in the soul
which they necessarily would have if the body were the principle of them.
The principle of the various powers we see exercised by man must be one for.m
through which the body is the kind of body that it is, and that one form is
the rational soul •
• • • diversae vires quae non radicantur in uno principio,
non impediunt se invicem in agendo, nisi forte earum actiones assent contrariae, quod in proposito non contingit.
Videmus autem quod diversae actiones animae impediunt se.
Cum enim una est intensa, altera remittitur. Oportet igi•
tur quod istae actiones, et vires quae aunt earum proxima
principia, reducantur in unum principium. Hoc autem principium non potest esse corpus; tum quia aliqua actio est
in qua non communicat corpus, scilicet intelligere; tum
quia, si principium harum virium et actionum asset corpus,
in quantum hujumnodi, inveniretur in omnibus corporibus;
quod patet esse falsum. Et sic relinquitur quod sit
principium earum forma aliqua una per quam hoc corpus est
tale corpus, quae est anima. Relinquitur igitur quod omnes actiones animae quae sunt in nobis ab ipsa una procedunt; et sic non sunt in nobis plures animae.7
As has been said the operation of the rational soul is not performed
through any corporeal organ, but that of the sensitive soul is performed
through a corporeal organ, but not through any corporeal quality, for although heat and cold, wetness and

drJ~ess

are required for the functioning

of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the sense operates by virtue of these qualities; they do serve, however, for the proper
7

~. ~·• II, 58, also, Q. Quodl., XI, q.S, a.S,c. (Marietti, V).
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disposition of the sense organ.

The lowest of the soul's activities, which

iS that of the vegetative soul, is performed both through a corporeal organ

and by virtue of corporeal qualities.

Yet low as this activity is, it yet

exceeds the operation of a purely corporeal nature, for it is performed from
an intrinsic principle, and not from an extrinsic one, as are the movements
of bodies, for every animated thing in a certain manner, moves itself.
Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae in tantum excedit
naturam corpoream, quod neque exercetur per organum corporals. Et talis operatio animae rationalis. Est autem
alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidam fit per
organum corporale, non taman per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilia: quia
etsi calidum at frigidum, at humidum at siccum, at aliae
hujusmodi qualitates corporae requirantur ad operationem
sensus; non taman ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilia procedat; sed requiruntur
solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem operationem animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, at
virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur taman operationem naturae corporeae: quia motiones corporum sunt
ab exteriori principio, hujusmodi autem operationes sunt
a principio intrinseco; non enim commune est omnibus
operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabili~.s
It is in virtue of the soul's office as a form that it possesses the
lower operations as well as the higher ones.

"• •• quia aliae operationes

vitae sunt actus animae in quantum est forma corporis corruptibilis at transmutabilis; cum quaedam anim transmutatione at alterations corporali sunt:"9
For sensation and nutrition there can be no question of the soul's need
for the body.

These activities the soul could in no way perform without

physical organs, and we may, therefore, say that for such actions the body is

~· Theol., I, q.78, a.l.c.
Q. Disp. ]! Spiritu. Creat., q.l, a.6, o.
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absolutely necessary.

"Invenitur autam corpus necessarium ad aliquam opera-

tionem animae, quae mediante corpore exercetur; siout patet in operibus animae sensitivae et nutritivae.nlO Without a bodily organ, St. Thomas tells us,
there is no sensation.

"• •• sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus

exterioribus; unde non potest homo sentire absque exterior! sensibili, siout
non potest aliquid moveri absque movente.nll
It is only when we come to the higher operations of the rational soul
that the necessity for a human body admits of questioning.

Now, the intel-

lectual operations of the soul, we repeat, are not exercised through the
medium of the body, but the body, in a way, ndnisters to their production.
"Est autam aliqua operatio animae, quae non exeroetur corpore mediante, sed
taman ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operationi exhibetur;"l2
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a discussion of the
Thomistic theory of knowledge except in so far as will be necessary to show
What part the body has in the intellectual operation of the soul, for if its
role is only an accidental one, union of body and soul would seam to be both
useless and unnatural.

Now, St. Thomas would never admit that, for he con-

siders that the sensitive powers are necessary to the soul, not merely as
accidental stimulants nor as dispositive conditions, but as representatives
to the intellectual soul of its proper object.

"Et ideo aliter dicendum est

quod potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per
accidens tamquam excitantes • • • neque disponentes tantum • • • sed ut
10Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c.
ucont.
- Gent., II, 57.
1~sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, o.

-
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repraesentantes animae intelleotivae proprium objectum•• • nl3
The soul requires something corporeal for its operation in a twofold
manner:

in one way, as an organ through which it operates, as the soul needs

the eye to see, and in this way the soul could not need a corporeal organ for
knowing; otherwise the soul would be corruptible.

The other way in which the

soul may need something corporeal is as an object, just as for sight a
colored body is required.

In this second way, the soul depends on a material

thing, an object, which object consists of phantasms--sense images from which
the agent intellect can abstract the intelligible species.
• • • anima indiget aliquo corporal! ad su~ operationam
dupliciter. Uno modo sicut organo per quod operetur,
sicut indiget oculo ad videndum: et sic ad intelligendum
non indiget aliquo organo, • • • Si autem sic indigeret
organo ad intelligendum, asset corruptibilis, utpote non
potens per se operari. Alio modo anima ad operandum indiget aliquo corporali sicut objecto, sicut ad videndum
indiget corpore colorato, at sic anima rationalis indiget
ad intelligendum phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt ut
sensibile intellectivae animae, • • • 14
Over and over again we find st. Thomas insisting that the soul depends
on nothing corporeal as a co-principle of knowledge or of intellectual operation.

On the other hand, the principle of vision requires both the faculty

of sight and the eye consisting of the power of vision and the pupil.

Thus,

just as the eye besides all that it has otherwise still requires an object
on which the color will be, so, too.,- does the intellect need its object,
though it does not need an organ for an act of knowing •
• • • intellectus in corpore existens non indiget aliquo
<

13Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, c.

·143. Quodl.-;-x, q.3, a.6, ~ lum.
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corporal! ad intelligendum, quod simul cum intellectu sit
principium intellectualis operationis, sicut accidit in
visu: nam. principium visionis non est visus tantum, sed
oculus constans ex visu at pupilla. Indiget autem corpore tamquam objecto, sicut visus indiget pariete in quo
est color: nam phantasma.ta comparantur ad intelleotum ut
colo~es ad visum, • • • 15
.And again:
• • • corpus requiritur ad actionem intelleotus, non sicut
organo quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obieoti:
phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad
visum.l6

An intellectual substance is united to a body, therefore, not in as much
as it is intelligent, but in as much as it needs those operations which are
exercised through the body for the completion of its intellectual operation
since it knows by abstraction from the phantasma.
Si ergo aliqua substantia intelligens corpori uniatur,
hoc non erit in quantum est intelligens, sed secundum
aliquid aliud; sicut supra dictum est, quod necessarium
est, animam humanam uniri corpori, in quantum indiget
operationibus per corpus exeroitis ad completum intellectualis operationis, prout intelligit a phantasmatibus
abstrahendo;l 7
Furthermore, we cannot say that the phantasms are merely useful, for
they are so essential that as long as the soul is in the body it cannot
understand without a phantasm, nor can it remember except through the sensitive powers of cogitation and memory through which the phantasms are prepared.

Having said that the intellect finds its object in the phantasm, st.

Thomas thus continues:

"•

• • unde, quamdiu est anima in corpore, non potest

15Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22um.
116 Sum. Theol.,
I, q.75, a.2, ad
3 -•--?"Q:"-nisp. ,!2! Spiritu. Creat.-;-q.l, a.5, c.
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intalligere since phantasmate, nee etiam reminisoi nisi per Virtutam cogitativam at me.morativ.rum per quam phantasmata preparantur, •
That this must needs be so we have two indications.

First, our own ex-

parience of ourselves and others assures us that the act of the intellect is
hindered when the imagination, or any other sense organ, is impaired.

Now,

this would not happen if the intellect did not depend upon the exercise of
some power which did make use of a corporeal organ.

Hence since the imagi•

nation, memory, and other sensitive powers do require organs, the lesion of
any one of these latter will be an impediment to understanding.

Wherefore,

in case of frenzy and lethargy, it happens that one does not understand those
things of which he had previous knowledge.
attested by experience.

The second indication is likewise

We know how dependent we ourselves are upon phan-

tasms, for when we learn something ngw, we form certain images to serve us
as examples, and also when we essay to impart our ideas to another, we employ examples and illustrations of various kinds that from these the student

may grasp our thought.

Thus has St. Thomas accounted for our need of phan-

ta~s:

• • • impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur,
aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi oonvertendo se ad
phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indioiis apparet. Primo quidam quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per
laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur
ad eius actum actus aliouius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partam sensitivam.
Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo soientiam de novo, sed
l8cont. Gent., II, 81.
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etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imagi•
nationis et oeterarum. virtutum.. Videmus enim quod, impedito
aotu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in
phreneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis,
ut in lethargiois: impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu
etia.m ea quorum soientiam praeaocepit. Secundo, quia hoc
quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis
conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi
per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et unde est etiam quod quando alium
volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla,
ex quibus sibi phantasmata for.mare possit ad intelligendum..l9
Phantasms are, therefore, necessary, according to St. Thomas, both to
acquire fresh knowledge and to utilize the knowledge that we actually possess,
and if the imagination is hindered, so, too, is the act of the understanding.
A concise expression we find elsewhere repeated in the following terms:
Et ex hoc est quod intellectus impeditur in intelligendo,

laeso organo phantasiae: quia quamdiu est in corpore indiget phantasmatibus non solum quasi accipiens a phantasmatibus dum aoquirit scientia.m, sed etiam comparans species intelligibiles phantasmatibus dum utitur scientia acquisita. Et propter hoc exempla in scientiis sunt necessaria.20
We cannot insist too strongly upon the influence which the sensitive
powers exercise over the act of understanding, for we shall see in the third
chapter what bearing this has on the disposition of the human body.

The fol-

lowing citation, though it merely repeats what has been said, emphasizes it
clearly and strongly:
Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, taman in
nobis operatic intellectus compleri non potest sine operationa virtutum corporearum, quae sunt imaginatio, et vis
memorativa at cogitativa, • • • Et inde est quod impeditis
harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis in198um. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c.

--

2aq:-Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22um.

------
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est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive
natura in materia corporali existens et per huiusmodi naturas, visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualam
cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autam huius naturae est,
quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non absque materia
corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit
in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoo
equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscum.que materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere,
nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens.
Particulars autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem;
et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat
suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata,
ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.23
In the passage just cited st. Thomas mentions that it is through such
natures of visible things that we rise to a knowledge of things invisible.
This sets forth another important aspect from which to view the need for the
body which the rational soul experiences.

Only through corporeal objects do

we know the incorporeal, and since incorporeals have no phantasms by which
we can know them directly, we would be deprived of that knowledge did we not
arrive at a certain degree of comprehension through a comparison of them with
corporeal things that have phantasms.

In this way we know truth by a con-

sideration of something of Which we possess the truth; we know God, in like
manner, as the cause of the effects we see around us, as possessing in the
highest possible perfection the qualities we find in creatures, and by denying of Him certain attributes we realize He cannot possess.

In the present

state of life we know other immaterial substances only by remotion or in comparison with other things.
• • • incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur
a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum
25

~um. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c.
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sunt phantasmata: sicut veritatem intelligimus ex considerations rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deus autem, • • •
cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, at per remotionem;
alias etiam incorporeas substantiae, in statu praesentis
vitae, cognosoere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi
aliquid intelligimus, neoesse habemus converti ad ~hantas
mata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata. 4
And also:
Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit
materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia
sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem de.
venJ.mus,
• • • 25

It is because of its aspect towards the lower realm of beings that the
rational soul must thus seek its knowledge of the higher:
Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita aspectum
habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; unde non
perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; unde neque
in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex praedictis speciebus
manud ucJ.•t ur. • • 26
We cannot, however, arrive at a perfect knowledge of these immaterial
things because of the insufficient proportion between materials and immateri•
als.
• •• ex rebus materialibus ascenders possumus in aliqualem
cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non taman in perfectam:
quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerummaterialium ad immateriales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, •• 27
In stating that it is appropriate that Holy Scripture should present

~4sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, ad ,um, also, Cont.~·· IV, 1.

5sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.l, ~
2SQ:-nisp. De Anima, q.l, a.l7, c.
2?
_ _.;.._
sum. Theol., I, q.ss, a.2, ad 1um.

-

--

57

divine and spiritual truths clothed in material forms, St. Thomas gives as
the reason that it is fitting that God should provide for each thing according to that thing's nature, and as the understanding natural to man is by

way of the senses, it becomes a human being to arrive at divine truths
through sense presentations.
Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturae. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat: quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu
initium habet. Unde convenienter in Sacra Scriptura traduntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium • • • 28
Since it is difficult for man to transcend the sensible, Divine Providance thus draws him to things divine through the material, and that because
such a procedure is natural to the human being, as St. Thomas again remarks:
Quia vero oonnaturale est homini ut per sensus cognitione.m
accipiat, et difficillimum est sensibilia transcendere,
provisum est divinitus homini ut etiam in sensibilibus
rebus divinorum ei commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc haminis
intentio magis renovaretur ad divina • • • 29
Not only does the human mind depend upon the senses to reach its knowledge of things incorporeal, it likewise depends upon them for direct knowledge of the individual.

The reason for this is that the intellect can have

direct knowledge only of the universal by abstracting the intelligible
species from matter which is the principle of individuation.

To know the

particular Which is in matter only, if we speak of natural things, the intellect must turn to the phantasms.

Thus it is only indirectly, and by a

certain reflex action, that the mind gets at the singular;
28 Sum. Theol., I, q.l, a.9, c.
29Cont. Gent., III, 119.
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comes through the senses.30
Again in speaking of species received from things, the Angelic Doctor
states that singulars are not known from these, but from a reflex action to
imagination and sense •
• • • et ideo ex eis singularia non oognosountur, quae individuantur per materiam, nisi per reflexionem quamdam intelleotus ad ±maginationem et sens~, dum scilicet intelleotus
speciem universalem, quam a singularibus abstraxit£ applicat for.mae singulari in imaginatione servatae. • .~1
Not only does the soul need the senses for its knowledge of things immaterial and things singular, it even needs them for an understanding of
first principles, for we should not be able to conceive that the whole is
greater than any of its parts, if we had not first seen some whole thing,
any more than a man born blind is able to have any idea of color.

Praeterea, id quod per sensum in nobis acquiritur non fuit
animae ante corpus. Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in
nobis ex sensibilibus causatur; nisi enim aliquod totum
sensu percepissemus, non possemus intelligere quod totum
esset majus parte, siout nee oaecus natus aliquid peroipit
de coloribus. Ergo nee ipsorum principiorum cognitio

3°sum.

Theol., I, q.86, a.l, c. "• •• singulare in rebus materialibus inte!lectus noster direote et pr~o cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est,
quia prinoipium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis: intellectus autem noster • • • intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiuamodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium.
Indirecte autam, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere
singulare: quia, • • • etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit,
non potest eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in
quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, • • • Sic igitur ipsum universale
per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia,
quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, 'Socrates
est homo. ' "
3
1~.!,! Sent., D. III, q.3, a.3, ~ ~·
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affuit e.nima.e ante corpus; multo igi tur minus aliorllm. 32
This last clause to the effect that if the soul does not know first
principles without the help which comes from the senses, much less does it
knOW

anything else, reminds us that for St. Thomas the soul knows nothing

through innate species.

In refuting those who held that the soul did have

such species, and that, consequently, the sense did not "per se" cause knowledge, but only "per accidens," in as much as upon the stirring of a certain
sense the soul was roused to a memory of its former knowledge, st. Thomas
holds that this is false for two reasons:

first, such a doctrine is unreaso

able because the soul would not forget what it knew naturally and furthermore
no fitting reason could be assigned for union of the soul with the body if
the senses were not really needed; and secondly, experience teaches us that
if a man is lacking in one sense, his knowledge of the object apprehended by
that sense is wanting, and this would not be the case were he endowed with
innate species.33
As St. Thomas visualizes it, the mind is like a blank slate on which
32cont. Gent., II, 83.
33sum. T~., I, q.84, a.3, c. "Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum.
Primo quidem si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse
possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod
nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere; nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea
quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, at
alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur esse inconveniens, si ponatur
esse animae naturale corpori uniri • • • Inconveniens enim est quod na.turalis operatic alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi
secundum naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex
hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus na.tus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si intellectuali animae assent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est
quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas."
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nothing is written, having no intelligible species of its own which belong to
it naturally for the exercise of its proper operation, understanding.

To

all knowledge it is only in potency and must be reduced to act through in•
telligible species received from exterior things by way of the senses which
are required by the sensitive powers.
the body can thus readily be seen.

~by

the soul needed to be united to

And this is as it should be for st.

Thomas never tires of repeating that the soul is the least in the order of
intellectual substances as prime matter is the least in the order of sensible
things.
• • • naturale est animae humanae corpori un~r~, quia cum
sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut
materia prima est infima in ordine sensibilium, non habet
anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit, quae
est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut
tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, • • • Unde oportet
quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat
mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et
animam humanrum necesse est corpori uniri.34
That the human soul should be actualized in knowing by intelligible
species draw.n from material things is in accord with its position in the
scale of beings.

The order and distinction of intellectual substances is

similar to that of corporeal substances.

From a consideration of the materi-

al order, then, we may arrive at a clearer grasp of the immaterial.

The

highest bodies have a potency in their nature which is wholly actualized by
their form.

In lower bodies the potency of matter is not completely per-

34Q. Disp. ~ Anima, q.l, a.8, c.
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rected by the form, but receives now one form, now another, from some external agent.

Likewise, inferior intellectual substances, such as human souls,

haVe an intellectual potency which is not actualized except successively by
reception of intelligible species from things.

The intellectual potency of

the higher intellectual substances is, on the other hand, completely actualized by intelligible species connatural to them.35
A difficulty may here arise.

Obviously, understanding by means of sim-

ply intelligible species is superior to understanding
abstracted from the phantasm.

by means of species

Now, since nature is always ordered to the

bast, why was not the human soul so fashioned as to have the first mode of
knowing natural to it, rather than the second?

St. Thomas thus presents the

difficulty:
Cum enim natura semper ordinetur ad id quod ~lius est;
est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad
intelligibilia simpliciter, quam per conversionem ad
phantasmata: debuit sic a Deo institui animae naturae,
ut modus intelligendi nobilior ei asset naturalis, et
non indigeret corpori propter hoc uniri.36
To answer this, st. Thomas offers as a consideration the fact that the

35sum. Theol., I, q.55, a.2, c. "Sic enim cportet intelligere distinctionem
er-ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, sicut est distinctio et ordo corporalium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter
perfectam per formam: in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae
non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam
formam, ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam
naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod aocipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intelleotiva in substantiis
spiritualibus superioribus, idest in angelis, naturaliter completa est per
species intelligibiles, in quantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt.
36~· Theol., I, q.89, a.l, c.
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universe requires that there should be a hierarchy of beings for the perreotion of the universe.

"Hoc autem perfeotio universi exigebat, ut diversi

gradus in rebus essent.u37 As a further reply, he considers that, although
the manner of understanding by means of phantasms is not so elevated as the
mode proper to higher intellectual substances, still it is the best and most
perfect as regards What is possible for rational souls.

"Considerandum est

igitur quod, etsi intelligere per oonversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter
nobilius quam intelligere per oonversionem ad phantasmata; taman ille modus
intelligendi, prout erat possibilis animae, erat imperfeotior.u38
The reason that knowledge by means of simply intelligible species is not
suited to human souls lies in the fact that because of the weakness of its
intellectual power it could understand such objects only in a confused and
general way, the consequent of which would be that rational souls would have
only imperfect knowledge.
of other intelligences.

That this is true is verified by an examination
God is Supremest Intelligence and the First Prin-

oiple of all intellectual light.

As they recede the farther from this First

Source, other intelligences participate in it less, and have, consequently,
weaker intellectual power.

Now, of all intellectual substances, the rational

soul is most distant from the First Principle of light; as a result, its intellectual power is less strong, and its manner of understanding must needs
be in proportion to its strength.

The light in the First Intelligence is

such that by one intelligible form, the Divine Essence, God knows all other
37Ibid.
36Ibid.

-
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things.

Superior intelligences, nearer than the human soul to the fountain

source, know by fewer and more universal intelligible forms •
• • • anima, cum sit infima in ordine intellectivarum substantiarum, infimo et debilissimo modo participat intellectualem naturam. Nam in primo intelligente, scilicet Deo,
natura intellectualis est adeo patens quod per unam formam
intelligibilam, scilicet essentiam suam, omnia intelligit;
inferiores vero substantiae intellectuales per species
multas; et quanta unaquaeque earum est altior, tanto habet
pauciores formas, et virtutem ma§is potentem ad intelligendum omnia per formas pauoas.3
That consideration leads to the conclusion that if inferior intellectual substances had forms so universal as the higher intellectual substances,
the knowledge of the former would be imperfect since their power of knowing

is weaker.

"Si autem substantia intellectualis inferior, haberet for.mas ita

universales siout superior; cum non adsit ei tanta virtus in intelligendo,
ramaneret ejus scientia incompleta; quia tantum in universal! res oognosceret
et non posset deducere cognitionem suam ex illis paucis et singulis.n 40

If

this mode of knowing were natural to the human soul, it would thus gain only
confused and general knowledge, as st. Thomas states:
Anima ergo humana, quae est infima, si acciperet formas in
abstractione et universalitate conformes substantiis separatis; cum habeat minimam virtutem in intelligendo, imperfectissimam cognitionem haberet, utpote oognoscens res in
quadam universalitate et confusione.41
An example may help to clarity this point.

Those men whose intellects

are weaker do not acquire knowledge by conceptions so universal as those
whose intellects are more powerful, but they must needs resort to details
39Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, o.
40 Ibid.
4!Ibid.

-

64

and examples, many of which can be dispensed with by keener minds.
&liqualiter apparet in hominibus:

"Quod

nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus per

universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. tt42
Thus, for perfect knowledge human souls must have recourse to material
objects and by their intellectual light reach out for the intelligible
species proportionate to their power which will make them from being potential knowers actual ones.

For the perfection of their intellectual opera-

tions, therefore, rational souls needed to be united to bodies.
Et ideo ad hoc quod ejus cognitio perficiatur, et distin-

guatur per singula, oportet quod a singulis rebus scientiam colligat veritatis; lumina taman intellectus agentis
ad hoc necessaria existente, ut altiori modo recipiantur
in anima quam sint in materia. Ad perfectionem igitur
intellectualis operationis necessarium fuit anima corpori uniri. 43
This should suffice to portray in what way the body ministers to the
accidental perfection of the rational soul, that perfection being the completion of its operations.

For nutrition and sensation, we have seen that

St. Thomas holds that the body is absolutely essential, and for the act of
intelligence it is also needed if the lowest of the intellectual substances
is to reach the perfection of its proper operation.

The sanses and the sen-

sitive powers may be unnecessary for intellectual substances which have
their proper object independently of exterior pathways, but for the human
soul there is no mode natural to it other than that whereby it grows in know42 Sum. Theol., I, q.89, a.l, c.
43~Disp • .£! Anima, q.l, a.l5, c.
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ledge through abstraction of its proper object from the phantasms received
rrom sensibles through the mediua of the organs of the human body.

The phan-

tasm, as we have seen, is necessary both to the acquisition of new knowledge
and to the application and use of the knowledge we have.

Since, therefore,

phantasms are acquired through the senses and the sensitive powers work
through organs, the body which will, consequently, be most suited to the
rational soul must be one whose disposition will best fit this mode of knowledge which is proper to the rational soul.

Just what that disposition is

considered to be by St. Thomas we shall endeavor to determine in the next
chapter.

CHAPTER

III

THE DISPOSITION OF THE HUMAN BODY
IS SUITED TO THE RATIONAL SOUL
The kind of body which will be suited to the rational soul depends to
a large extent upon the close and intimate relationship which must, in the

vieW of St. Thomas, exist between the soul and its body.

Thus he explicitly

states that the soul is the efficient, formal, and final cause of the body,
for in his commentary on Aristotle, he says:

"Et cum principium at causa

dicatur multipliciter, anima dicitur tribus modis principium et causa viventis corporis.

~ ~~

cujus causa, idest finis.

sicut unde est principium motus.

Alio

~·

sicut

Tertio, sicut substantia, id est forma animator-

um.."l
That St. Thomas means by the principle of movement, referred to in this
passage, the efficient causa is clear from another in which he tells us that
this was the sense attached to it by Aristotle.

To the objection that the

soul would need to precede the body in point of time if it were the efficient
cause of the body, st. Thomas gives as the interpretation of Aristotle the
following:

tt

• • • Philosophus non dicit animam, efficients.m esse oausrum cor-

poris, sed causa unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus
localis in corpore, at augmenti, at aliorum hujusmodi. • • tt2
1st. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 7, n.318.
2Q. Disp. De Pot., q.'3,"' a.lO, ad sum.
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It is this

67
conception of efficient cause, therefore, which we must give to st. Thomas'
own statement:

"• •• corpus autem disponatur ad hoc quod sit proportionatum

esse per actionem animae, quae est causa efficiens corporis. • • tt3
Although in the first chapter we treated of the soul as the form of the
body with reference to the

t~e

of the existence of the rational soul, we

shall here again for the sake of unity consider that st. Thomas holds that
the rational soul is the substantial or formal cause of the body for two
reasons:

first, it is the formal cause of its body because it is the cause

of its being in that the human body is actualized by the rational soul, and
secondly, since the act of anything is the for.m of that thing, and, consequently, its formal cause, the soul is the formal cause of the body because
it is the aot of the body which was only potentially in act before its advent.
Et primo, quod anima sit causa viventis corporis, ut forma:

et hoc duplici ratione: quarum prima talis est. Illud est
causa alicujus ut substantia, idest, ut forma, quod est
causa essendi; nam per formam unumquodque est actu. Sed
anima viventibus est causa assendi; par animam enim vivunt,
at ipsum vi vera est esse eorum: ergo anima est causa vi vantis corporis, ut for.ma.4
Id quod est actus alioujus, est ratio et forma ejus quod
est in potentia: sed anima est actus corporis viventis • • •
ergo anima est ratio et forma viventis oorporis.s
The rational soul is not only the efficient and formal cause of the

3Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 11um., also In IV Sent., D.XLIV, q.l, a.2,
s.l, c. ts'imon Ocohi, Venica,l71r0'}'" "• •• aniiiia' ha'6at se ad corpus non
solum in habitudine formae, at finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae efficientis."
4rn I I De Anima, leot. 7, n.319, also Cont. _Gent., II, 68-70.
5Th-Ibid., n. 320.
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body, but it is its final cause as well.
rorma et motor, sed etiam finis.n6

"• •• anima non solum est corporis

The reason given is that just as the in-

tellect acts for an end, so, too, does nature.

Now the intellect in the

things that are achieved through art orders matter and disposes it for the
ror.m; in like manner does nature.

Since, therefore, the soul is the form of

the body, and the matter is disposed for the form, the human body will have
as its end the rational soul.
Et quod sit causa, ut finis, viventium corporum, sic ostendit.

Sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et natura.
• • Sed intellectus in his quae fiunt per artem, materiam
ordinat at disponit propter for.mam: ergo et natura. Cum
igitur anima sit forma viventis corporis, sequitur quod
sit finis ejus.7
That the soul is the final cause of the body has an important bearing
on the disposition of the body, for the union of soul and body exists for
the sake of the soul and not for the sake of the matter since form is not
for matter but rather matter is for form.

"• •• considerandum est quod unio

animae et corpori non est propter corpus, sed propter animam:
est propter materiam, sed e converso."8

nee enim forma

Now because matter is for the form,

it is from the form that we seek the reason that the human body is such as
it is.

"• •• cum materia sit propter formam, et none converso; ex parte

animae oportet accipere rationam, quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur; •• •n9
The soul, as we explained in the last chapter, requires a body as a
necessary instrument for its operations of sensation and nutrition, and for
6Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c.
7In II De -Anima, laot. 7, n.321.
s
--~· Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c.
Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c., also Sum. Thaol., I, q.91, a.S, c.
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its intellectual operations, as a minister.
Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam operatione.m
animae, quae mediante corpori exercetur; sicut patet in
operibus sensitivae et nutritivae • • • Est autem aliqua
operatio animae, quae non exercetur corpore mediante,
sed taman ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operatione
exhibetur.lO
Now, form gives being and species to matter that matter may be suited
to the operations of the form, and because the body is to minister to the
various activities of the rational soul, it must have diversity of parts •
• • • cum materia sit propter formam; hoc modo forma dat
esse et speciem materiae, secundum quod congruit suae
operationi: et quia corpus perfectibile ab anima ad hoc
quod congruat diversis operationibus animae, requirit
diversitatem in partibus • • • 11
Furthermore, just as the whole organized body is so related that it may
zealously serve the soul's operations which are exercised through it, so,
too, there is one organ related to, or corresponding to, each determinate
operation.

"• •• sicut tatum corpus organicum se habet ut deserviat opera-

tionibus animae quae per corpus exercentur, ita se habet unum organum ad
unum determinatam operationem."l2

A great variety of organs is demanded be-

cause the soul, though simple in its essence, is yet manifold in its powers
and operations.

"• •• anima rationalis quamvis sit simplex in essentia,

tamen est multiplex in potentiis et operationibus; et ideo oportet quod corpus suum multa habeat organa ad diversas operationes apta; • • • "13
lOsum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3.c.
llQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 2um.
12Ibid., ad~
-1~
- -D.l, q.2, a.5, ad 3um., also Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, ad
In II Sent.,
3um., and also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 17um.
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-

--

-

--

70

Diversity of organs is, therefore, in proportion to diversity of operations, and this in turn to the gradation in perfection of forms, for nobler
forms have a greater variety of operations.

This is because perfection in

activity corresponds to perfection in being since operation pertains to being existing in act.

Having said that the soul, like any other form, is the

principle of its operations, st. Thomas continues:
Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi,
cum operatic sit existentis in actu; et ideo quanto aliqua
forma est majoris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam
majoris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores
habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae
minus perfectae.14
In less perfect beings a diversity of accidents is sufficient for diversity of operations, but for the more perfect, a diversity of parts is needed.
In fire, for example, various activities pertain to various accidents.

Fire

ascends according to its lightness and heats according to its warmth, but no
organs are required for such.
Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus

perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium. In rebus autem
magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium; et
tanto magis, quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Vidamus enim
quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa
accidentia; sicut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis; sed taman quaelibet harum oEerationum competit igni secundum quamlibet
partem ejus.l
Animate bodies have nobler forms than inanimate ones and, consequently,
more operations, and parts, as well.
14Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.9, c.
15Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.9, c.
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of the root, the stem, and the branches are not identical.
~ero

"In corporibus

animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus deputan-

tur diversae partes; sicut in plantis, alia est operatic radicis, alia rami,
et stipi tis; • • • nl6

He concludes, then, that animated

are more perfect,

require more parts to correspond to their greater

~11

bodies, as they

perfection, and that since the rational soul is the most perfect of forms,
its body, consequently, will need a greater variety of organs or parts.
• • • et quanta corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto
propter majorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri majorem
diversitatem in partibus. Unde cum anima rationalis sit
perfectissima formarum naturalium, in hamine invenitur
maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes; • • • 17
It is to the rational soul, therefore, that we must look for the reason
why the human body is what it is and is not what it is not, and chiefly to
the proper operation of this noblest of forms, for it is its function of
understanding which

~11

necessitate a body different from all other bodies.

"• •• cum materia sit propter formam, forma autem ordinetur ad propriam
operationem oportet quod talis sit materia uniuscuique formae ut competit
operationi illius formae; • • • ttl8

Navf, if the rational soul needs to be

united to a body to receive that which

~11

actualize it in knowing; namely,

the intelligible species received from things by way of the senses, it follows that the body to which the soul is united must be such that it is most
capable of representing to the intellect the sensible species from which the
16 Ibid
1

•
?fS:rd.,

also II Cont. Gent., 71, and also, Q. Disp. ~ Spiritu. Creat.,
c.-- 18Q. Disp. E! Anima, q.l, a.lO, ~ 1um.

q:r; a.4,
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agent intellect can extract its proper object.

The human body must, there-

fore, be best disposed for sensation.
Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori,
quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus
mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima
rationablis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum
ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibles, ex
quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultant.
Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur,
esse optime dispositum ad sententiendum.l9
Since without organs there is no sensation and since nature does not
fail to furnish what is necessary, there must be sense organs in the human
body.

Now, although there are several senses, there is one which is the

foundation of all the others; namely, touch, in which man's whole sensitive
nature chiefly consists.

"Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui

est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura
sensitiva consistit; •• • n20
Why is it that touch should be considered by st. Thomas to be the
foundation of all other senses, rather than sight, or some one of the other
senses?

One reason is that the sense of touch is absolutely essential to

make a body an animal body.

For no other sense can this be said because

there are some animals which, although they have no other sense but touch,
are truly called animals because they have this sense of touch.

Concerning

this, the following comment of st. Thomas will be interesting to note:
• • • sicut vegetativum potest separari a tactu et ab
omni sensu, sic tactus potest separari ab aliis sensibus. Multa enim sunt animalia, quae solum sensus
19op. cit., a.8, c., also Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, c.
20 Ibid:;-also In III De Anima, lect., 3, n.602.
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taotus habent, sicut animalia imperfecta. Omnia autem
animalia habent sensum tactus. Vegetativum autem principium dicimus illam partem animae~ qua etiam vegetabilia, idest plantae, participant. l
Likewise of interest is his gradation of living things with regard to touch.
Sic igitur ex praedictis patent tres gradus viventium.
Primus est plantarum. Secundus animalium imperfectorum immobilium, quae habent solum sensum tactus.
Tertius est animalium perfectorum quae moventur motu
profressivo, quae etiam habent alios sensus. Manifestum est autem, quod quartus gradus est eorum quae
habent cum his etiam intellectum.Z2
We see, therefore, that because of this sense a thing is first entitled
to be called an animal.

"• •• propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur; ••"zs

Without this sense of touch, moreover, the animal would die, and nothing can
have this sense unless it be an animal, nor be an animal unless it have the
sense of touch, as St. Thomas expresses it:

"• •• cum necesse sit omne

animal habere tactum, • • • manifestum est quod solum per privationem hujus
sensus, scilicet tactus, necesse est animalia mori.

Hie enim sensus

convert~

tur cum animali, nee aliquid potest ipsum habere nisi sit animal, nee aliquid
potest esse animal nisi habeat hunc sensum.n2 4
Touch is so necessary because it is through it that discernment between
the suitable and the non-suitable is made whereby the safety of the animal
is secured, and the good sought and the evil avoided.

"Et ideo nisi animal

haberet sensum tactus, per quem discerneret convenientia a corruptivis, non
posset haec fugere et illa accipere, et ita non posset salvari animal.
21In II De Anima, lect.3, n.260.
22Ibid:"~!Q· Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.a, c.
In III De Anima, lect., 18, n.869, also Cont.

~.,

II, 90.
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oessarium est igitur ad salutem animalis, quod habeat sensum tactus.n 25
Now, how does St. Thomas account for this power of discrimination which
he attributes to the sense of touch and which is one more reason why it is
the foundation of all the other senses?

He tells us that it is the organ of

the common sense which discerns the sensible of one sense from the sensible
of another sense, for to distinguish the essence of white and sweet belongs
to the intellect, but to distinguish the way in which the sense is modified
belongs to sense.

"Cognosoimus autem differentiae albi et dulcis, non solum

quantum ad quod quid est utriusque, quod pertinet ad intellectum, sed etiam
quantum ad diversam immutationem sensus.

Et hoc non potest fieri nisi per

sensum." 26
The sense which thus discriminates is touch whose ultimate organ is not
flesh since it has the ability to discern the tangible from other sensibles
and for this reason is the root of all the other senses because it is so
closely related to the fountain source of all the senses, to wit, the common
sense.
Et si, per aliquem sensum fit, hoc maxima videtur, quod fiat
per taotum, qui est primus sensuum, et quodammodo radix et
fundamentum omnium sensuum; et ab hoc, animal habet, quod
dicatur sensitivum. Unde manifestum est, quod caro non est
ultimum organum sensus taotus: quia cum per sensum tactus
fiat disoretio, necesse asset quod ipso contactu carnis a
tangibili fieret discretio tangibilis ab aliis sensibilibus. Attribuitur autem ista discretio tactui non secundum
quod tactus est sensus proprius, sed secundum quod tactus
est fundamentum omnium sensuum, et propinquius se habens
ad fontalem radioem omnium sensuum, qui est sensus communis.27
25 rn III De Anima, lect.l7, n. 860.
2Elr\::'
- - - - 3, n.601.
Op.- Cit.,
lect.,
2'1n:::
nn. Cit., n.602 •
.... ..;;&:. -
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The reason that touch can thus discriminate is, therefore, because the
organ of the sense of touch is also the organ of the common sense, and the
reason that flesh cannot be the ultimate organ of the sense of touch is that
since discernment is effected through touch it is necessary that by the very
contact of the flesh with the tangible, discernment of the actual tangible
from other sensibles should occur.

Consequently, this discrimination is at-

tributed to touch not in so far as touch is a proper sense, but rather in so
far as it is related to the common sense and is the root of all the other
senses.

Furthermore, it is because the organ of touch is diffused through-

out the whole body that it can be the organ of the common sense.
Oportet autem illud principium sensitivum commune habere
aliud organum, quia pars sensitiva non habet aliquam
operationem sine organo. Cum enim organum taotus diffundatur per totum corpus necessarium videtur, ut ibi
sit organum hujus principii sensitivi communis, ubi est
prima radix organi tactus.28
And this is the reason why touch can be the foundation of all the other
senses; namely, because the organ of touch is diffused throughout the whole
body, and the instrument of any sense is also the instrument of the sense of
touch, as st. Thomas states:
sensuum:

"• •• tactus est fundamentum omnium aliorum

manifestum est enim, quod organum tactus diffunditur per totum cor-

pus, et quodlibet instrumentum cujusque sensus est etiam instrumentum taotus; • • .u29
Two more indications given by st. Thomas that the sense of touch is the
principal sense are:
28 op. cit., n.6ll.

First, when this sense is inoperative, all the other

29"fu IIDe Anima, lect., 2, n.484.
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senses are also.

For no other sense is this true.

Our sense of vision, for

example, or our sense of hearing may not be functioning, but that does not
prevent our tasting, smelling, and the like.

"• •• et inde est quod immo-

bilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno acoidit, amnes alii sensus i.nmobilitantur;
, • ,tt30

Secondly, all the other senses are impeded not only by the excess

of their own proper sensibles, as vision is hindered when the light is too
brilliant, and hearing when sound is too intense, but also they are hindered
by an excess of the proper sensible of touch, that is to say, by too much
heat or cold and the like.

"• •• et iterum omnes alii sensus non solum

solvuntur ab excellentia proprium sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum
fulgidis at auditus a maximis sonis; sed etiam ab exoellentia sensibilium
secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore.n31
The body which can have the sense of touch cannot be a simple body beoause it must be so constituted that it can perceive its object without any
medium.

We might, perhaps, suppose that a body which needed to be properly

equipped for hearing could be composed of air, for the auditory sense contacts its proper object through the medium of air, or again that a body
which was to be suited to the sense of sight only could be composed of light,
for light is the medium between sight and its object, but the body which must
have the sense of touch, and every animal body must have, needs to be so
formed that it will require no medium between itself and its object for
touch is not exercised through a medium but simply through direct contact

1-----...
Ibid.

~ 0Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, o.
---
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since it perceives through itself.

Now, an airy body, or a body of light,

or of fire, for instance, could not contact sensible objects, and, therefore,
could not be an instrument of touch.

The animal body must be such, as a

consequence, that through it the sense of touch can be constituted.32
viously, then, this body cannot be of any one element.

Ob-

"Et, quia corpus ani

malis oportet esse tale ut per ipsum fiat sensus tactus, impossibile est
quod ullum elementorum sit corpus animalis:
alii sensus:

neque terra, per quam non sunt

neque alia elementa, per quae fiunt sensus.n33

Perhaps the strongest reason which St. Thomas gives to prove that the
animal body cannot be of any one element is that it must be a medium between
contraries, and so must not have any element in excess, as it would have if
it were made of fire only, or air, or water only.34
Now, the human body,although it is an animal body, is united to a
32rn III De Anima, lect.l8, n.865. "• •• oportet quod omne corpus animatum,
sciliCe~anima sensibili, sit tale, ut per ipsum possit fieri sensus tactus. Omnia autem elementa praeter terram, possunt esse organa, vel media
aliorum sensuum, scilicet aer et aqua faoiunt sentire per alterum, idest
per medium. Sed tactus non fit per medium, sed in tangendo ipsa sensibilia; et ideo sic nominatur, quamvis et alii sensus sentiant quodammodo
in tangendo, non quidem immediate, sed per medium immutat ipsum. Solus
autem sensus tactus in tangendo sensibile sentiti per ipsum, et non per
aliquod medium."
33rbid., n.866, also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.S, ad 1um, and ad 12um.
34rbid., n.867. "Cujus ratio eat, quia illud, per quod:rit tactus, oportet
medium inter qualitates tangibiles, ad hoc quod sit susceptivum
earum, utpote in potentia existens ad eas, • • • Et hoc est verum non
solum respeotu qualitatum terrae, sed etiam omnium tangibilium qualitatum.
In corporibus autem simplicibus non invenitur medium inter qualitates
tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae qualitates, secundum extremitatem contrarietatis. Et inde manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nee
per aliquid corporibus simplicibus vicinum, potest fieri sensus tactus.
Et ideo ossibus, capillis et talibus partibus non sentimus, quia super•
abundat in eis quod terrae est, et non reducuntur ad medium prout tactus
requirit. Also, Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, ad 1um.
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rational soul, and therefore, must be constituted
other animal bodies.

some~hat

differently from

The first difference will consist of its being so

:fashioned as to be the best possible ins.trument for touch.

The reason that

this must be is that the intellectual powers of man are dependent, as we
have seen in the second chapter, upon the sensitive powers, and these sensitive powers are in turn dependent upon the sense of touch.

"Cum igitur cor-

pus cui anima rationalis unitur, debeat esse optima dispositum ad naturam
sensitivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tactus: • • • tt35
As every animal body, the human body must be composed of contraries because the organ of touch must be a medium among the contraries.

"• •• or-

ganum autem taatus oportet esse medium inter contraria; • • • Unde corpus
congruens tali animae fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum.n36

Now it is

necessary for the organ of touch to be a medium precisely because it must
have contraries, not actually, but potentially.

"• •• oportet organum tac-

tus non habere actu contrarietates, sed potentia; • • • n37
st. Thomas proves that the sense of touch is only in potency in the
following manner.

The sense organ suffers from a sensible object, for sen-

sation is, in a way, suffering.

This sensible object which contacts the

organ is What really actualizes the sense of touch.

Now, the organ of touch

does not perceive the quality of the object Which affects it when the organ
itself already possesses that quality in act, for we do not perceive that
35Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c.
36Q. Disp. -De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.
37 Cont. Gent.,
-II, 90.
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is hard or soft, hot or cold, according to the mode in which any of

these is in the organ itself, but we feel the degrees of tangibles by the
sense of touch when the organ of this sense is in a middle state between two
contraries, e.g., hot and cold.

And thus it is that we are able to dis-

tinguish between hot and cold, and the like, for if heat were in act in the
body, the degree of heat in the sensible could not be ascertained, and so

tor cold, and all the others.
Manifestum est autem, quod organum tactus, • • • est quaedam pars, quae est in potentia ad hujusmodi qualitates.
Organum enim sensus patitur a sensibili, quia sentire est
pati quoddam: unde sensibile, quod est agens facit ipsum
tale in actu, quale est sansibile, cum sit in potentia ad
hoc. Et propter hoc, organum tactus non sentit illam
qualitatem secundum quam est in actu. Non enim sentimus
id quod est calidum aut frigidum, durum aut molle, secundum illum modum quo haec insunt organa tactus; sed sentimus excellentias tangibilium, quasi organa tactu constitute in ali§ua mediante inter contrarias tangibiles
qualitates. 8
Moreover, to discern what is vary hot the sense of touch must know what
is very cold, for heat and coldness are relative qualities.

One and the

same object, for example, may be both hot and cold depending upon that to
which it is compared.

If lukewarm water is compared to boiling water it is

cold; if, on the other hand, it is compared to ice water, it is hot.

The

sense of touch must be susceptible of both extremes in order to determine
accurately the quality of the sensible that affects it, and for this reason
it may be said to be both extremes in potency.

Just as the organ which is

to detect white or black must be actually neutral to both, and so for each
38 In II De Anima, lect., 23, n.547.
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sense organ with regard to its proper object, so, too, the sense of touch
must be neither hot nor cold actually, but both potentially.
Et propter hoc organum tactus discernit extrema tangi-

bilum: medium enim est discretivum extremorum: potest
enim pati ab utroque extremorum, eo quod dum comparatur
ad unum habet in se rationem alterius; sicut tepidum in
comparatione ad calidum, est frigidum; in comparatione
ad frigidum, est calidum: unde medium patitur ab utroque extremorum, cum sit quodammodo utrique contrarium.
Et oportet quod, sicut organum, quod debet sentire
album et nigrum, neutrum ipsorum habet actu, sed utrumque in potentia, et eodem modo in aliis sensibus; sic
etiam se habeat in sensu tactus; scilicet organum neque
sit calidum, neque frigidum actu, sed potentia utrumque.39
However, there is this difference between touch and the other senses.
They are not only in potency to their sensibles, but they must be absolutely
without them in their organs.

There must be no color in the eye, to make

one application, because the receiver of a thing must be without the thing
received.

The organ of touch is not under this necessity, for touch must be

capable of being acted on by all those qualities of which the animal body is
necessarily composed; to wit, heat, cold, dryness, wetness, and the rest.
It is not possible, therefore, for the organ of touch to be entirely free
from its proper sensibles, but it must be reduced to a medium in order to be
in potency to contraries~O

It is obvious, then, that perfection of touch

39Ibid.
40Q::Disp. ~ Anima, q.l, a.a, c. "cum autem organum cujuslibet sensus non
debeat habere in actu contraria, quorum sensus est perceptivus; sed esse
in potentia ad illa, ut possit ea recipere, quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto; aliter neoesse est hoc esse in organo tactus, et in
organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret
omnino albo et ni~ro, et universaliter omni genera coloris; et similiter
est in auditu et 1n olfactu; hoc autem in taotu accidere non potest. Nam
tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sioci; unde impossibile
est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genera sui sensibilia; sed
oportet quod sit reductum ad medium sic enim est in potentia ad contraria."
Also
um
heol.
91 a 1 a
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will correspond to a medium disposition.

"Et propter hoc, quanta animal

habet complexionem magis reductam ad medium, tanto habet meliorem tactum. tt41
Now, because mixed bodies have nobler forms the closer they approach to
evenness of complexion, that body to which the rational soul is united must,
consequently, have the most equable disposition, according to st. Thomas:
"• •• quum videamus corpora mixta tanto nobiliores formas habere quanta
magis ad temperamentum commixtionis perveniunt; et sic quod habet for-mam nobilissimam, utpote substantiam intellectualem, si sit corpus mixtum, oportet
esse temperatissimum; • • • n42
most equable of bodies.

Man has, therefore, the noblest form and the

"Et ideo, quanto talia corpora ad majorem aequali-

tatem mixtionis accedunt, tanto nobiliorem formam sorliuntur a Deo:

quale est

corpus humanum, quod est temperatissimae mixtionis, ut probat bonitas tactus
in hominibus, et nobilissimam formam habet, scilicet animam rationalem.n43
St. Thomas tells us further that in this evenness of temperament we can
see terminated in man, as in the most perfect, all the operations of the inferior natures:
Corpus ergo cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse
convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit
maxima reductum ad medium per aequalitatem oomplexionis.
In quo apparet quod tota operatio inferioris naturae
terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus
enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus
elementis commiscendo ea, quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commdxtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano.
Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem corporis cui anima
rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis.44
42
__
4lrn
II _De Anima, lect., 23, n.548.
Cont. Gent., II, 90.
43ne Occ~s Operationibus, (Mandonnet, Opuscula Omnia, I, 5).
44Q. Disp. ~Anima,
q.l, a.a, c.
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Thera is for st. Thomas a very decided relationship between intellectual
ability and the sense of touch and evenness of disposition, for we find such
expressions of the great Saint as the following:
• • • quanto est melioris tactus, tanto est melioris intellectus, quia subtilitas tactus sequitur aequalitatem complexionis.45
And again:
• • • unde etiam videmus quod molities carnis et bonitas
tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt
signa boni intellectus.46
Also:
• • .et quod propter bonitatem hujus sensus etiam unus
homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes.
Molles enim carne (qui sunt boni tactus) aptos mente
videmus.47
Finally:
Et propter hoc homo inter animalia melioris est tactus.

Et inter ipsos

homines~

qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt

melioris intellectus.4
We can scarcely say that an idea that appears so frequently in the works
of the Angelic Doctor was an inconsiderable one for their author.

Indeed,

St. Thomas insists that it is this very sense of touch which makes men, of
all other animals, the most prudent, and makes man differ from man in mental
cleverness.

No other sense can lay claim to such importance.

"Unde, quia

homo habet optimum tactum, sequitur quod sit prudentissimum omnium aliorum
animalium.

Et in genera hominum ex sensu tactus accipimus, quod aliqui in-

4Sr
46
_
n_
II _Sent., D.l, q.2, a.5, c.

Cont. Gent., II, 90.
47Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, c.
48 Sum. Theol.,
I, q.76, a.5, c.
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geniosi sunt, vel non ingeniosi:

et non secundum aliquam alium sensum.n49

The necessary corollary to this is that men whose flesh is hard are weak
in intellectual power, and those whose flesh is soft are well-endowed in
This st. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm, for he continues his

~nd.

thought thus:

"Qui enim habent duram carnem, et per consequens habent malum

taotum, sunt inepti secundum mentem:

qui vero sunt molles carne, et per con-

sequens boni tactus, sunt bene apti mente.

Unde etiam alia animalia habent

duriores carnes quam homo.n50
st. Thomas accounts for this correspondence between aptitude of mind
and the sense of touch in the following manner.

Since touch is the founda-

tion of all the other senses, and since the instrument of any other sense is
also the instrument of the sense of touch, as we have before remarked, (Supra,
footnote, 29), it is on this sense that a sensitive nature depends.

He who

has a better sense of touch will have, consequently, a more sensitive nature,
and, therefore, in the mind of St. Thomas, a keener intellect.

The reason

for this is that excellence of touch is a disposition to excellence of intellect.

This will not hold true for any other sense.

One may, for example,

have a more delicate sense of hearing without at the same time having a more
sensitive nature, and so for all the other senses save only touch.
Sed dicendum est, quod duplici ex causa, bonitas mentis
respondet bonitati tactus. Prima ratio est, quod tactus
est fundamentum onmium aliorum sensuum: manifestum est
enim, • • • illud, ex quo aliquid dicitur esse sensitivum, est sensus tactus. Unde ex hoc quod aliquis habet
meliorem tactum, sequitur quod simpliciter habet maliorem
49 In II

-

De Anima, lect., 19, n.483.

50ibid."-
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sensitivam naturam, et per consequens, quod sit melioris
intellectus. Nam bonitas sensus est dispositio ad bonitatem intellectus. Ex hoc autem, quod aliquis habet
meliorem auditum vel meliorem visum, non sequitur quod
sit melius sensitivus vel melioris sensitivae simpliciter,
sed solum secundum quid.Sl
Furthermore, goodness of touch is consequent upon goodness of complexion
and upon goodness of complexion nobility of soul follows because every form
is proportionate to its matter.

Wherefore we may conclude with St. Thomas

that those whose touch is more perfect are nobler in soul and clearer in
:mind.
Alia ratio est, quia bonitas tactus consequitur bonitatem
complexionis sive temperantiae • • • Ad bonam autem camplexionem corporis sequitur nobilitas animae: quia omnis
forma est proportionata suae materiae. Unde sequitur,
quod qui sunt boni tactus, sunt nobilioris animae, et
perspicacioris mentis.52
A better sense of touch, then, denotes better intellect, and perfection
of touch is consequent uponlcomplexion and softness of the flesh, and also
upon greater or less susceptibility to heat and cold, for st. Thomas gives
this latter condition in the following passage.
Et ideo oportet quod sensus tactus tanto sit certior quanto

complexio corporis est magis temperata, quasi ad medium
zeducta. Hoc autem maxima oportet in homine, ad hoc quod
corpus ejus sit proportionatum nobilissimae formae. Et
ideo homo inter alia animalia habet certissimum tactum,
et per consequens gustum, qui est tactus quidam. Et huius
signum est; quod homo minus potest sustinere vehementiam
frigoris et caloris qurum alia animalia; et etiam inter
homines, tanto est aliquis magis aptus mente; quanto est
melioris tactus; quod apparet in his qui habent molles
carne, • • • 53
5lrn II De Anima, lect., 19, n.484.
52Tl:'
- - n.485.
~!'"Ibid.,
5
~De Sensu et Sensato, I, 9, (Ioannem Keerbergium,Antwerp,l612,Tomus Tertius)
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These qualities in the human body, to which we have just referred, are
indications of a good intellect, but they are not all that is required.

The

act of understanding depends upon the interior sense faculties and so upon
their organs, as well as upon the exterior senses and their organs, and the
disposition of these interior organs will be a determinant factor in estimating the strength of mental power.

Thus, after speaking of the impediment to

understanding caused by the indisposition of the organs of the imagination,
memory, and "vis cogitativa," to which we have previously called attention in
chapter two, st. Thomas continues:

"Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositio-

nis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, in quantum ex hoc
praedictae vires fortiores existunt."54
Now, the disposition of these organs mentioned above depends upon the
brain, and as man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers,
"Praecedit etiam homo amnia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores; • • • "55 , he has the largest brain of all other animals in proportion

to the size of his body.
Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinam potentiarum sensitivarum
interiorum, puta imaginationis, et memoriae, et cogitativae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri;
ideo factus est homo habens majus cerebrum inter omnia
animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis.56
The two reasons that account for one man's being able to understand
better than another are taken from these two dispositions; namely, the disposition of the body, and the disposition of the interior organs.
54cont. Gent., III, 84.
s~sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ~~··also I, q.78. a.4, c.
S~Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, c.
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ditions are thus presented by St. Thomas:
• • • unus alio potest eande.m ram melius intelligere, quia
est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; • • • Hoc autem
circa intellectum contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo
ex parte intellectus, qui est perfectior. Manifestum est
enim quod quanta corpus est melius dispositum, tanto
melior em sorti tur animam: quod manifest a apparet in his
quae sunt secundum speoiem diversa. Cujus ratio est, quia
actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae
capaoitatem: unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant
corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo. • • Alio modo oontingit hoc ex
parte inferiorum virtutum quibus intellectus indiget ad
sui operationem: illi anim in quibus virtus imaginativa
et cogitativa at memorativa est melius disposita, sunt
melius dispositi ad intelligendum.57
In the passage just cited, st. Thomas once again states that diversity
and dignity of souls is derived from a diversity of bodies.

As we noted in

treating of the distinction of souls in the first chapter, if diversity of
souls depended on diversity of the for.ms, that would entail a specific differenoe.

Now this is untenable in the Thomistic system.

". • • differentia

formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositions materiae, non facit
diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum numerum; sunt enim diversorum indi viduorum di versae formae, secundum materiam di versificatam. tt58

The dis-

position of the rational soul follows the disposition of the body, then,
partly because the rational soul receives something from the body, and partly
because forms are diversified according to the diversity of the matter.
"• •• ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis;

tum quia anima rationalis aliquid accipit a corpore; tum quia secundum
57Sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.7, c.
58 Ibid., ad 3um.
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diversitatam matariae diversificantur at for.mae.n59
The brain is an important part of the human body, and it is because of
it that man, alone of all other animals, has an upright stature.

In order

that the brain may be freer in its operations, the head must be erect.

This

requires a high degree of heat in the heart, and this necessity, as we shall
see later, (Infra, 66), affects the other senses •
• • • st ut liberior sit ajus operatio, habet caput sursum
positum; quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero animalia ourva incedunt; at ad hanc rectitudinem habendam at
conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde,
• • • ; cujus signum est quod in senio incurvatur homo,
cum calor naturalis debilitatur.60
That an upright stature is becoming to man, as wall as necessary, St.
Thomas gives four reasons.

First, man was given his senses not merely to

procure the necessaries of life, for which purpose they were given to other
animals, but also to acquire knowledge.

That accounts for their position

chiefly in the face, for in this way, man oan contact things above and below,
and from all drink in knowledge and enjoyment,
• • • habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter
quatuor. Primo quidam, quia sensus sunt dati homini, non
solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, siout aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad oognosoendum • • • solus homo deleotatur
in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et
ideo, quia sensus praeoipue vigent in facie, alia animalia
habent faciem pronam ad terram, • • • homo vero habet
faciem erect am, ut per sensus, at praeoipue per vi sum, • • •
libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia oognosoere, at
oaelestia at terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem oolligat veritatem.61
59Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad tum.
60Q. Disp. De Anima,
q.l, a.a,o. 61 Sum. Theol.,
I, q.9l, a.3, ad 3um.
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The second reason has been already given; namely, that the greater freedom of the brain requires an upright stature,

(Supra, 60).

The third is

that if man were not of an erect posture, he would need to use his hands for
feet, and thus would not have the free use of them for other purposes.

"Tar-

tio quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronum staturam, uteretur manibus
loco anteriorum pedum.

Et sio utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda

oessaret."6 2
st. Thomas gives as the fourth cause that the tongue of the human animal would become hard and protruding if it were employed as the instrument
for acquiring food.

This, moreover, would prove an impediment to speech,

which is the natural vehicle of the reason.
Quarto quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet
ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa,
et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur,
siout patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio
omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium rationis.63
Delicate touch, soft flesh, evenness of complexion, large brain, and upright stature, are, therefore, dispositions which are proper to bodies united
to rational souls, and, consequently the human body is fittingly disposed for
its form.

Having noted these five elements, St. Thomas considers that he has

sufficiently accounted for the construction of the human body, for he coneludes:

"Et per istum modum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assig-

nanda ad singula quae sunt homini propria; •• •"64
62 rbid.
63rbid.

6Q.
4Disp.

~

Anima, q.l, a.8, c.
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But has he sufficiently accounted for the disposition of the human body?
The human body is certainly not the most perfect possible of bodies, nor is
it even so perfect as the bodies of many other animals in many respects.
Now, surely, the most perfect of

fo~,

such as is the rational soul, should

have been united to the most excellent of bodies.

This objection st. Thomas

meets by conceding first of all that it is indeed true that other animals
have a better sight, a more sensitive smell, a more acute hearing, greater
agility in movement and the like, even natural clothing and arms of defense
which men have not, but that also we must observe that the human body excels
other bodies in touch, equability of temperament, brain, and that these are
more desirable assets than those by which other animals surpass the human
animal.

Furthermore, we must remark that the human body had to be endowed

just as it is in order to minister to the intellectual operation of the
rational soul.

For this, man's temperament must be of an even disposition,

and to this evenness can be traced the explanation that human sight is not
so keen and human audition not so delicate as the animal sight and hearing.
This too prevents greater swiftness in movement, for excess in speed is
repugnant to an equable temperament.

Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia
sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo,
propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et
eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velooitatis
repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis.65
That human beings have poorer scent than other animals can likewise be
65sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 1um.
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accounted for in the following manner.

For erect posture, as we have re-

marked elsewhere, (Supra, 60), there is required great heat in the heart.
Now this heat must be moderated by a low temperature in the brain.

For this

low temperatura, the brain must have great humidity, since the brain is large
Now, for the perfection of smell, much dryness is required, which dryness is
tmpaded by the humidity of the brain.

Wherefore, the olfactory sense is lass

powerful in man than in some other animals, whose brain, though large, does
not have to be very damp as there is not so much heat in the heart to be
counteracted.
Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum.
Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia,
respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum: • • • tam
etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis,
quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit
rectae staturae. Magnitude aute.m cerebri, propter eius
humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit
siccitatam.66
In place of natural weapons and clothing, men have been endowed with
reason which can conceive a great variety of instruments and can choose the
proper one for the proper circumstance, and with hands which are, as it were,
the organ of organs.

Other animals are guided by instinct and thus deter-

mined to this thing or that, but such necessity would not have been suited
to the rational animal •
• • • alia animalia habent aestimativam naturalem determinatam ad aliqua certa; et ideo suffioienter potuit eis
prpvideri a natura aliqualibus certis auxiliis; non autem
homini, qui propter rationem est infinitarum conceptionum;
at ideo loco omnium auxiliorum quae alia animalia naturaliter habent, habet homo intelleotum, qui est species speci-
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arum; at manus, quae sunt organum organorum, per quas potest
sibi praeparare omnia necessaria.67
Furthermore, horns and claws, feathers, thickness of skin, and such
things are unsuited to the softness of flesh and equability of temperament
~ich

are essential to the human animal because these qualities indicate an

abundance of the earthly element which cannot predominate in an even complexion such as is that of the human body •
• • • cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma,
at spissitudo corii, at multitude pilorum aut plumarum, quae
aunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiaa tarrestris
elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et tenaritudini complexi•
onis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed
loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare
sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis
modis. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae,
quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem
infinita instrumenta sibi paranda.68
Another objection to the explanation of st. Thomas of the suitability of
the human body is based upon the soul's distinction of being the most subtle
of forms.

Since it is that, why then should it not have been united to the

most subtle of bodies?

We have partially answered this in showing what must

be the temperament of a body which was to excel in the sense of touch.
(Supra, 33 at 34).

We shall content ourselves with adding here only the

words of st. Thomas which directly

an~er

the question; namely, those wherein

he states explicitly that the rational soul could not have been united to the
most subtle of bodies, fire, for example, since then the matter could not
have been reduced to an evan disposition.
67Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, ad 2oum.
68 Sum. Theol.,
I, q.91, a.3, ad-um:-2 •
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• • • lioet anima sit subtillissima formarum, "in quantum
est intelligens; quia taman, cum sit infima in genera
formarum intelligibilium, indiget oorpori uniri, quod fit
mediante complexiane, • • • necessarium fuit quod corpus
cui unitur, haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus alementis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit effioacissimae virtutis in agendo; nisi secundum quantitatam inferiora elementa excederent, non possent fieri
commixtio, et maxima reducta ad medium; ignis enim alia
elementa consumeret.69
Furthermore, to no simple body could the rational soul be united, for in
simple bodies contraries are in act and could not be reduced to a medium.

We

repeat this text:
In oorporibus autem simplioibus non invenitur medium
inter qualitates tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae qualitates, secundum extremitatem oontrarietatis. Et inde
manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nee per
aliquid corporibus simplicibus Vicinum, potest fieri
sensus taotus.70
And, although it was not fitting for the rational soul to be united to a
heavenly body because such a body has no contraries and would not be a suitable instrument for touch, still the human body is most like this body in
that it is most distant from contraries because of the evenness of its disposition.
De nobilitate autem corporis caelestis est, quod non habet
contrarium; unde quanto plus corpus separatur a contrarietate, similius caelo effioitur • • • at ideo illus corpus
quod venit ad maximam aequalitatem mixtionis, est simillimum caelo, et tale corpus debet esse corpus humanum; •• • 71
That the human body has defects, and that these defects are, in a certain sense, natural to it, st. Thomas will not deny, nor will he seek to
69Q. Disp. De Ani~, q.l, a.s, ad 1um.
70 In III De~ma, lect., 18, n.S6~cited also (Supra, 34)
n
- D.l, q.2, a.5, c.
rn -II-Sent.,
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evade the issue by falling back upon sin as the cause of the corruption,
fatigue, subjection to disease, and the like disadvantages of the body, for
he considers that sin did not detract from human nature, considered in its
principles and the properties that flow from them.
~~ae

potest tripliciter dici:

"• •• bonum naturae hu-

primo ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus ipsa

natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae,
et alia hujusmodi • • • Primum bonum naturae nee tollitur, nee diminuitur per
peccatum." 72
To ascertain in what respect these defects can be said to be natural, we
may note first of all the twofold meaning of the word •natural.'
that has a nature is called natural.

A thing

That is the first distinction.

The

second is that a property flowing from that nature is said to be natural,
for example, to be lifted up is natural to fire.

"• •• naturale dicitur

dupliciter; vel id quod habet naturam, sicut dicimus corpora naturalia; vel
illud quod consequitur naturam secundum naturam existens, sicut dicimus quod
ferri sursum, est naturale igni: • • • nn

It is in this latter sense of

properties flowing from the nature of things that we shall consider whether
death and such like defects are natural to man.
de naturali, quod est secundum naturam."74
and form.

Something, therefore,

form or according to the matter.

~~y

II

• • • et sic loquimur nunc

Now, nature consists of matter

be natural to a thing according to the

The act of heating is natural to fire ac-

cording to form, for action follows form.

On the other hand, the ability to

72sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.l, c.
7~Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. For a further discussion of this point con74!~1~!ng narl;u~consult Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192bl.
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be heated by fire, as in water, is natural to water, not as to its form, but
as to its matter.

And since form is more truly nature, so to speak, than is

matter, what is natural to anything according to its form is more natural to
it than What is merely natural according to its matter.
Unde cum natura dicatur dupliciter, scilicet forma et materia, dupliciter dicitur aliquid naturale: vel secundum
formam, vel secundum materiam.. Secundum formam quidem,
sicut naturale est igni quod calefaciat nam actio consequitur formam; secundum materiam, autem, sicut aquae est
naturale quod ab igne calefieri possit. Cumque forma sit
magis natura quam materia, naturalius est quod est naturale secundum formam quam quod est naturale secundum ma.teriam..75
The natural condition of matter can likewise be viewed from two different aspects.

There is one condition of matter that makes it suitable for

such and such a form.

This is matter considered in relation to its end, and

this is what is looked to by the agent when he selects matter for some definita purpose, for he needs must choose those qualities which will be useful
to the thing he proposes to fashion.

The second condition of matter is that

which follows of necessity from the very nature of the matter itself.

This

consequent is not according to matter's suitability to its form, for it may
even be repugnant to the form, and, therefore, this is not chosen in the matter nor intended by the maker when he seeks the best matter for the form he
has in mind.
Sed id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter accipi potest:
uno modo secundum congruit formae; et hoc est quod agens
eligit in materia: alio modo non secundum quod congruit
formae, immo forte repugnat etiam formae et fini, sed ex
necessitate materiae; et talis conditio non est electa
75Q. Disp • .£!_ Iv~alo, q.S, a.5, c.
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vel intanta ab aganta; • • • 76
There are, therefore, certain conditions in matter which make a certain
matter proper for a certain form and certain conditions which have no ralation to the form but which follow of necessity from the matter.

The former

are what the agent seeks in making something, and not the latter, as we find
st. Thomas again affir.ming:

"• •• sed taman considerandum est, quod in his

quae sunt ex materia, sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter
quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; at sunt aliquae quae consaquuntur
ex necessitate materiae, at non ex electione agentis; •• • n77
Now, whatever is destined for an end will be so constituted as to serve
to the attainment of that end, as is clear in artificial things especially.
"• •• ea quae sunt ad finem, instituuntur secundum rationem finis, ut patet
praecipue in artificialibus.n78

Since God created all natural things, each

thing can, consequently, be called a work of art, and God, a Divine Artist.
The Divine Artist, as any human artist, desires to give to each of His productions the bast disposition in view of the purpose for which the object is
intended.

This best disposition may not, however, be the very best absolute-

ly, but only relatively, and it may even be compatible with many defects.

An example may illustrate this more clearly.

A man wants to fashion a saw.

This saw must cut, and must, therefore, be made of matter Which may not indeed be the most beautiful, or entirely free from undesirable accidents such
as subjection to rust, dullness, and the like, but which will be capable of
76 Ibid.

77Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, c.
7Brn II Sen~, D.l9, q.l, a.2, c.
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serving or fulfilling the end of the saw; namely, to cut.

Iron, as a con-

sequence, and not glass, will be selected by the fabricator of this instrument.
• •• omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina:
unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet
aute.m artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam
inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad fine.m.
Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram
ad secandam, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad seoandam;
nee curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia,
quia talis pulchritude esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositione.m, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem.79
And also:
• • • sicut ad faciendam serram artifex eligit duritiem in
ferro, ut sic serra utilis ad secandam; sed quod acies ferri hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex
necessitate materiae.SO
Furthermore, these undesirable qualities which are not suited to a form
or to its end, would willingly be excluded from the matter proper to the conceived end, if this were possible, but since it is not, they must be accepted and accounted for, not by their final cause, but rather by their material
cause.

It is for this reason that the agent who acts in view of an end and

who looks to the final cause of the thing should not be called to task for
conditions which flow from the matter itself.
Invenitur tamen in ferro aliqua conditio secundum quam ferrum non habet aptitudinem nee ad formam nee ad finem, siout
quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem vel aliquid
hujusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non sunt electa
79

Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, c •
._80Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, c.
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ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur, si asset possibile. Unde • • • in accidentibus individui non est quaerenda causa finalis sed solum causa materialis: proveniunt
enim ex dispositione materiae, non ex intentione agentis.81
These principles, than, namely, that something may be natural to a for.m
and not natural to the matter, and vice versa, and that matter itself has
certain conditions which give it an aptitude for a certain for.m and other
conditions which are necessitated by the very qualities of the matter and
which may even be repugnant to the form, will make clear, perhaps, in what
sense, we may affirm that the defects of the human body are natural to man
and also in what respect the human body has the best possible disposition.
According to the form of man, understanding, willing, and such operations,
are natural to him.

"Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale secundum suam

formam, ut intelligere, vella, et alia hujusmodi; • • • n82

Also, according

to his form, incorruptibility is natural to man because, as st. Thomas holds,
every form intends perpetual being in so far as it can, but only the rational
soul whose being does not wholly depend upon matter, since it has· immaterial
operations, can achieve it.
Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse, quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi
perpetuitatem sui, praeter an~am rationalam, eo quod ipsa
non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae
formae; quinimo habet propriam operationem immaterialem,
• • • Unde ex parte suae formae naturalior est homini incorruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus.83

81Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.
82Ibid.
-----8~sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.6, c. also, Cont.~·· II, 79.
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Naw, the rational soul is destined to eternal beatitude and, consequent-

ly, is adapted to its end by reason of its immortality.

But the human body

which has the rational soul for its proximate end is adapted to that end in
one way, but in another way it is not.

"• •• forma hominis, quae est anima

rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatenl, proportionata est suo fini,
qui est beatitude perpetua; sed corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile, secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo proportionatum est suae formae, et
quodammodo non. n84

It is adapted to the soul in that it is so constructed

that it may serve the soul in its acquisition of knowledge.

For this reason

the human body had to be composed of contraries, as has been previously
stated, (Supra, 36, et sqq.), and in this sense it is matter proportionate
to its form.
Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari
potest: uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam; • • •
Secundum aptitudinem quidem ad formam, necessarium est
corpus humanum esse ex elementis compositum, et medie
complexionatum. • • Unde corpus congruens tali animae
fuit corpus contrariis compositum.86

Now, anything composed of contraries is subject to corruption, for contraries are the "• •• causa corruptionis in rebus, ••

.n86

This corruption

is an absolute necessity since it is inseparable from the matter itself.
"• •• cum necessitas corruptionis sit necessitas absoluta, utpote proveniens
ex ipsa materia, • • • "87

It is according to this condition following upon

matter that the human body is not adapted to its form.
84Ibid.

8~isp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.
86 In II Sent.,
-D.l9,q.l, a.2, c.
87In D~ima, lect., 7, n.317.
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ex necessitate materiae quod sit corruptibile. secundum hanc conditionem non
habet aptitudinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam.''88
If, however, there could be found in nature any body composed of elements which would, at the same time, be incorruptible, that body would certainly be adapted to the rational soul, that is to say, proportionate according to the nature of the soul, and not merely according to the end intended.
As far as that goes, we may say the same for any other thing.

If iron could

be found which would be unbreakable and not subject to rust, that would be
the iron most suited to a saw, but since there exists no such iron, the hard
and breakable kind must suffice.

So, too, with regard to the human body.

Since only corruptible matter can be found which will, at the same time, be
organic and composed of contraries, such matter must be taken for union with
'
the rational soul.
Unde si in natura inveniri potuisset aliquod corpus ex alementis compositum quod esset incorruptibile, proculdubio
tale corpus asset conveniens animae secundum naturam; sicut
si posset inveniri ferrum infrangibile et rubiginem non
oontrahens, asset convenientissima materia ad serram, at
talem artifex quaereret; sed quia talis inveniri non potest
accipit qualem potest, scilicet duram vel frangibilem.
Et similiter quia natura non potest invenire corpus ex
elementis compositum quod secundum naturam materiae sit
incorruptibile, aptatur naturaliter animae incorruptibili
corpus organicum licet corruptibile.89
88Q.. Disp • .ll§. Malo, q.S, a.5, c.
89Q.. Disp. De Malo, q.S, a.S, c., also Q.. Disp. De .Ap,ima, q.l, a.8.o. "Magis
enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter hujusmodi defectus conse~uentes
non praetermittit ex hujusmodi materia convenienti facere opus. s~o igitur
et in corpore humano oontingit; quod enim taliter sit cammixtum et secundum
partes dispositum, ut sit oonvenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est
electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et hujusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate
materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subjacere talibus defeotibus."

100
Neither· can it be said that God could have done otherwise, for in the
formation of natural things, we do not inquire what God could effect, but
what the nature of things permits to be done.
quod Deus potuit aliter facere:

"Nee potest obviari per hoc

quia in institutions naturae non quaeritur

quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat, • • • n90
However, God provided man with a remedy for these defects by the gift of immortality of which man rendered himself unworthy by sin.
Sed quia Deus, qui est haminis institutor, hanc necessitatem
materiae sua omnipotentia potuit prohibere ne in actum prodiret, ejus virtute collatum est homini ante peccatum ut a
morte praeservaretur quousque tali beneficia se reddidit
peccando indignum: sicut et faber praestaret ferro ex quo
operatur, si posset, quod numquam frangeretur.9l
Likewise:
Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus
homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae
originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae,
quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nee mors nee aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente
a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficia~ et subjacet defeotibus secundum quod materiam requirit. 2

st. Thomas concludes, then, that death and corruption are natural to
man

according to the necessity of matter, but according to his form, immor-

tality is proper to him.

"Sic ergo mora et corruptio naturalis est homini

secundum necessitatem materiae; sed secundum rationem formae asset ei conveniens immortalitas • • • Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis,
mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam. n93
90Q.
9lQ.
92Q.
93Q.

Disp.
Disp.
Disp.
Disp.

De Anima, q.l, a.a, c.

De Malo, q.5, a.5, c.
1Je' Aiiiiiia, q.l, a.a, c.
De Malo, q.S, a.S, c.
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This will suffice to show that the human body has a disposition suited
to the rational soul because this very disposition was determined by the nee
themselves of that soul.

The proximate end of the human body is the human

soul, and since matter is always for the form and not the form for the

matte~

it was fitting that the body should have been so disposed as to be an instrument suited to minister to the operations of the for.m to which it was united.
Because the intellectual operation of the rational soul depends in some sense
upon the sensitive nature of the body, that body had to be an apt subject for
sensation with many sense organs required by the diverse activities of the
soul.

Furthermore, it had to be composed of contraries and constituted of a

medium complexion that it might have a delicate touch, Which is the foundation of all the senses and which is more perfect in man than in any other
animal.

Soft flesh, large brain in proportion to his body, erect posture

were also necessary to man, and, therefore, the human body was given these.
In many things it may be surpassed by other animals, and we may also add, is
not free from defects proper to itself, but these defects considering the
nature of the rational soul, could not have been avoided, and thus we come
to a further problem concerning the body; namely, Can the body be considered
to be a burden to the soul?

In the light of Thomistic principles we shall

discuss this subject in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE BODY IS NOT A HINDRANCE TO THE SOUL
If we consider man in his nature, apart from original sin, we may say
that st. Thomas will, in no sense, consider the body a burden to the soul.
If, on the other hand, we approach this subject from the view-point of fallen
and sinful man, then there is a sense in which the Angelic Doctor will concede that the body is a hindrance to the soul.
First of all, let us look at man as God made him.

He is a composite

substance, a unity resulting from the union of two incomplete substances, one
of which, the soul, though capable of an independent existence, yet requires,
in a very real sense, the other part, the body, for its full perfection.
Now, if the rational soul attains the perfection of its nature through its
union with the body, it surely cannot be said that through this self-same
union it suffers an impediment.

". • • non est in detrimentum animae quod

corpori uniatur, sed hoc est ad perfectionem naturae."l
Furthermore, if the body occupies such an important place in the exercise of the soul's operations, as we have seen it does, it certainly cannot
be said to hinder these operations, for nature would not unite one thing to
another if that other impeded the operations of the higher substance since
nature seeks in such a combination rather to facilitate these activities than
to obstruct them in any way.

-

"Nulli autem rei natura adjunxit per quod sua

--

lQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ad 14um.
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operatic impediatur, sed magis ea per quae fiat convenientior."2

Union of

the soul with the body is, therefore, for the perfection of the soul in its
nature and in the exercise of its operations, for, as st. Thomas expresses
it:

"Anima unitur corpori ut perfioiatur non solum quantum ad intelligere

phantasmaticum, sed etiam quantum ad naturam speciei, et quantum ad alias
operationes quas exercet per corpus."3
To hold that man's proper operation, understanding, is impeded by the
body, (as those maintained who were of the opinion that souls existed in
another world before they came to bodies and forgot through this very contact
the knowledge they had had previously), is to affirm that man is an unnatural
being, a consequential position which is, for st. Thomas, unthinkable.
Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae ad
corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturae alicui
non impedit ejus propriam operationem. Si igitur unio
corporis impedit intelligentiam animae, non erit naturale
animae corpori uniri, sed contra naturam; et ita homo
qui oonstituitur ex unione animae ad corpus, non erit
aliquid naturale: quod videtur absurdum.4
Such a doctrine that the body is a check upon the intellectual operation of the soul suggests, moreover, that the union of soul and body is not
for the sake of the toul but rather of the body.

But it is unfitting that

the soul, which is the nobler of the two, should, for the purpose of the
body's ennoblement, suffer an Lnpediment to its proper operation because of
this very contact with and ennoblement of the body.
Sed secundum hanc opinionem non videtur quod possit
2cont. Gent., II, 83.

~isp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.3, ~~·
4Q. Disp. Anima, q.l, a.l5, c.

R!
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assignari rationabilis causa propter quam anima corpori
uniatur. Non enim est hoc propter animam; cum anima
corpori non unita perfeote propriam operationem habere
possit, et ex unione ad corpus ejus operatio propria
impeditur. Similiter etiam non potest dari quod propter
corpus; non enim anima est propter corpus, sed corpus
magis propter animam, cum anima sit nobilior corpore.
Unde et inconveniens videtur quod anima ad nobilitandum
corpus sustineat in sua operatione detrime~tum.5
If the soul, through union with a body, did not reach by this very
means, its ultimate perfection, it would be of a different nature, and, consequently, we must admit, if we agree with st. Thomas, that according to the
nature which it has, the soul cannot better attain its end than through its
union with the body.

"Si anima non esset oorpori unibilis, tunc asset al-

terius naturae; unde secundum hano naturam quam habet, non potest melius ad
divinam bonitatem accedere quam per hoc quod unitur corpori."6

Through the

exercises it performs through its body or with that body's help, it arrives
at its terminus, beatitude.

"Et etiam secundum operationes quas in corpore

exercet, ad divinam beatitudinem accedit merendo •••"7
The end of man, for st. Thomas, is to arrive at the contamplation of
truth, for, as he affir.u1s, the last end of anything is that which it reaches
through the exercise of its proper operations.

Now, all the proper activi-

ties of man lead him to a contemplation of truth, and it was for this reason
that his soul was given a body; namely, that through it he might acquire
knowledge, not that he might forget or lose it •
• • • ultimus finis rei cujuslibet est id ad quod res per5Ibid.
Sin II Sent., D.l, q.2, a.4, _ad 1um..
rr;::-Op. cit., o.

--

105
venire nititur per suas operationas. Sed per omnes proprias ordinatas operationes et rectas homo pervenire
nititur in veritatis contemplationem; nam operationes
virtutum activarum sunt quaedam preparationes et dispositiones ad virtutes contemplativas. Finis igitur hominis est pervenire ad veritatis contemplationem. Propter
hoc igitur anima est unita oorpori; quod est esse hominem. Non igitur, per hoc quod unitur corpori, scientiam
habitam perdit; sed magis ei unitur ut scientiam acquirat.S
Elsewhere, we find the same thought expressed as follows:
Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitions
veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc quod perfioiatur anima in cognitions veritatis, indiget uniri
corpori, quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt
sine corpore.9
However, it is just here that the difficulty begins.

The ultimate per-

faction of the natural intelligence of rational substances consists in the
knowledge of separated substances, but in this life, because of its union
with the body, the soul cannot have a direct knowledge of these, and in that
sense at least, the body would seem to be an impediment.

Not for st.

Thomas, who holds that it was not in vain that the soul was united to the
body; rather it was precisely that it might more perfectly attain that knowledge which is proper to it that the soul was given a body.
• • • ultima perfectio cognitionis naturalis anfmae humanae,
haec est ut intelligat substantias separatas; sed perfectius
ad hanc cognitionem habendam pervenire potest per hoc quod in
corpore est,~quia ad hoc disponitur per studium, et maxima
per meritam; unde non frustra corpori unitur.lO
Certainly, St. Thomas will admit that this knowledge of separated substances is only the kind that is acquired through intelligible species ab8cont. Gent., II, 83.
9Q:15isp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c.
10.2.1:• ..£!.!.,- a .17,
-=-::.---!:.,<,! 3um.
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stracted fram the phantasms, but this mode is the one proper to the human
intellect, and for it union with the body is an absolute necessity, rather
than an obstacle •
• • • finis ad quem se extendit naturalis possibilitas animae humanae, est ut cognoscat substantias separatas secundum
modum praedictum; et ab hoc non impeditur per hoc quod corpori unitur; et similiter etiam in tali cognitione substantiae separatae ultima est felicitas hominis ad quam per
naturalia pervenire potest.ll
As for admitting that the body hinders the soul from seeing God in His
essence, that would be impossible for st. Thomas, since it is, according to
his thought, impossible for any created intellect with or without a body to
attain to a knowledge or vision of God in His essence unless that intellect
receive some special help from God.

"Non est autem possibile quod ad istum

visionis divinae modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute propria possit
attingere.nl2

Furthermore, to see God in His essence belongs properly to

the Divine Nature, and since that Essence transcends the limit of any created
nature, it belongs properly to no other nature.

The action of God,

therefor~

is needed to enable anyone to have a direct sight of God.
Videre autem Deum per ipsam essentiam divinam est proprium
naturae divinae • • • quidquid excedit limites alicujus naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem ulterius;
sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota.
Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis naturae creatae. Nam cujuslibet naturae intellectualis
creatae proprium est, ut intelligat secundum modum suae
substantiae. Substantia autem divina non potest sic in_
telligi, • • • Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab aliquo
intelleotu oreato ad visionem divinae substantiae, nisi
per actionem Dei, qui omnem creaturam transoendit.l3
llOp. cit., a.l6, ad 1um.
1Cont.Gent.,
2-III,52.~.-:-al"so 0. Dian. De Veri tate

-

a.lO. a.ll

e.
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It is not our intention to penetrate further into this problem which
more properly finds place in the Thomistic theory of knowledge, but we call
attention to it here just in so far as it is necessary to show in what sense
the body is not an impediment to the soul.

It is obvious that the rational

soul, though made for the vision of God, "• •• quamvis intellectus noster
sit factus ad hoc quod videat Deum • • • nl4, could not attain that vision even
without the body were it not given a special light by God to do so.

Con-

sequently, in this point at least, the body is not a burden to the soul.

It

is because of the finite nature of the soul, and for no other reason, that
this must be the case.
Cum autem ad visionem divinae substantiae intellectus creatus quodam supernatural! lumina sublimetur, • • • non est
aliquis intellectus creatus ita secundum suam naturam infimus, qui non ad hanc visionem possit, elevari • • • lumen
illud non potest esse alicui creaturae connaturale, sed
omnem creatam naturam excedit secundum virtutem.l5
From the standpoint, then, of nature, it is to the soul's advantage to
be in a body since only there can it acquire perfection, but, considered
practically and not theoretically, the body can be a burden to the soul and
that fact st. Thomas does not hesitate to face and trace to original sin.
When treating of the disposition of the body, we saw that it was necessary for the body to be corruptible because composed of contraries.

Now, it

is this very corruptibility which st. Thomas considers to be an obstacle to
the soul.

We find in his works many expressions which suggest this burden of

14Q. Disp. De Veritate, q.lO, a.ll, ad 7um. (Marietti, III)
15cont. Gent., III, 57, Cf. John F. MCCormick, "The Burden of the Body,"
"[The New Scholasticism, October, 1938, XII, no. iv, 398).
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the body as deriving from its corruption.

In answering the objection that

the body is an impediment to the soul in its knowledge of truth, he explicitly states that the soul's mode of understanding, though natural to the human
soul, is yet below that of spiritual superior substances, and that even in
its own characteristic mode it suffers an impediment from the corruption of
the body.

"• •• iste modus cognosoendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiat

intelligibilem veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spirituales superiores,
accipiendo scilicet eam ex sensibilibus; sed in hoc etiam patitur impedimentum ex corruptions corporis, • •
And again he tells us that the intellectual light in man is shadowed
through union with the body, and is impeded so that it cannot freely perceive
even naturally knowable truths--, but here again he assigns the cause to the
corruptibility of the body.
Lumen intellectuale ubi est purum sicut in angelis, sine
difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter damonstrat, ita
quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere: in nobis
autem lumen hujusmodi est obumbratum per conjunctionem ad
corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non
possit libere veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem
inspicere secundum illud Sapient., IX, 15. 'Corpus quod
corrumpitur, aggravat animam, at terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem.' Et ex hoc est, quod non
est in nobis omnino veritatem oognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta sed unusquisque hoc magis vel minus habet
in potestate secundum quod lumen intelleetuale est in
ipso purius.l7
Likewise, we find st. Thomas affirming that it is difficult for man to
turn to his beatitude for two reasons.

One is that it is beyond his nature,

lSQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ad 1sum.
17rn Boeth. de Trinitate, q.l, &::"1, ad~·
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and the other that he is impeded by the corruption of the body and the infeotion of sin.

"Converti autem ad beatitudinem ultimam, homini quidam est

difficile et quia est supra naturam, et quia habere impedimentum ex corruptione corporis et infectione peccati."lS
Furthermore, St. Thomas assigns three reasons why the mind is prevented
from being wholly absorbed in God, two of which, sin and temporal affairs,
he can eliminate, but the third which results from the burden of a corruptible
body, he must retain.l9
It is thus evident that the body does weigh upon the soul, and that that
depression in this life cannot be lifted.

M~~

would fain find rest in God,

but he is prevented from so doing by that which the Apostle can call the body
of this death.

That contemplation of truth which would give him the coveted

rest in God man can only desire, not fully attain, because the body inclines
18sum. Theol., I, q.62, a.2, ad 2um.
l~Disp. ~ Caritate, q.l, &:lo;-o. (Marietti, II) "Impeditur autem homo in
hac vita, ne totaliter mens ejus in Deum feratur, ex tribus. Primo quidem
ex contraria inclinatione mentis; quando scilicet mens per peccatum conversa ad commutabile bonum sicut ad finem, avertitur ab incommutabile bono.
Secunda per occupationem secularium rerum, • • • Tertia vera ex infirmitate
praesentis vitae, cujus necessitatibus oportet aliquatenus hominem occupari, et retrahi, ne actualiter mens feratur in Deum; dormiendo, comedendo,
et alia hujusmodi faciendo, sine quibus praesens vita duci non potest; et
ulterius ex ipsa corporis gravitate anima deprimitur, ne divinam lucem in
sui essentia videre possit, ut ex tali visione caritas perficiatur; secundum illud Apostoli, II ad Cor., v, 6; 'Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem-enrm-ambulamus, et non per speciem.' Homo autem
in hac vita potest esse sine peccato mortali avertante ipsum a Deo; et
iterum potest esse sine occupatione temporalium rerum, • • • Sed ab onere
corruptibilis carnis in hac vita liber esse non potest. Unde quantum ad
remotionem primorum duorum impedimentorum, caritas potest esse perfecte in
hac vita; non autam quantum ad remotionem tertii impedimenti, et ideo illam
perfectionem caritatis quae erit post hanc vitam, nullus in hac vita habere
potest, nisi sit viator et comprehensor simul; quod est proprium Christi."
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the soul to earthly truths.
Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex contrarietate veritatis quam contemplamur; sed ex defectu nostri
intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferiora retrahit, secundum illud (Sapient., ix, 15): 'Corpus
quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem.' Et inde est quod quando homo
pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius earn amat:
sed magis odit proprium defectum et gravitatem corruptibilis
corporis, ut dicat eum Apostolo (Rom., vii, 24): 'Infelix
ego homoJ quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?r20
The human body because of its corruptibility is then a decided burden to
the rational soul in that highest intellectual act; namely, contemplation.
But is this susceptibility to corruption the only sense in
Angelic Doctor considers that the body weighs upon the soul?

~ch

the

st. Thomas

tells us that when the soul is separated from the body, it will understand
more freely than when in it because the weight and care of the body dims the
intellectual clarity of the soul in this life.

"• •• anima separata est

quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura qua oommunicat cum natura corporis:

sed tamen quodaDllnodo est liberior ad intelligendum, in quantum per

gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur." 21
And he further reminds us that there is no doubt that through corporeal
movement and sense occupation the soul is hindered from receiving the impressions of separated substances, and that, therefore, it is only during sleep
or upon withdrawal from sense activity that men can receive revelations.
Nee taman dubium est quin per motus corporeos et oocupationem
sensuum anima impediatur a receptione influxus substantiarum
separatarum: unde dormientibus et alienatis a sensibus quae20sum. Theol., II-II, q.l80, a.7, ad 2um.
2Isum. Theol., I, q.89, a.2, ~ 1um. - -
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dam revelationes fiunt quae non accidunt sensibus utentibus.22
Withdrawal from the senses, then, is a necessary condition for higher
understanding, for the reception of impressions from separated substances,
and for knowledge of the future.

Nam anima, quando impeditur ab occupatione circa corpus proprium, redditur debilior ad intelligendum aliqua altiora;
unde et virtus temperantiae, quae a corporeis delectationibus retrahit animam, praecipue facit homines ad intelligendum aptos; homines etiam dormientes, quando corporeis sensibus non utuntur nee est aliqua perturbatio humorum aut fumositatum impediens, percipiunt de futuris, ex superiorum impressions, aliqua quae modum ratiocinationis humanae excedunt; et hoc multo magis accidit in syncopizantibus et
extasim passis, quanta magis fit retractio a corporeis
sensibus.23
And again:
• • • anima quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum; et
etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus
causarum naturalium in imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a
quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata.24

Now, although dependence upon the senses does prove an impediment to the
receptfon of knowledge from a higher source than phantasms, this should be no
argument to prove that the body is a burden because knowledge that does not
come to the intellect through the senses is not natural to it even when the
soul is separated from the body, for st. Thomas says:

"•

• • modus intelli-

gendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori
uniri:

sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et

22Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, c.
23cont. Gent., II, 81.
24sum. T~., II-II, q.l72, a.l, ad 1um.

-
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similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter natura.m."25
If that were the extent to which St. Thomas concedes that the body is a
burden, we might well give his answer to the difficulty of the body's corruptibility and dismiss the subject, but the problem is not so easily solved,
and before we attempt an explanation of the first real obstacle, we must consider that st. Thomas maintains that the senses not only impede higher knowledge, but also that kncwrledge which is in very truth proportionate to the
rational intellect, and that the passions, too, have their share in the depression of the soul by the body.
St. Thomas insists that in this life we can know higher things through
lower ones, causes through their effects, and, so too, the First Cause

thro~

His effects.

"Unde

That mode is quite within the nature of the human mind.

nee per hanc viam cognosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut causa cognoscitur per effactum. 11 26

But even for this knowledge of effects we must ad-

mit, st. Thomas says, that sense occupation is an impediment to a full and
lucid comprehension of them.

"A consideratione autem plena at lucida intelli

gibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, at circa se occupatur."27
Corruptibility and sense distraction are thus two weights upon the soul
caused by its union with the body which st. Thomas recognizes as impediments
to understanding.

The third is found in the human passions.

25op. cit., I, q.89, a.l, c.
26cont:-Gent., III, 48.
2'lsum. Theol., I, q.94, a.l, c., Cf. McCormick,~· cit., 396.

113
• • • homini sunt impedimenta plurima perveniendi ad finem.
Impeditur enim debilitate rationis, • • • Impeditur etiam
ex passionibus partis sensitivae et ex affectionibus quibus
ad sensibilia at inferiora trahitur; quibus quanto magis
inhaeret, longius ab ultimo fine distat; haec ~nim infra
hominem sunt, finis autem superior eo existit. 8
The act of contemplation is hindered through the vehemence of the passions

~.ich

lowing:

incline the soul's attention to sensibles, he states in the fol-

"Impeditur actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit

vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur intentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia, et per tumultos exteriores.n29

It is, however, because the soul does not rule the body that such

a hindrance must be recognized, as St. Thomas says:

"• •• nunc autem im-

peditur ex corporis unione, propter hoc quod anima non perfectae dominatur
in corpus.n30
Now, how can St. Thomas insist so strongly upon this naturalness of the
union existing between the soul and its body, as we have seen he does, and
still grant that this body, ld1ich is such a burden, is yet for the soul's
good?

All these defects that we have noted, St. Thomas will

an~er

flow from man's nature considered from the aspect of his matter.
composed of elements must needs be corruptible.

us,

A body

Desires in man are necessar

if the senses are, and the struggle consequent upon desires flows from the
necessity of the matter itself.

"Pugna quae est in homina ex contrariis

concupiscantiis etiam ex necessitate matariae provenit; necesse enim fuit si
28cont. Gent., III, 147.
29sum. T~., II-II, q.lBO, a.2, c.
30-Q. Disp. ~Pot., q.5, a.lO, ad sum.
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homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum sequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium quae plerumque repugnat rationi.n31
All this St. Thomas admits.

~~

is subject to corporeal and spiritual

defects, and these can, in a certain sense, be attributed to matter.
Posset tamen aliquis dicere hujusmodi defectus, tam corporales quam spirituales, non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes.
Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis
compositum, oorruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum
in ea quae sunt secundum deleotabilia moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi, et intelleotum possibilem,
quum sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullum
eorum habens in actu, sed ex sensibus natum ea acquirere,
difficulter ad scientiam veritatis pertin~ere et de facili propter phantasmata a vero deviare.3
However, he continues, and we must consider this as his answer in so far
as an answer can be given, if we think rightly on the matter, we must conelude that God would not have united the soul to a body which would naturally impede it unless at the same time He gave to the soul some special help
whereby these aforesaid consequences necessarily following upon matter would
in no wise be a check upon the rational nature.
Sed taman, si quis recta consideret, satis probabiliter
poterit aestimare, divina providentia supposita, quae
singulis perfectionibus congrua perfectibilia coaptavit,
quod Deus superiorem naturam inferiori ad hoc conjunxit
ut ei dominaretur, et, si quod hujus dominii impedimentum
ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficia tolleretur; ut scilicet, quum anima
rationalis sit altioris naturae quam corpus, tali conditione credatur corpori esse conjuncta quod in corpore
aliquid esse non possit contrarium animae, per quam corpus vivit; et similiter, si ratio in homine appetitui
sensuali conjungitur et aliis sensitivis potentiis, quod
31Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, ad 7um.
32cont. Gent:', IV, 52.
--
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ratio a sensitivis potentiis non impediatur, sed magis
eis dominetur. 33
St. Thomas can only conclude, therefore, that from the standpoint of
faith, and that indeed is the only reasonable standpoint, man, in the beginning, was free from those defects which are consequent upon matter, and that
it was only after the advent of sin that he became subject to the full possibilities of his lower nature.
Sic igitur, secundum doctrinam fidei, ponimus hominem a
principia taliter esse institutum quod, quamdiu ratio
hominis Deo asset subjecta, et inferiores vires ei sine
impedimenta deservirent et corpus ab ejus subjections
impediri non posset per aliquid impedimentum corporale,
Deo et sua gratia supplente quod ad hoc perficiendum
natura minus habebat; ratione aversa a Deo, at inferiores vires a ratione repugnarent et corpus vitae, quae
est per animam, contrarias passiones susciperet. Sic
igitur, hujusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini
videantur, absolute considerando humanam naturam ex
parte ejus quod est in ea inferius, taman, considerando
divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis
humanae naturae, satis probabiliter probari potest
hujusmodi defectus esse poenales.34
The body of the first man, then, in the light of the above citation,
was proportioned to the human soul according to that which was required of it
by nature; namely, that it should be a fitting instrument through which the
human intellect could be perfected, but it was also proportionate to the
soul according to grace since the defects belonging to the very nature of the
body were to prove in no way burdensome to the soul.

"• •• corpus Adam fuit

proportionatum humanae animae, • • • non solum secundum quod requirit natura,
sed secundum quod contulit gratia:
33Ibid.
34cont. ~·· IV, 52.

qui quidem privamur, natura manente ea-
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dem."35

Because of its noble form, the body was destined to live forever,

and although incorruptibility was not natural to it according to the active
principles of nature, nevertheless it was natural to it in view of its end,
to wit, that it should be matter suited to its rational and incorruptible
form, as is said by St. Thomas:
Deus, • • • in institutione humanae naturae aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus
principiis debebatur, scilicet incorruptibilitatem quamdam, per quam convenienter suae formae coaptaretur; ut,
sicut animae vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam
posset perpetuo vivere: at talis quidem incorruptibilitas, etiam si non asset naturalis quantum ad activum
principium, erat taman quodammodo naturalis ex ordine
ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suae
naturali formae, quae est finis materiae.36
It is thus evident that the soul of man was to suffer no impediment
from the corruptibility of his body, and this conclusion is in full accord
with reason, for it was fitting that the rational soul which exceeds the
capacity of corporeal matter should have been granted a power whereby it
could preserve the body in a way that would surpass the capacity of corporeal matter.
Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existens; sed inerat animae vis
quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat
corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quamdiu ipsa Deo
subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia
enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis
materiae, • • • conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus
daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam
corporalis materiaa.37
35Q. Disp. rye Anima, q.l, a.8, ad sum.
36cont. (}ant:", IV, 81.
--37sum. T~., I, q.97, a.l, c.
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As for the need of phantasms and corporeal organs which seem to be an
impediment to knowledge, that was always natural to man even before sin.
~he

human intellect, then as now, was obliged to revert to the phantasms for

understanding;.
Manifestum est aute.m ex praemissis quod ex hoc quod anima
est accomodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem
secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis
modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hie modus intelligendi etiam animae primi
hominis competebat.38
The knowledge of separated substances which the first man had was not
perfect, but this imperfection came, not from the fact that the body was an
obstacle to the soul, but because the connatural object of the human intellect fell short of the excellence of separated substances.

In the present

state of man, his knowledge is imperfect for both the above reasons •
• • • hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu
substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravations corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem
deficimus propter utrumque.39
Adam, consequently, in the view of St. Thomas, did not have direct knowledge of God in His essence.

Nevertheless, he knew God more perfectly than

we can know Him because he suffered no impediment to a clear and strong
understanding of intelligible effects.
Haec autem fuit rectitude hominis divinitus instituti, ut
inferiora superioribus subderentur et superiora, ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediebatur
per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplations intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiations primae veritatis
38op. cit., q.94, a.2, c.
39Ibid., ad ~·
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percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita.40
With regard to the hindrance which comes to man in his present state
through the passions and through the rebellion of the body, St. Thomas re-

.

plies that the soul had complete mastery over the body in the primitive state
of innocence.

"Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori per-

ficiendo et guberna.ndo accommodata, sicut et nunc: • • • Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, in quantum corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nullo impediens, • • ."41
There have always been passions in man, but in the first human being
there were none with evil as their object •
• • • omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in
Adam non erant, • • • similiter nee illae passiones
quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut
cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt
esse praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt
futuri ut suo tempore habendi, et desiderium et spes
non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae.42
But the lower powers could not act against the reason then.
Sed contra hoc etiam homini fuit datum remedium in statu
innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur.43
As for the passions constituting a check upon man, even in his fallen
state, we need only say that, for st. Thomas, these passions, considered in
themselves, are neither morally good nor morally evil.

When they are sub-

jected to reason, then they deserve to be termed morally good, when not,
40sum. Theol., I, q.94, a.l, c.
4lrbid., a.2, c.
42sum. Theol., I, q.95, a.2, c.
4~Q.. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.s, ~ 7um.

119
morally evil •
• • • passiones animae duplioiter possunt considerari: uno
modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis
appetitus; sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod
dependet a ratione, • • • si autem considerentur secundum
quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in
eis bonum vel malum morale.44
The passions can be mighty forces for good in the perfecting of human
bein6s or mighty forces for evil.
reason and to sin, vmen not.

They incline to virtue when controlled by

"• •• passiones animae, in quantum aunt prae-

tar ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum:
tae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutam."45

in quantum autem sunt ordina-

Furthermore, we are neither praised

nor blamed for our passions.
Sed secundum passiones absolute consideratas neque laudamur
neque vituperamur. Non enim aliquis laudatur neque vituperatur ex hoc quod absolute timet vel irascitur sed solum
ex hoc quod aliqualiter timet vel irascitur, idest secundum
rationem vel praeter rationem.46
By no means, therefore, are passions diseases of the soul unless they
are unchecked by reason.

"Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi, vel purbationes

animae, nisi cum carent moderations rationis. 11 47

Rather are they important

factors in man's moral good because that good, since it is based on reason,
1vill be all the mora perfect as it has reference to more things pertaining
to man.
44sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l, a.
45op. cit., a.2, ad 3um.
46rn II Eth. lect:7s;-n.300, (P. Fr. A• Pirotta, ~Arietti, Tarini, Ialy,
1934),-also sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l, ad 3um.
47sum. Theol.,~II, q.24, a.2, c.
-----
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Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omne motus appetitus
sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod
etiam ipsae passiones moderatae per rationem. Cum enim
bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto
istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini
conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad
perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum
membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire ratione, • • • ad perfectionem moralis siva humani boni pertinet quod etiam
ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.48
It is only in man, however, that good"depends upon the proper ordering
of the passions and the bodily activities, for in God and the Angelic Spirits
there is neither sensitive appetite nor bodily members.

"• •• in Deo et in

angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo
bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeum
actuum, sicut in nobis.tt49
It might be useful to pause at this point in order to ascertain that
part which st. Thomas assigns to the passions in the life of the will.

That

they have a share must be evident from the very fact that the rational soul
is decidedly a human soul and reaches its perfection in a human way, and this
way does not exclude the passions.
We must first remark that just as this great Christian philosopher insists that the intellect is not exercised through a corporeal organ, so does
he assert that the will, which, in his thought, is in the reason, is an entirely immaterial and incorporeal power, not dependent on any material organ.
"Voluntas enim, • • • est in ratione.
48op. cit., a.3, c.
49rbid., ad 2um.

Ratio autem est potentia non alligata
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organo corporali.

Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino imma-

terialis et incorporea.n50
However, the intellectual appetite, or will, can be moved by the sensitive appetite.
tem.n51

"• •• ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet volunta-

And the sensitive appetite, furthermore, is the act of a bodily or-

gan, "• •• appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporali."52
Naw, if the will is moved by the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive
appetite depends upon a corporeal organ, it seems clear that the disposition
of that organ will affect the sensitive appetite, and, in a certain sense,
the will.
Est autam sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt
ab appetitu intellective, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appatitus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis non autem
voluntas. Omnis autem actus utentis organo dependet non
solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi
dispositions; sicut visio ex potentia visiva at qualitate
oculi per quam iuvatur vel impeditur. ~nde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex vi appetitiva,
sed etiam ex dispositions corporis.53
Before we consider just what influence the passions exercise over the
sensitive appetite and, therefore, over the will, we must first note that
the movements of the sensitive appetite Which use corporeal organs are what
we mean here by passions, and that these passions are, consequently, always
accompanied by some bodily alteration.

"• •• passiones sunt motus appetitus

sensitivi qui utitur organo corporali.

Unde omnes cum aliqua corporali

50sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.5, c.
5lop. cit., I-II, q.9, a.2, c., also, Op. cit., I-II, q.lO, a.2, c.
52op. Cit., I-II, q.9, a.5, ad 3um.
53sum.'Theol., I-II, q.l7, a::r,-o;
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transmutations fiunt.n54
Now, as to the influence exerted upon the free will of man by these passions, we can say that in the exercise of its act, the will can be moved
necessarily by no finite object, for regardless what object is presented to
man, he has it in his power not to will it actually.

However, the will can

be moved as to the specification of its act, which it derives from the object.

"• •• voluntas movetur dupliciter:

uno modo, quantum ad exercitum

actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.n55
This is where the passions of the sensitive part enter.

They can move the

will just in so far as the will is moved by its object.

The reason for this

is that the will is moved by what man apprehends to be good.

Now, the pas-

sions can make an object appear to man good and fitting at one time which he
would not judge to be so at another time.

"• •• passio appetitus sensitivi

movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto, inquantum scili
cet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem iudicat aliquid esse conveniens
et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret."56
The object which influences the will must be a suitable good which is
apprehended.

That is evident.

Furthermore, the good apprehended as good

and desirable must be apprehended as such in particular and not just in
general.

Moreover, unless the object appears to be desirable from every

possible angle, the will oan be inclined to it under one particular aspect
rather than under another, and one of the three elements that can color man's
54In IV Eth., lect., 17, n.867, also Q. Disp. ~ Verit., q.26, a.l, c.
55sum:-The01., I-II, q.lO, a.2, c.
56op. 2.!.!. , a. 3, 0.
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perception of the good, is, according to st. Thomas, the disposition of the
body, for as a man is, so will the good seem to him.57
As an example of this, we know that the will of the man who is angry is
moved to something quite different from that to which the calm man's will is
directed in much the same way as food is looked upon as desirable by the
healthy man, and undesirable by the man who is ill.

"Unde aliter movetur ad

aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieti, quia non idem est conveniens utrique; siout etiam aliter aooeptatur cibus a sano et aegro."58

It is because

the sensitive appetite changes man's disposition, therefore, that he judges
a certain thing to be appropriate or not appropriate, and it is in this fashion that the will can be moved by the sensitive appetite on the part of the
object.
Quod autam aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus
contingit, scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et
eius cui proponitur; conveniens enim secundum relationem
dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependat. Et inde est
quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit
aliquid, ut conveniens, et ut non conveniens • • • Manifestum est autem quod secundum appetitus sensitivi immutatur homo ad aliquam dispotitionem: unde secundum quod
homo est in passions aliqua, videtur ipsi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur ei extra passionem existens; sicut
57Q. Disp. De Malo, q.6, a.l, c. "fatet ergo quod si oonsideretur motus
voluntatise~rte exeroitii act.us, non movetur ex necessitate; si autem
consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte objecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est, quod objeotum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; • • • requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum at conveniens apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in
particulari, et non in universali tantum • • • Et quod voluntas feratur in
quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam, potest contingere triplicitar • • • Tertio vero modo contingit ex
dispositions hominis; quia, • • • qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."
58 Ibid.
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irato videtur bonum quod non videtur quieto; at per hunc
modum ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem.59
Is this bodily disposition subject to reason?

In so far as it precedes

the act of the sensitive appetite, that is to say, in so far as a man may be
disposed to one passion rather than another in respect of his physical constitution, it is not.

But in so far as his condition is consequent upon the

act of the sensitive appetite, for example, in so far as man becomes heated
by anger, this condition can be subject to reason •
• • • qualitas corporalis dupliciter sa habet ad actum appetitus sensitivi: uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis
est aliqualiter dispositus secundum corpus ad hano vel il•
lam passionem; alio modo, ut consequens, sicut eum ex ira
aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praeoedens non subiaoet imperio rationis; quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti motione,· quae non statim quiescere potest.
Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis, • • • so
Now, what bearing has all this, which looks like a digression, upon the
question of the burden of the body?

Just this, that we must think of man as

a composite of body and soul, destined to be that, not so made by chance or
an accident or sin or by any other such unnatural cause.

Man was so fash-

ioned that from the very beginning he was to reach his intellectual and moral
perfection through his human body working with his rational soul.

Senses and

sensitive appetite are natural to the human being, and what belongs to that
creature by nature was neither given him nor taken away from him when he fell
from his Creator's friendship.

"Ea quae sunt naturalia homini neque substra-

59sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.2, c.
60sum. Theol., I-II, q.l7, a.7, ad 2um.
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hantur, neque dantur per peccatum."61

It is not, then, a matter of surprise

to us to find that st. Thomas teaches that man will attain a greater perfection of moral good if his sense appetite as well as his rational appetite
moves him to it.
Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonun1, et faciat
exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum, secundum
quod Psal., LXXXIII, 3, dicitur: 'Cor meum et caro mea
exultaverunt in Deum vivum,' ut 'cor' accipirumus pro appetitu intellective, 1 carnem 1 autem pro appetitu sensitivo.62
The power to love and hate, to desire and hope, dare and fear, and all
the rest are certainly necessary for complete human perfection, and all these
passions belong not to the soul alone, nor to the body alone, but to the composite.

"Passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore,

cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam."63
Nor does virtue consist in the complete cessation of the passions, for
st. Thomas affirms that they have spoken ill who were of such convictions and
for this reason:
• • • quod totaliter a virtuoso volunt excludere animae
passiones. Pertinent enim ad bonum rationis ut reguletur per eam appetitus sensitivus, cujus motus sunt passiones. Unde ad virtutem non pertinent quod excludat
omnes passiones, sed solum inordinatas, quae sunt ut
non oportet et quando non oportet et quaecumque alia
adduntur pertinentia ad alias ciroumstantias.64
Thus spoke the human saint, and because this common-sense philosopher
6lsum. Theol., I, q.98, a.2, c.
62op. cit., I-II, q.24, a.3, c.
63In x Eth., lect.l2, n.2114.
64~ II Eth., lect.3, n.272, also sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l and 2.
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and profound Christian never forgets that man is a unity of body and soul,
he will never permit that his intellectual or moral perfection be accomplish
without the body having its full share of contribution.

"• •• aninta enim

indiget corpore ad consecutionem sui finis, in quantum per corpus perfectionem acquirit, et in scientia, et in virtute, • • • n65
A body so essential as an instrument to an intellectual soul cannot constitute a real burden to it, but since the soul is situated midway between
two worlds, it must incline toward the higher to have its full perfection,
and that can only be had by a corresponding withdrawal from the lower.
"• •• quia, quum anima humana sit in confinio corporum et incorporearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens aeternitatis et temporis, recedens ab
infima appropinquat ad summum; • • • tt66
If the body can be said to shadow the intellectual light of the soul,
it is precisely because the soul's nature is the lowest in the order of intellectual substances and can only receive its light veiled and, as it were,
through the instrumentality of matter, which necessarily obscures the brilliant rays of the purely intelligible.

But, viewed in itself, the body is

no weight upon the soul, but an absolute necessity for the soul's development
in this life.
Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae,
habent esse affine corpori, inquantum sunt corporum for.mae:
et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus,
et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur: alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur.67
65cont. Gent., III, 144.
6~0p. cit., II, 81.
67sum.~eol., I, q.55, a.2, c., e.lso, McCormick, ~· ~., 400.
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That the body is, in a certain sense, necessary even in the next life
for tl1e perfection of the happiness of the rational soul, we shall now endeavor to establish in our final chapter.

CHAPTER V
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR THE
FULL PERFECTION OF ITS FINAL HAPPINESS
The important place that the human body occupies in the life of the
rational soul has now been sketched, and from the standpoint of reason presents no difficulty as to the naturalness and necessity of the soul's union
with the body.--But the soul when separatedl-•That is another aspect to the
question and offers a little more of a problem.
dependent of matter.

The soul has its being in-

It needed matter for its perfection in this life, but

it always felt somewhat burdened by a corruptible body so that when the time
came for corruption of that body according to the laws of nature, one might
expect this noble and rational substance to heave a sigh of relief, wing its
flight to higher, purer regions, rejoicing in its liberation from the ties
that bound it to anything corporeal, forever free to soar amid eternal, tmchanging, spiritual realities.
For those, indeed, who looked upon the union of soul and body as something accidental, an unnatural, burdensome relationship, such a conception
might well prove satisfactory, but for st. Thomas, what was natural once is
natural always, and, consequently, the human soul will never be all that it
should be until it again meets its body.

To be forever separated from its

proper matter would be contrary to the nature of the rational soul, end what
is against nature cannot continue forever.
cannot last forever without its body.

The soul

~~11

last forever; it

Reason assures us that the immortality
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of the soul requires the future resurrection of the body.
Ostensum est enim (Liber II, 79) animas hominum immortales
esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a corporibus absolutae.
Manifestum est etiam • • • quod anima corpori naturaliter
unitur, est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma.
Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse.
Nihil autem quod est contra naturam potest esse perpetuum.
Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato conjungi:
quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere
videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram.l
There is, however, one sense in which separation from the body can be
said to be natural to man, and another in which it cannot.

If we consider

the subject from the point of view of the body, as we have remarked previously, (Chapter III, P• 98), we must admit that corruption is natural to it, and
that without the special preservation which it was destined to receive from
the soul, the body is subject to death, and thus separation of soul and body,
considered with reference to the body, is natural to man.

On the other hand,

if we have regard to the nature of the soul and the disposition which was
given to the body in the beginning, severance of the rational form from its
human matter is accidental and contrary to nature.
corporis respiciatur, mors naturalis est.

"Si igitur ad naturam

Si vero ad naturam animae et ad

dispositionem, quae propter animam supernaturaliter humano corpori a principio indita fuit, est per accidens, et contra naturam, cum naturale sit aniI!'.am

corpori esse uni tam. tt2
Further, we are told that union with the body belongs to the soul by

reason of its nature, and that when it is separated from the body, it will
lcont. Gent., IV, 79.
2comp. The'Ol., I, 152.
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retain its aptitude and natural inclination for the body.
this St. Thomas takes from a consideration of a light body.

An illustration of
According to

that body's nature, it is proper to it to be lifted up, but the light body
remains light when taken from its proper place; yet it keeps an aptitude and
an inclination towards that place.

So, too, the soul, when separated from

the body keeps its own baing, but it does not lose its aptitude and natural
inclination for union with its body •
• • • secundum sa convanit corpori levi esse sursum. Et
sicut corpus lave manet quidem lave cum a loco proprio
fuarit separatum, cum aptitudine taman at inclinations
ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse
cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et in•
clinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.3
Desire for reunion with the body will remain in the separated soul, and
there will not be perfect rest of will until the soul rejoins its body,
since the will cannot attain perfect peace as long as it is the subject of a
natural desire left unfulfilled.
Considerandum est autem, quod non potest esse omnimode
immobilitas voluntatis, nisi naturale desiderium totaliter impleatur. Quaecumque autem nata stmt uniri secundum
naturam, naturaliter sibi uniri appetunt: unumquodque
appetit id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.
Cum igitur anima humana naturaliter corpori uniatur, • • •
naturale ei desiderium inest ad corporis unionem. Non
poterit igitur esse perfecta quietatio voluntatis, nisi
iterato anima corpori conjungatur, quod est hominem a
morte resurgere.4
In the preceding chapters, we devoted some attention to the fact that
the body is necessary for the soul's substantial and accidental perfection.
3sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.l, ad~·
4comp. Theol., I, 151.
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Here, we shall investigate what St. Thomas has to say concerning the body's
relation to the soul's final perfection.
Man's final perfection, which is perfect beatitude or happiness, consists in the divine vision.

"Consummatio autem hominis est in adeptione ul-

timi finis, qui est perfecta beatitude, sive felicitas quae consistit in
divina visione, •• • "5

Now, St. Thomas holds that the final perfection of

anything requires the first perfection of that thing, the first perfection
of anything being that it should be perfected in its nature, and the final
that it should attain its end.

For _the human soul to be fully perfected as

regards its end, it must, therefore, be perfected in its nature, and that
nature requires to be united to a human body.

The nature of the soul is that

it should be part of man as his form, and as no part has its perfection outside the whole, the rational soul must be united to its body to have the
full perfection of its nature, not only at the beginning of its existence,
but always.
Item, final is perfectio requiri t perfectionem primam:
prima aut~m perfectio uniuscujusque rei est ut sit perfactum in sua natura, finalis vero perfectio consistit
in consecutione ultimi finis. Ad hoc igitur quod anima
humana omnimode perficiatur in fine, necesse est quod
sit perfecta in sua natura, quod non potest esse nisi
sit corpori unita. Natura enim animae est ut sit pars
hominis ut forma: nulla a.utem pars perfecta est in
sua. natura, nisi sit in suo toto. Requiritur igitur
ad ultimam hominis beatitudinem, ut anima rursum corpori uniatur.6
The rational soul, therefore, in the ultimate perfection of the human
5op. cit., 149.
6comp. Theo1., I, 151.

132

species, cannot forever be without the human body.

"• •• anima in perfec-

tione ultima speciei humanae esse non potest a corpore separata:

unde nulla

anima in perpetuum remanebit a corpore separata: • • • "7
The soul without the body is imperfect, and as everything naturally
desires perfection, final happiness for man cannot be attained unless the
full perfection of his nature is assured •
• • • naturale hominis desiderium ad felicitatem tendere.
Felicitas autem ultima est felicis perfectio. Cuicumque
igitur deest aliquid ad perfectionem nondum habet felicitatem perfectar1, quia nondum ejus desiderium totaliter
quietatur; omne enim imperfectum perfectionem oonsequi
naturaliter cupit. Anima autem a corpore separata est
aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum totum existens: anima enim naturaliter est pars humanae
naturae. Non igitur homo potest ultimrum felicitatem
consequi, nisi anima iterate corpori conjungatur; praesertim quum ostensum sit quod homo in hac vita non
potest ad felicitatem ultimam pervenire.a
Absolutely speaking, however, for man's perfect happiness which consists
in the vision of the Divine Essence, the body is not necessary because that
vision does not depend upon the body, since the intellect will not require
the phantasms for the understanding of the Divine Essence.
Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore
nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem oontuetur, • • • Manifestum est autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, • • •
Unde cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis
beatitude consistat, non dependet beatitude perfecta
hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse
beata.9
7rn IV Sent., D.43, q.l, a.l, s.2, c., (Venice, Simon Occhi, 1780, Tomus,

nrl)8cont. Gent., IV, 79.
9sum. T~., I-II, q.4, a.5, c.
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St. Thomas does not, however, leave that statement as it stands, for he
qualifies it by distinguishing the two ways in which something may pertain to
another's perfection.:

in one way so as to constitute the essence of the

thing, and in that sense the body does not belong to the perfection of human
happiness, because the essence of man's happiness is not in his body; in a
second way as being necessary for the well being of that thing, and in this
latter sense the perfection of human happiness does require that the soul be
reunited to the body.

The reason that this is so is that since operation

follows the nature of a thing, the more perfect the soul is in its nature,
the more perfectly will it exercise its proper operation, in which its beatitude consists.
Sed soiendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter
aliquid pertinet. Uno modo ad constituendam essentiam
rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alia
modo requiritur ad perfeotionem rei quod pertinet ad bene
esse eius: sicut pulchritude corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo
corpus prima modo ad perfeotionem beatitudinis humanae
non pertineat pertinet taman secunda modo. Cum enim
operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quanta anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam
propriam operationam, in qua felicitas consistit.lO
As long, therefore, as the soul is separated from the body it is prevented from enjoying the entire perfection of its happiness.

This hindrance,

however, is not one of opposition, but rather one of defect.

It simply

means that the soul has not all that it needs to make it perfect in every
way.

It is happy, but it cannot tend with all its strength to its last end

because it desires that its enjoyment in beholding God should overflow into
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the body in so far as that can be.

And, consequently, so long as the soul is

not united to the body, it rests in its delight in God in such a way that it
still desires to have its body participate in its own happiness •
• • • dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo,
per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem
caloris: at tale impedimentum operationis repugnat
felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam defectus, quia
scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam
eius perfectionem requiritur; at tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectionis ipsius. Et sic separatio animae a corpore dicitur
animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendit in visionem
divinae essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo,
quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per radundantiam, sicut est possibile; at ideo quamdiu ipsa
fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit
in eo, quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem
eius vellet suum corpus pertingere.ll
Besides being contrary to faith and well-established authority, the position of those who deny the reunion of the soul with the body is, therefore, likewise untenable from the standpoint of reason.

St. Thomas is so

convinced, both by his faith and by his reason, that bodies will one day find
again their noble forms that he can say that the souls of the saints do not
enjoy the Divine vision so perfectly before the resurrection as afterwards.
Sed haec positio praeter hoc quod est fidei contraria,
ut ex auctoritatibus inductis et pluribus aliis patere
potest, etiam a ratione discordat. Non enim perfectio
beatitudinis esse poterit ubi deest naturae perfectio.
Cum autem animas et corporis naturalis sit unio, at
substantialia, non accidentalis, non potest esse quod
natura animae sit perfecta, nisi sit corpori conjuncta;
at ideo anima separata a corpore non potest ultilruam
perfectionem beatitudinis obtinere. Propter quod • • •
animae sanctorum ante resurrectionem non ita perfects
fruuntur divina visione sicut postea; unde in ultima
llsum. Theol., I-II, q.4, a.5, ~~·
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perfections beatitudinis oportebit corpora humana esse
animabus unita • • • 12
Indeed, this must be the case, for the human body has been ordained to
the soul, not according to man's anllnal life, but rather according to the
perfection of his nature, and, this very body with such a destiny, though
camposed of contraries, will not forever be subject to corruption.
Corpus etiam hominis ordinatur ad hominem, non secundum
animalem vitam, sed ad perfectionem naturae ipsius. Et
quamvis corpus hominis sit ex contrariis compositum,
inerit principium incorruptibile, quod poterii praeservare a corruptions absque violentia, cum sit intrinsecum.l3
It should be clear, then, that St. Thomas affirms that reason demands
the resurrection of the body, but what kind of body?

Will a body composed

of contraries, equipped with sense organs, and the like, be a fitting partner
to the separated soul?
As st. Thomas sees it, the body must be of the same nature after the
resurrection as before, and this for the following reasons:
is united to the body as form to matter.

First, the soul

Now, every form must have its de-

terminate matter, and since the soul will be of the same specific nature,
the body must also be of the same specific nature.

The risen body will,

consequently, be composed of flesh and bones and other such parts •
• • • anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis
autem forma habet determinatam materiam: oportet enim
esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur anima sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur quod habeat earndam materiam secundum speciem. Erat ergo idem corpus
secundum speciem post resurrectionem et ante; at sic
oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et
12Q. Disp. ~~·· q.5, a.lO, c.
l3rbid.
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aliis hujusmodi partibus.14
Since the body is to be the same in the essentials after its reunion
with the soul as it was while united to it while on earth, all its members
will likewise rise.

This st. Thomas explains in the following manner.

The

soul is related to the body not only as for.m and end but also as efficient
cause, for it is related to the body as art is related to the art effect.

Now, whatever is explicitly revealed in the product of the art is wholly and
originally contained in the art itself, and likewise whatever appears in the
parts of the body is originally contained in a certain manner in the soul.
Furthermore, just as the art is not perfected if its exterior expression
lacks something which is contained within the art itself, so neither can man
be perfected unless all that is contained implicitly in the soul is exteriorly manifested in the body, for in the contrary case the body would not be
completely proportionate to the soul.

Therefore since in the resurrection

the body is to be completely proportionate to the soul because it will only
rise according to the relation it has to the rational soul, we must conclude
14cont. ~., IV, 84.
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that a perfect man will rise with all the members which are now in his body.15
To explain this a little more clearly, we may say that st. Thomas considers the members of the body as related to the soul in a two-fold manner,
~ither

according to the relation of matter to its form, or according to the

relation of an instrument to the agent, for one and the same is the proportion of the whole body to the whole soul and of parts to parts.

If, there-

fore, we take the members of the body as under the first relationship, their
end is not their operation, but rather their end is the perfection of the
species, and this use of the members of the body; namely, to complete the
body in its species, will be required even after the resurrection.

If, on

the other hand, we take the members of the body in view of their second relationship in which their end is their operation, even though they will not
all be used after the resurrection to enable the soul to exercise its activities, they will still have a decided utility in showing forth the powers of
the soul.

According to 6t. Thomas, then, we must conclude that although all

15In IV Sent., D.44, a.l, a.2, s.l, c. "• •• anima habet se ad corpus non
s;lum in habitudine formae, et finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae efficientis: est enim comparatio animae ad corpus, sicut est comparatio artis ad artificiatum, • • • Quidquid aute.m explicite in artifioiato ostenditur, hoc totum implicite, et originaliter in ipsa arte continetur: et sunliter etiam quidquid in partibus corporis apparet, totum originaliter, et
quodammodo implicite in anima continetur. Sicut ergo artis corpus non
esset perfectum, si artificiato aliquid deesset eorum quae ars continet;
ita nee homo posset esse perfectus, nisi totum quod in anima implicite
continetur, exterius in corpore explicetur; nee etiam corpus ad plenum proportionaliter responderet animae. Cum ergo oportet in resurrections corpus
hominis esse animae totaliter correspondens, quia non resurgit nisi secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem; oportet etiam hominem perfeo•
tum resurgere; utpote quod ad ultimam perfeotionem oonsequendam reparatur:
oportet quod omnia membra quae nunc sunt in corpore, in resurrections
hominis reparentur."
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the members of the human body will not retain the same functions they parformed while the body was united to the soul on earth, they will be in the
risen body to reveal the potencies of the rational soul and to enable the
body to be a perfect human body •
• • • membra dupliciter possunt considerari in comparatione
ad animrun: vel secundum habi tudinem materiae ad formam,
vel secundum habitudinem instrumenti ad agentem. Eadem est
enim comparatio totius corporis ad totam animam, at partium
ad partes, • • • Si ergo membrum accipiatur secundum primam
comparationem, finis eius non est operatic, sed magis per•
rectum esse speciei; quod atiam post resurrectionem requiretur. Si autem membrum accipiatur secundum secundam comparationem, sic finis eius est operatio, nee taman sequitur
quod quando deficit operatio, frustra sit instrumentum:
quia instrumentum non solum servit ad exequendam operation~ agentis, sed ad ostendendum virtutem ipsius:
unde
oportebit ut virtus potentiarum animae instrumentis corporis demonstretur, etsi numquam in actum prodeant, ut
ex hoc commendetur Dei sapientia.l6
It is likewise necessary that the same body should rise again for yet
another reason.

In the definition of natural things, st. Thomas tells us,

the essence of a species is signified, and in that definition matter finds
its place.

Now, if the matter should vary specifically the species of the

natural thing would have to vary.

I

Since man is a natural thing, if he does

not resume the same specific body, he will not be of the same species and
can be called a man only equivocally •
• • • cum in definitione rerum naturalium, quae significat
essentiam speciei, ponatur materia, necessarium est quod
variata materia secundum speciem, varietur species rei
naturalis. Homo autem res naturalis est. Si igitur post
resurrectionem non habebit corpus consistens ex carnibus
at ossibus, at hujusmodi partibus, sicut nunc habet, non
16rn IV Sent., D.44, q.l, a.2, s.l, ~ 1um.
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erit qui resurgat, ejusdem speciei, sed dicitur homo tantum aequivoce.l7
Thirdly, the human body must be the same because man must rise the
same in number.

In the thought of st. Thomas, man would seem to have been

made in vain if he does not arrive, the same in number, at the end for which
he was fashioned.

He must have the same soul and the same body when he

rises as that which he had while on earth; otherwise, there would not be a
resurrection, properly so called •
• • • necessitas ponendi resurrectionem est ex hoc ut homo
finem ultimum propter quem homo factus est, consequatur;
quod in hac vita fieri non potest, nee in vita animae
separatae, • • • alias vane asset homo constitutus, si ad
finem ad quem factus est, pervenire non posset. Et quia
oportet quod illud idem numero ad finem perveniat quod
propter finem factus est, ne in vanum factum esse videatur, oportet quod idem numero homo resurgat; et hoc quidam sit cum eadem anima eidam numero corpori coniungitur,
• • • alias enim non asset resurrectio propria loquendo,
nisi idem homo repararetur.l8
Again, in refuting those who denied the resurrection, St. Thomas affirms
once more that for any resurrection the same thing that falls must rise again
otherwise there is no resurrection.

This applies especially to the body.

Et praedicti errores haereticorum destrui possunt ex hoc
quod veritati resurrectionis praeiudicant, quam sacra
Scriptura profitetur. Non enim resurrectio dici potest,
nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est
iterata surrectio; eiusdem autem est surgere, et cadere:
unde resurreotio magis respicit corpus quod post mortem
vivit: at ita si non est idem corpus quod anima resumit,
non dicetur resurrectio, sed magis novi corporis assumptio.l9
17cont. Gent., IV, 84.
l8In IV Sen£., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.2, c.
19op. cit., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.l, c.
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Also:
• • • differentia quae est inter animam resurgentis: at
animam in hoc mundo viventis, non est secundum aliquid
essentiale, sed secundum glori~ at miseri~; quae dif•
ferentiam accidentalem faciunt: unde non oportet quod
aliud corpus numero resurgat, sed alio modo sa habens,
ut respondeat proportionabilitar differentia corporum
differentiae animarum.20
Now, in order that man should rise the
parts of man must be the same in number.

s~e

in number, the essential

"• •• ad hoc quod homo idem nu-

mero resurgat, necessarium est quod partes ejus essentiales sint eodem numero.

Si igitur corpus hominis resurgentis non erit ex his ossibus ex quibus

nunc componitur, non erit homo resurgens idem numero."21
Identity of essential principles is necessary that a thing should be the
-,'
s~e

1,
I

in number.

The principles of a human being are matter and form, and,

therefore, the matter that rejoins the human soul must be essentially the
same as that to which it was first united.

St. Thomas again expresses this

as follows:
• • • ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur
identitas principiorum essentialium. Unde quodcumque
principiorum essentialium, etiam in ipso individuo,
varietur, necesse est etiam identitatem variari. Illud autem est essentiale cujuslibet individui quod est
de ratione ipsius; sicut cuilibet rei materiali sunt
essentialia materia et forma: unde si accidentia
varientur at mutentur, remanentibus principiis, essentialibus individui, ipsum individuum remanet idem.
Cum ergo principia essentialia hominis sint anima et
corpus, et haec remaneant, quia resurget eadem anima
at idem corpus; dicendum, quod corpus hominis resurget
idem numero.22
20op. cit., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.l, ad 2um.
2Icont:-G'ent., IV, 84.
-22Q. Quo~XI, q.6, a.6, c. (Marietti, V).
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However, since there has been a substantial corruption, the resurrection
cannot take place through the action of nature, but only by the divine power.
Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur eadem numero secundum operationem naturae, sed
solum secundum speciem• • • Cum igitur corpus humanum
per mortem substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest operationa naturae idem numero reparari. Cum igitur hoc
exigat resurrectionis ratio, • • • consequens est quod
resurrectio hominum non fiat per actionem naturae, • • •
sed resurgentium reparatio sola virtute divina fiet.23
The human body, therefore,

~11

be of the same specific nature.

It can-

not become a spirit, for in order that one thing may be transformed into
another, each must have matter, but a spiritual substance cannot have matter
in it.

"Ponere enim corpus transire in spiritum est omnino impossibile.

enim transeunt invicem, nisi quae in materia communicant.

Non

Spiritua1ium autam

et corporalium non potest esse communicatio in materia, cum substantiae
spirituales sint omnino immateriales, • • • "24

Furthermore, if the human

body were converted into a spiritual substance, it would be transformed
either into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other spiritual
substance.

If into that of the soul, then after the resurrection man would

be nothing but soul, as he is before the resurrection when the soul is in a
state of separation from the body.
feet upon the condition of man.

The resurrection, then, would have no ef-

If, on the other hand, the body were changed

into some other spiritual substance, it would follow that from the union of
two spiritual substances some one thing in nature would result.

That would

be impossible because every spiritual substance is 'per se' subsistent.
23comp. Theol., I, 154.
24cont. ~·· IV, 84.
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• • • si transeat in substantiam spiritualam corpus humanum,
aut transibit in ipsam spiritualem substantiam quae est anima, aut in aliquam aliam. Si in ipsam, tunc post resurrectionem non asset in homine nisi anima; sicut et ante resurreotionem. Non igitur immutaretur conditio hominis per
resurrectionem. Si autem transibit in aliam substantiam
spiritualem, sequetur quod ex duobus aliquid unum in natura;
quod est omnino impossibile, quia quaelibet substantia
spiritualis est per se subsistens.Z5
Nor will the human body become like to air or wind or any such thing,
for man's body, like the body of any animal, must have a determinate figure
both in the whole and in the parts.

How, a body with a determined figure

must be in itself terminable because a figure is something which is comprehended in its term or terms, and air is terminable not in itself, but in
something else.
Similiter etiam impossibile est quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit quasi aereum, et ventis simile. Oportet enim
corpus ho~~nis et cujuslibet animalis habere determinatam
figuram in toto et in partibus. Corpus autem habens determinatam figuram, oportet quod sit in se terminabile,
quia figura est quae termino, vel terminis comprehenditur;
aer autem non est in se terminabilis, sed solum termino
alieno terminatur. Non est ergo possibile quod corpus
hominis resurgentis sit aereum vel ventis simile.26
This is again proved by considering that the body that is to rise must
have the sense of touch because without it the body would not be animal, and,
if not animal, then not the human body.

Now, neither air nor any other sim-

ple body could be susceptible to touch because such a body would not be a
medium of contraries.
• • • corpus hominis resurgentis oportet esse tactivum,
quia sine tactu nullum est animal: oportet autem ut
25Ibid.
26cont. ~·· IV, 84.
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resurgens sit animal, si sit homo. Corpus autem aereum non
potest esse tactivum sicut nee aliquod corpus simplex, quum
oporteat corpus, per quod fit tactus, esse medium inter
qualitates tangibiles, ut sit quodammodo in potentia ad
eas, • • • Impossibile est igitur quod corpus hominis resurgentis sit aereum et simile ventis. 2 7
For the same reason, the risen body cannot be a celestial body since
such a heavenly body could not be an organ of touch as it has no contraries
either in act or in potency.
Ex quo etiam apparet quod non poterit esse corpus coeleste.
Oportet enim corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis esse
susceptivum tangibilium qualitatum ut jam dictum est. Eoc
autem corpori coelesti non poteet convenire, quia non est
neque calidum, neque frigidum, neque humidum neque siccum,
neque aliquid hujusmodi vel actu, vel potentia • • • Corpus
igitur hominis resurgentis non erit corpus coeleste.28
We must, therefore, conclude that the body which the rational soul will
resume after the resurrection will be neither a heavenly body, nor an airy
one, nor that of any other animal, but it will be a human body composed of
flesh and bones and the same members which it had while body and soul were
united in this earthly life.

"Non enim resumet anima in resurrectione cor-

pus coeleste, vel aereum, vel corpus alicujus alterius animalis, • • • sed
corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus compositum organicum eisdem organis,
ex quibus nunc consistit. 11 29
The disposition of risen bodies, however, will not be the same as is
that of bodies still united to their souls before dissolution sets in, for
the corruptibility which weighed upon the soul will no longer be present in
27rbid.
2Brbid.
29comp. Theol., I, 153.
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the risen body, and the rebellion of man's lower nature will no longer drag
his higher nature down.

The reason that this must be is again taken from

the principle that the body is for the soul and the condition of the risen
body must be proportionate to that of the separated soul.
Quia vero corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter
formam, et organum propter artificem, animae vitam praedictam consecutae tale corpus in resurrectione adjungetur
divinitus, quale competat beatitudini animae • • • Quae
enim propter finem sunt disponi oportet secundum exigentiam finis. Animae autem ad summum operationis intellectualis pertingenti non convenit corpus habere, per quod
aliqualiter impediatur, aut retardetur. Corpus autem
humanum ratione suae corruptibilitatis impedit animam et
retardat, • • • Corpora igitur resurgentium beatorum non
erunt corruptibilia, et anima retardantia ut nunc, sed
magis inoorruptibilia, et totaliter obedientia ipsi animae, in nullo ei resistent.30
All risen bodies will, therefore, be incorruptible.
Disponetur igitur corpus communiter omnium secundum condecentiam animae, ut scilicet forma incorruptibilis esse
incorruptibile corpori tribuat, contrariorum compositione
non obstante, eo quod materia corporis humani, divina
virtute, animae humanae quantum ad hoc subjicietur omnino.31
Just what the disposition of the glorified body will be may be ascertained from a consideration that the soul is both the form and the motor of
the human body.

In as much as it is form, it is not only the principle of

the body's substantial being but even of its proper accidents which are
caused in the subject by the union of the matter with its form.

Now, in pro-

portion as the form is stronger, its impression upon its matter is so much
the less impeded by any exterior agent.
30op. cit., I, 167.
3lcont. Gent., IV, 86.

We can see this in fire whose form,
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which is said to be the noblest among the elementary forms, confers this upon
fire that it is not easily changed by any exterior agent from its own natural
disposition.

Likewise, the beatified soul in its supreme nobility and power

bestows something of this nobility and power upon the body reunited to it;
namely, that it should be subtle and spiritual.32
The glorified body will thus be a subtle and a spiritual body, and this
subtlety will derive front the dominion of the glorified soul over its body,
and from its spirituality its subtlety will arise, as St. Thomas confirms
when stating the opinions of others as his own in the following citation:
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod dicta complexio, ex quo corpora

humana subtilia dicentur, erit ex dominic animae glorificatae, quae est forma corporis, super ipsum; ratione cuius
corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui
subiectum. Prima autem subiectio animae subiicitur, est
ad participandum esse specificum, prout subiicitur sibi
ut materiae formae, et deinde subiicitur ei ad alia opera
animae, prout animae est motor; et ideo prima ratio spiritualitatis in corpore est ex subtilitate, et deinde ex
agilitate, et aliis proprietatibus corporis gloriosi: • • • 33
In the resurrection, then, the body will be entirely subject to the sou
First, as we have just seen, by the gift of subtlety, the body will be sub32comp. Theol., I, 168. "Anima enim est corporis forma et motor. Inquantum
autam est forma, non solum est principium corporis quantum ad esse substantials, sed etiam quantum ad propria accidentia, quae causantur in subjecto
ex unione formae ad materiam. Quanta autem forma fuerit fortior, tanto impressio formae in materia minus potest impediri a quocumque exteriori agente, sicut patet in igne, cujus forma quae dicitur esse nobilissima inter
elamentares formas hoc confert igni, ut non de facili transmutetur a sua
naturali dispositione patiendo ab aliquo agente. Quia igitur anima beata
in summa nobilitatis et virtutis erit, utpote rerum primo principia conjuncta, confert corpori sibi divinitus unito, prima quidem esse substantiale nobilissimo modo totaliter ipsum sub se continendo, unde subtile et
spirituale erit."
33In IV Sent., D.44, q.2, a.2, s.l, c.
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ject to the soul in as much as the soul is the form of the body, giving it
specific being.

Secondly, by the gift of agility, the body will be complete-

ly dominated by the soul in all its movements and actions in as much as the
soul is the motor of the human body.

Thus the glorified body will be wholly

subject to the glorified soul, not only in such a way that there will be
found in it nothing that will resist the will of the spirit, for such subjection was found in the body of the first man, but even that there will be
some perfection in the body by an overflow, as it were, from the glorified
soul by which this subjection will be more proportionate to the soul.

That,

at least, seems to be the thought in this passage;
• • • corpus gloriosum erit omnino subiectum animae glorifioatae, non solum ut nihil in eo sit quod resistat voluntati spiritus, quia hoc fuit etiam in corpore Adae, sed
etiam ut sit in eo aliqua perfeotio effluens ab anima
glorifioata in corpus, per quam habile reddatur ad praediotam subiectum: quia quidem perfectio dos glorificati
corporis dicitur. Anima autem coniungitur corpori non
solum ut forma, sed ut motor; et utroque modo oportet
quod corpus gloriosum animae glorificatae sit summa subiectum. Unde sicut per dotem subtilitatis subiicitur ei
totaliter, inquantum est forma corporis, dans esse
specificum; ita per dotem agilitatis subiicitur ei inquantum est motor, ut scilicet sit expeditum, et habile
ad obediendum spiritui in omnibus motibus, et actionibus
animae.34
Impassibility is another quality which will belong to the risen body,
as St. Thomas states:
Corpus humanum, et quidquid in eo est, perfecte erit subiectum animae rationali, sicut etiam ipsa perfecte subiecta erit Deo: et ideo in corpore glorioso non poterit
esse aliqua mutatio contra dispositionem illam qua per34In

l!

Sent., D.44, q.2, a.3, s.l, c •
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ficitur ab anima; et ideo corpora illa erunt impassibilia.35
The cause of this quality of impassibility is again the dominion which
the soul will exercise over the body.

"Causa autem eius dominium animae

super corpus; quod quidem dominium causatur ex hoc quod servitur Deo immobili
ter:

unde in illo qui perfectius fruitur, est maior impassibilitatis causa1
Another prerogative of glorified bodies will be the quality of clarity,

and this will be an overflow from the glory of the soul into the human body •
• • • ideo melius est ut dicatur quod claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, non recipitur per modum influentis, sed
per modum recipientis; et ita claritas quae est in anima ut
spiritualis, recipitur in corpore ut corporalis: et ideo
secundum quod anima erit maioris claritatis secundum maius
meri tum; ita enim differenti.a clari tati s in corpore, ut
patet per Apostolum I Corinth., xv, et ita in corpore
glorioso cognoscitur-gloria animae sicut in vitro cognoscitur color corporis quod continetur in vase vitreo, • • • 3 7
What the glorified soul has, therefore, the glorified body will share,
and as the soul is elevated to the glory of heavenly spirits, the body, too,
will receive the properties of heavenly bodies, such as clarity, impassibility, mobility without difficulty and labor, in a word, it will be entirely
perfected by its form •
• • • sicut anima hominis elevabitur ad gloriam spirituum
coelestium, ut Deum per essentiarrt videat, • • • ita ejus
corpus sublimabitur ad proprietates coelestium corporum,
inquantum erit alarum, impassibile, absque difficultate,
et labore mobile, et perfectissime sua forma perfectum.38
But human bodies will be celestial, not in nature, but in glory, for
35op. cit., D.44, q.2, a.l, s.l, c.
36rn Ivrsent., D.44, q.2, a.l, s.2, c.
3~.-ci~D.44, q.2, a.4, s.l, c.
3 Cont. Gent., IV, 86.
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there are heavenly bodies, and there are earthly bodies, and the glory of the
one is not the glory of the other.

Vfuerefore, just as the glory to which the

human soul is elevated exceeds the natural power of celestial spirits, so,
too, the glory of the risen body exceeds the natural perfection of the celestial bodies, and human bodies

~~11

be clothed with greater brightness,

stronger impassibility, and they will enjoy more perfect agility and dignity
of nature •
• • • et sic propter hoc Apostolus dicit (I Cor.,xv,40)
resurgentium corpora esse coelestia, non quantum ad naturam, sed quantum ad gloriam. Unde cum dixisset quod
sunt corpora coelestia et sunt terrestra corpora, subjunxit, quod alia est coelestium gloria, alia terrestrium. Sicut autem gloria, in quam humana anima sublevatur, excedit naturalem virtutem coelestium spirituum,
• • • ita gloria resurgentium corporum excedit naturalem
perfectionem coelestium corporum, ut sit major claritas,
impassibilitas, firmior agilitas, et dignitas perfectior.39
The human body, consequently, will have its full share in the happiness
of its noble partner, for the perfect beatitude of man consists both in soul
and body, and we may well bring this final chapter to a close on the strong,
true note, struck by the Angelic Doctor when he utters his profound and sati&
fying conviction that while the soul contemplates God and enjoys the eternal
beatitude for which it was formed, the body, too, is there, radiant in the
overflow of the superabundant glory of her noblest of forms, the immortal
soul.
Hominis autem beatitude perfecta consistit in anima et
corpore, • • • in anima quide.m, quantum ad id quod est
ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo:
in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus 'resurget spiri-
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et in virtute et in §loria et in incorruptione,'
ut dicitur l~·· xv, 40.4
tuale~

40sum. Theel., III, q.l5, a.lO, c.
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CONCLUSION
As we have endeavored throughout this essay to gather together at the
end of each chapter the most salient features of the matter treated therein,
a very brief statement should suffice to bring this topic to a close.

In

our study of St. Thomas concerning the place that the body occupies in the
life of the soul, we have essayed to portray the very intimate and necessary
relationship existing between the soul and its body.

We have seen that this

great Scholastic holds that the rational soul really needs the human body to
begin its existence in the full perfection of its nature.
matter, the rational soul, as a form, is incomplete.

Without its proper

Alone it does not con-

stitute human nature, for it is only a part of human nature, and requires the
other part, the body, for the completion in its species.

Without the body,

moreover, human souls would differ specifically because matter, in the
Thomistic system, is the principle of individuation.

Furthermore, if the

rational soul could begin to exist apart from the body, no reasonable cause
could be assigned for its union with the body, and we should be eventually
led by such a supposition to the conclusion that union of body and soul is
unnatural, and man, an unnatural being, a consequence which is manifestly
absurd.
Not only is the body necessary for the perfection of the nature of the
soul, it is

like~~se

necessary, as we have seen, for the

perfec~ion

operations, from the lowest activities to the very highest.
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of its

It is, moreover,

151

because of this need of the body for the perfection of its activities that
the human body is constituted just as it is, for the body exists for the soul
and not the soul for the body.

It was not to ennoble the human body that

God joined the two together, but it was because the soul is a human soul,
not a pure spirit, and as such, receives its full perfection in no other way
than by its union vnth a human body.
A body so essential to the soul in this life is not really a burden to
it, but because of sin, the body vms deprived of those gifts, which by a
supernatural favor, would have made it more perfectly proportionate to its
incorruptible form.

By its conquest over the defects of the body, in so far

as these defects may be overcome, the rational soul now reaches up to its
final beatitude, and when it has attained it, it does not forget the human
body in which it dwelt in its struggle towards its goal.

~fuat

is natural to

the soul once is natural to it always, according to the Angelic Doctor, and
since the soul will live forever, the body will be alvmys a natural complement of the soul, and, therefore, we can say that it is true that the body
must be reunited to it, and this body must be essentially the same as that
to whiCh it was joined while on earth.

In a certain sense, we have seen, the

body is even necessary for happiness of the separated soul, and by an overflow into itself from the glory of its beatified form, it will be rewarded
for its vital share in the life of the pilgrirr, soul.
Far from being an evil, a burden, or an obstacle and prison of that
noble and immortal creature, the rational soul, the human body is a real
good and a source of development in that it is through it that the rational
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soul attains its substantial, accidental, and its final perfection.

Our

reason, as well as our faith in the wisdom and power of the Divine Artist
Creator assures us that so it must be, and we are grateful to the Angelic
Doctor for his establishment of the human body in its rightful place in the
scheme of the universe and his bestowing on it, by rational justification, a
dignity and usefulness, unmatched in any other corporeal being.
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